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Abstract
Initial results are reported from a multi-year, interdisciplinary effort to provide guidance and
assistance for designers of intelligent systems and their user interfaces. The objective is to
achieve more effective human-computer interaction (HCI) for systems with real-time fault
management capabilities (i.e., process monitoring and control during anomalous situations).
Intelligent fault management systems within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) have been evaluated for insight into the design of systems with complex HCI.
Preliminary results include (1) a description of real-time fault management in aerospace
domains, (2) recommendations and examples for improving intelligent system design and user
interface design, (3) identification of issues requiring further research, and (4)
recommendations for a development methodology integrating HCI design into intelligent
system design.
Keywords: human-computer interaction, user interface, intelligent system, design guidance,
development methodology, real-time fault management
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Executive Summary
This report documents the initial results from a multi-year, interdisciplinary effort to provide
guidance and assistance for designers of intelligent systems and their user interfaces. The
objective is to achieve more effective human-computer interaction (HCI) for systems with real-
time fault management capabilities (i.e., process monitoring and control during anomalous
situations). Intelligent fault management systems within NASA have been evaluated for insight
into the design of systems with complex HCI. Fifteen intelligent systems were selected from a
variety of aerospace programs, including Space Shuttle, Space Station, unmanned spacecraft,
and military and advanced aircrafL Information was collected by interviewing intelligent
system developers and users, observing intelligent system demonstrations, and referencing
available intelligent system documentation. A review of pertinent literature was also conducted
in parallel to the case study.
This report represents work in progress. Preliminary results of this study include (1) a
description of real-time fault management in aerospace domains, described in section 3, (2)
recommendations and examples for improving intelligent system design and user interface
design and issues requiring further research, provided in sections 4 and 5, and (3)
recommendations for a development methodology integrating HCI design into intelligent
system design, discussed in section 6. These preliminary results will be amplified and
formalized in the report Making Intelligent Systems Team Players: Design Assistance and
Guidelines to be published in Fiscal Year 1993.
The results of the case study are documented in a two volume report. This document is
Volume 1, which summarizes the recommendations and issues for HCI design guidance and
development methodology. Volume 2 (Matin et al., 1991) provides the detailed analysis of
each application in the ease study.
Real-Time Fault Management with Intelligent Systems
Fault management has traditionally been performed by teams of human operators (i.e., onboard
crew members and ground flight controllers). The introduction of intelligent systems into real-
time flight support has altered this traditional mode of operation. The team now consists of
human and computer agents. Activities are distributed between these agents. This distribution
of activities to software agents and the resulting joint human-computer tasking is a key change
in operations. The availability of multiple agents requires allocation of tasks to specific agents
and introduces the need for dynamic task allocation for situations where an agent's capabilities
to perform a task axe altered in real time (e.g., intelligent system fails and the human must take
over its task). Issues include managing interruptions in time-critical activities and determining
appropriate task assignments. Inappropriate task assignments can adversely affect the
operator, complicating performance of tasks and removing opportunities for on-the-job training
and development of expertise.
Inherent in the availability of multiple agents is the need to coordinate the activities of these
agents, particularly when they are working jointly on a task. These coordination activities are
independent of and in addition to the fault management activities. When multiple team
members are working simultaneously on a fault management task, information from
independent activities must be exchanged and related to system behavior. Such a joint effort
may be described as collaboration between agents of the fault management team. The goal of
such collaboration is to allow the operator to understand the intelligent system's point of view
by sharing information and providing visibility into intelligent system reasoning. Retrospective
explanation (in the form of static rationale and rule trace) is not sufficient for such collaboration
and information sharing.
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Effective control of the intelligent system also requires that the operator understand intelligent
system processing. This includes providing visibility into the intelligent system reasoning and
clearly identifying what levels of automation are available, when they axe used, and how task
are allocated for each level.
Intelligent systems for flight operations support add both enhanced capability and an additional
source of error. The operator is responsible to make the final decisions in fault management
situations and thus must be able to manage and direct the intelligent system, including the
ability to compensate for erroneous behavior. Erroneous behavior can be due to failures of the
intelligent software (e.g., inaccurate knowledge base, inadequate performance) or due to
erroneous or unavailable input information. Typically, errors in the intelligent system result in
shut down of the intelligent system. Error correction is performed off-line, after the
operational support period. The intelligent system can be designed, however, to permit on-line
error compensation by operator intervention into intelligent system processing. Methods for
intervention into the intelligent system reasoning process include (1) altering information used
by the intelligent system, (2) redirecting the reasoning process, (3) restarting the intelligent
system, and (4) selectively overriding portions of the intelligent system processing. For
situations when redirection is ineffectual, the operator can take over all intelligent system task
responsibilities.
To retain the capability to manage the monitored process (i.e., the domain process that the team
is responsible to manage) and make decisions in failure situations, the operator must maintain
an awareness of the overall state and behavior of the monitored process, even when significant
portions of the fault management tasks are conducted by the intelligent system. The operator
must be able to extract the important information from the barrage of alarms that typically
accompany an anomaly and interpret and pdoritize these alarms by severity of impact and time-
criticality. The operator must also have access to diagnostic information critical to
understanding situations affecting the monitored process, including assessment of mission
impacts, evaluation of consequences and alternatives, monitoring and execution of procedures,
and assessment of functional capability remaining after a failure. Since not all fault
management situations can be anticipated, the intelligent system must he designed to support
the o .perator in generating and testing workaround procedures for contingency or unanticipated
situauons.
A common problem in real-time fault management is overloading the operator with large
amounts of dynamic information. The intelligent system should be designed to assist the
operator in interpreting and using information, i.e., managing information. Managing
information overload requires designing the intelligent system and its user interface to assist the
operator in interpretation of information. Information context can he used to present
information in a more meaningful fashion. Qualitative representation of information can be an
effective way to present information consistent with human mental models. Summarization of
information and suppression of irrelevant detail are promising techniques for information
management, but require further investigation.
Case Study Trends
Several trends in user interface design were found based on the cases studied. One issue that
occurred in several systems is a proliferation of windows which can lead to navigation issues
concerned with where to find related data. This is complicated by hidden windows and
complex menus. This trend points to a lack of workspace design (coordinating the set of views
into the monitored process as well as the intelligent system that can be seen together in parallel
or in series) and lack of specification of information requirements (what information should the
observer be able to extract from observing a particular display -- in isolation and in concert with
other displays). With respect to the interface between the human operator and intelligent
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system, diagnostic reasoning was typically displayed as chronologically ordered message lists.
However, this approach fails to capture the temporai nature of events or distinguish between
kinds of messages (e.g., events and actions). The predominant view into the monitored
process was physical topology schematics annotated with active data about the state of the
monitored process (i.e., color coded digital parameter values or component states). However,
there were cases in which this approach did not provide appropriate information for the
operator (e.g., did not highlight events or system change).
The net result of these user interface trends is black-box, inscrutable systems where the user
interface capabilities inadvertendy reinforce barriers between the human operator and the
intelligent system as well as between the operator and the monitored process. The lack of
transparency in inscrutable systems, caused by lack of needed information or confusing
presentation of excessive information, makes it difficult for the operator to visualize the
intelligent system's situation assessment and recommendations in relation to the flow of events
in the monitored process.
Design Guidance - Recommendations, Examples, and Issues
This report contains numerous recommendations and "Before/After" examples to address
identified human-computer interaction design problems and needs. Where further research is
n_, a description of the research issue is provided in the design context. Until research
helps resolve these issues, designers will make design choices based on engineering judgment
and prototyping. Design guidance is provided for both user interface designers and intelligent
system designers. It is presented in three broad areas:
1) Support for coordination and management of intelligent systems
• Multi-tasking and dynamic task assignment
• Collaboration b_tween agents
• Managing intelligent system errors
2) Support for fault management
• Alarm management
• Oitical diagnostic information
• Unanticipated situations and workaround
3) Support for information management and display
• Representation and interpretation of information
• Workspace design
Development Methodology
The development process was initially investigated to identify how to effectively deliver HCI
design guidance. Case study observations of the development process, however, identified a
more fundamental design problem than delivery of guidance. It was observed during the case
study that perceived user interface design problems are often actually intelligent system design
problems (e.g., unavailable information, mis-representation of information). These problems
result from failing to identify the information that needs to be exchanged between human and
computer when performing domain tasks (i.e., information requirements). These information
requirements are defined as a part of HCI analysis and design.
Although HCI design can affect the entire support system, including conventional software
systems, intelligent systems, and the user interfaces to both, it is usually not considered during
system design. At best, the user interface design is influenced by HCI considerations. The
user interface primarily addresses presentation med/a (i.e., presentation of information),
however, and is not concerned with the information message (i.e., information content) that is
also a part of HCI design. Since user interface design is frequently done after system design,
the potential for HCI design to influence system design does not exist. It is necessary to
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modify thedesign process to include definition of the information requirements for both the
support system (both conventional and intelligent software agents) and the user interface.
This process view of system design is often absent during intelligent system design. Designers
tend to focus on specific technology aspects of the design (e.g., what software tools will he
used) and fail to consider the overall system view of the design (e.g., how will the intelligent
system be integrated into the existing support environment). Most types of design guidance
address technology issues instead of process issues. A development methodology is needed
that addresses design process issues.
Development methodology seems to he the most effective means of integrating HCI design into
system design. The methodology should support mapping from a specification of the task into
information requirements for both the intelligent system and the user interface. This task
description should include both domain tasks and tasks required to coordinate human and
computer agents. The methodology should incorporate both information-level and display-
level design guidance as an integral part of design. It should provide mechanisms for
communication and coordination between members of a multi-disciplinary design team. It
should support development of the intelligent system as an integral part of the overall support
system, which may include both intelligent and conventional software.
Research Issues
Much work remains to he done to realize the goal of providing effective HCI design guidance
for intelligent systems. Team architectures must he defined that specify how fault management
tasks are performed, including agent interaction, mode shifts, and dynamic task assignment.
This investigation includes identifying what coordination activities are required for shared
tasking and information requirements for a controllable, directable intelligent system.
Information requirements that support agent communication and collaboration must be
identified. These requirements should provide visibility into intelligent system reasoning and
permit the operator to understand how and why the intelligent system reached a conclusion,
resulting in a shared view of the world between agents. New display designs are needed that
accommodate the new types of information and graphic forms and the new mix of tasks and
information resulting from the use of intelligent systems for real-time fault management.
Finally, an intelligent system development methodology is needed to facilitate use of HCI
design guidance in developing information requirements and in designing intelligent systems
and their user interfaces. This methodology should support the use of prototyping and
storyboards with operational scenarios and task analysis modified to identify agent
coordination activities.
Meanwhile, we hope that this document provides significant assistance to designers of
intelligent systems for real-time fault management. We also hope that it can he used by the
research communities of artificial intelligence, human factors, and software engineering to
identify issues to investigate so that even better assistance can be provided to intelligent system
designers in the future.
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Section 1
Introduction
Flight operations support is characterized by the need to process large quantities of information
in high risk situations under real-time constraints. The demands of the aerospace environment
on humans can be alleviated by enhanced support software. Assistance in the form of
intelligent support software can result in an effective joint cooperative problem-solving
capability. In such a joint effort, the operator (i.e., any onboard crew member or ground flight
controller that interfaces with the intelligent system) and the intelligent system can be
considered as a team. The human is the team leader of the cooperative effort and the intelligent
system assists the human. The computer provides assistance according to a pre-defined set of
capabilities and range of activities.
In 1990, a study was initiated to provide guidance in designing intelligent systems that are
effective team members in flight operations support. This study was conducted as part of a
Research and Technology Operating Plan (RTOP) for the Artificial Intelligence Division of the
Office of Aeronautics, Explorations, and Technology (OAET). This report documents a case
study performed in three parts this year as part of the RTOP to investigate design guidance.
One part was conducted at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) by Jane Malin of the Intelligent
System Branch at JSC and Debra Schreckenghost of the MITRE Corporation. A second part
conducted by David Woods of Ohio State University included intelligent systems at other
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) centers. The third part was performed
by Kenneth Forbus at Northwestern University and addressed qualitative model-based
intelligent systems.
This document represents work in progress. It is intended to assist designers and to highlight
issues for researchers. The results are based on a case study and a review of pertinent
literature. Study to amplify and formalize preliminary recommendations is planned to continue
through 1993, culminating in an updated report on human-computer interaction (HCI) design
guidance tiffed Making Intelligent Systems Team Players: Design Assistance and Guidelines.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this project is to identify and address HCI issues that are critical to intelligent
systems. These issues have been termed "advanced HCI issues" and affect both HCI and
intelligent system design. These issues are not unique to intelligent systems, for they impact
any system involving multiple, intelligent agents (i.e., human or computer entities that exhibit
intelligent behavior in the accomplishment of task goals) working together as a team to
accomplish tasks. Intelligent systems are, however, the most commonly occurring systems
with these characteristics. This study assumes an expert user, a sophisticated intelligent
system, and a complex domain requiring real-time support. The resulting HCI issues are
related to the coordination of team activities, multi-tasking in distributed environments,
dynamic task allocation between agents, and the management of large quantities of information
in real time. For real-time intelligent systems, these advanced HCI issues have turned out to be
the central focus of the HCI problem. But such issues are not addressed by traditional
computer-human interaction and human factors.
There are two thrusts to this investigation: identifying effective forms of HCI design guidance
and integrating this guidance into the intelligent system design process. The source of
observational information for this project was the case study of intelligent systems. This report
documents the results of that case study.
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1.2 Objectives and Scope
The objective of the case study was to identify preliminary guidance in the design of effective
HCI with intelligent fault management systems in aerospace applications. HCI design
represents a mapping from the tasks of the domain into the mechanics of the visual display.
Much of the current work in human factors and experimental psychology focuses on finding
basic tenets for HCI design that are independent of the domain of application (e.g., the way
that humans scan a visual display). This approach strives to avoid consideration of the task-
specific aspects of the problem. Thus most of the existing guidelines are targeted at the display
specification of design (e.g., Smith and Mosier, 1986; JSC, May, 1988) and do not address
the other aspects of HCI design.
An important stage in the design of effective HCI is the identification of agent activities and
information required to perform tasks. Task analysis techniques developed for conventional
software assist in identifying the fault management activities performed by agents of the
system. Systems with multiple, interacting agents, however, exhibit another class of activities
that are not identified by conventional task analysis. These are the activities required to
coordinate tasks shared by the human and computer agents. These coordination activities are
solely for the purpose of effective interaction between agents and are independent of fault
management activities. An important element in accomplishing these activities is access to and
management of information from all elements within system (i.e., the monitored process, the
intelligent support system, and the human operator). Thus, the emphasis of this study is on
assisting designers in identifying and translating fault management tasks into agent activities
(i.e., actions that have been assigned to specific agents) and information requirements (i.e., the
information exchanged between the operator and the intelligent system). This specification of
agent activities and information requirements will affect the design of both the intelligent
system and its HCI.
The results of the case study should be of interest to intelligent system designers and to
researchers in the areas of HCI and human factors, artificial intelligence, and software
engineering. This document identifies preliminary design recommendations and issues
(sections 4 and 5) and discusses the design process (section 6) for intelligent system and HCI
design. These results are provided to address the current need for HCI guidance in the
development of intelligent system without waiting for more formal guidelines to be available.
This document should be used with an awareness that results are preliminary and will be
superceded by later documents.
1.3 Approach
A case study of intelligent systems within NASA was performed to identify preliminary design
guidance. A number of constraints were used to assist in selecting cases. The investigauon
has been limited to fault management systems within aerospace domains. For this study, a
fault management system is a software support system that assists a flight controller in
monitoring real-time fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR). The study was also
constrained to human-centered applications, where responsibility for the control of both the
monitored process and the intelligent support system lies with the operator. Thus the
computer becomes a technical assistant to the operator. This assumption affects the roles that
both the human and computer can fulfill.
Information about the applications selected for this case study was acquired by interviewing the
developers and users of NASA fault management intelligent systems. These interviews were
supplemented by relevant documentation and demonstrauons of these applications. The
information collected included a domain description, intelligent system functionality, and
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Jsupporting HCI capabilities. The design techniques and methodologies used were also
documented in an attempt to characterize the design process. Information collected during the
case study has been supplemented by extensive literature search and relevant conference reports
in the areas of intelligent fault management and human-computer interaction.
Information collected during the case study has been used to identify candidate guidelines,
interesting examples, key design issues, promising research areas, effective design
methodologies, and characteristics of the design process. The aerospace domain has been
evaluated to identify the design constraints and requirements imposed by this environment on
the intelligent support system. Fault management activities have been characterized and the
information requirements to perform these activities in conjunction with an intelligent system
have been discussed. These requirements affect the design of both the intelligent system and
its HCI. Guidance in identifying agent activities and information requirements has been
provided in the form of recommendations and issues. Examples illustrating recommendations
are also provided. These examples reference a hypothetical intelligent system developed for a
space-based Remote Manipulator System (RMS). They are based on observations made
during the case study and illustrate HCI design before and after use of the recommendation.
As the first step in integrating HCI design guidance into the overall intelligent system design
process, the design process used to develop intelligent systems in the case study has been
characterized and a preliminary format for delivery of guidance has been developed.
The authors also had the opportunity to participate in the design of the HCI for the Space
Shuttle Payload Deployment and Retrieval System (PDRS) Decision Support System (DESSY)
prototype. HCI design concepts were provided in the form of a paper storyboard. These
concepts were structured to emphasize information requirements for PDRS flight support using
this intelligent system. This in-depth investigation allowed first hand observation and
participation in the design process, permitted testing of techniques for specifying a display, and
provided a series of examples that have been incorporated into this reptm.
1.4 Background on Human-Intelligent System Cooperation
While many of the initial expert systems developed were called consultant systems, these
intelligent systems possessed minimum capabilities for sup.porting cooperative interaction with
human practitioners. The interaction was based on a quesuon and answer dialogue; there were
minimal capabilities for explanations of machine solutions; the human domain practitioner had
few if any means available to inspect the intelligent system's reasoning or control the system as
a resource in his or her own problem solving process.
However, it was quickly realized, especially for applications involving supervisory control of
dynamic processes, that a more meaningful interaction between human and intelligent machine
was required. As a result of this, as well as trends in the spread of interface technology,
intelligent systems have been developed that go beyond a question and answer dialogu, e. These
new systems incorporate graphic displays, windowed workstations, and more extensive
explanation capabilities, ostensibly to support better interaction.
The need to integrate human and machine problem solvers into an effective cooperative system
-- to make artificial intelligence (AI) systems team players -- has been recognized, especially for
dynamic fault management applications. To do this _:luires serious consideration of the
coupling between human and intelligent system, as well as the requisite interface capabilities,
as an integral part of the design of intelligent systems.
One can think about the problem of human interaction with intelligent systems at two levels.
At a concrete level, human interaction can be thought of in terms of the computer interface
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between the human operator and the intelligent system -- the graphic displays available, the
window structure, the dialog mechanisms that support moving around in the interface or that
support communication with the intelligent system. But at a deeper level, design of the
interaction between practitioner and the intelligent system requires an explicit definition of the
roles of each, as well as consideration of an appropriate cooperative problem solving approach
for a particular application. This section explores some of the issues in cooperative problem
solving (of., also, Woods, 1986; Woods, Roth and Bennett, 1990; Robertson, Zachary and
Black, 1990 or the bibliography in Woods, Johannesen and Potter, 1990).
1.4.1 Question and Answer Dialogs
In the beginning, intelligent systems interacted with domain practitioners via question and
answer dialogs. The human team member went out and gathered data for the expert system
because the expert system was not connected to a database about the state of the device or the
monitored process. Similarly, the intelligent system possessed no effector mechanisms and so
relied on the domain practitioner to carry out its conclusions about the nature of the fault and
how to correct it. However, it was recognized that these systems were not capable of solving
all possible problems that might occur, therefore they were called "computer consultants"
implying that the human could and should overrule the machine expert whenever he or she
determined that it was in error.
Woods has called this style of human-intelligent system interaction the machine-as-prosthesis
paradigm (Woods, 1986). In this paradigm, the human's role is to serve as the eyes and hands
of the machine. Roth Bennett and Woods (1987) conducted a study of the interaction between
technicians and an intelligent system designed in the machine-as-prosthesis paradigm for a
troubleshooting application. They found that, even in static troubleshooting situations where
there are not any of the dynamism, sating requirements, and mission impact requirements that
occur in aerospace contexts, effective performance required the human to play an active role as
a full partner or as a supervisor especially in more complicated situations. The machine-as-
prosthesis intelligent system failed to provide any interface mechanisms that supported the
technicians as partners in the problem solving process; in other words, the AI system failed to
be a team player.
The intelligent system in this study used a question and answer dialog as the only means of
communication between the human and the intelligent system. The results showed that this
form of interaction resulted in a wall between the human and intelligent system (shown in
figure 1-1). The active, successful technicians tried to break through this wall to discover the
expert system's reasoning process and to manipulate the machine as a resource to help them
solve their problem (the human was the problem holder). Thus, the design task in making AI
systems team players can be thought of as breaking down that barrier to collaboration or
enhancing collaboration by creating effective windows to see through the wall.
The realization that more effective support for collaboration was needed drove people working
on the AI research agenda to formulate the problem as -- the machine expert needs to be more
intelligent, in the sense that the intelligent system needs to be a better conversationalist. Hence,
a relatively large amount of the effort on human-intelligent system cooperation from an AI point
of view has been directed at enhancing the machine s natural language capability and enhancing
the machine's ability to talk about its own reasoning (cf., the structured bibliography of work
on human-intelligent system interaction, Woods, Johannesen, and Potter, 1990).
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Human Intelligentsystem
Whatareyouthinking?
Whydoyouwantthat?
Oh
Whydoyouthinkit's"x'?
Whatabout'z'
Butthatdoesnlfixitl
Tryingtoruleout...
Givemedata
Thepresenceof"w' will
eliminate'v' fromconsideration
Themostlikelysuspectis"x'
Ifsymptoms"y',
then"X"
Duh?
0 !_1W_k. I_m_. kJmmmm. _y
Figure 1-1. Quesdon and Answer HCI: Interaction Across Barrier to Human Practitioner and
InteUigent System Cooperation
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It is clear that conversational style interactions as the primary form of communication between
the human and intelligent system is inadequate for dynamic fault management applications.
One characteristic of these types of situations is that communication demands, information
processing demands, decision demands all tend to go up as the severity of challenges to
process integrity go up. The communication bandwidth of a conversational dialogue is too low
to support timely and effective exchange of information between cooperating agents under
these circumstances (cf. e.g., the results on clumsy automation -- Wiener, 1989; Cook et al.,
1990).
1.4.2 Decorating Intelligent Systems with Graphics and Windows
However, aerospace and many other applications are dynamic real time systems where
databases about the state of the monitored process are available. All of the intelligent system
cases examined in this project recognized that question and answer style dialogs are inadequate
to support the communication requirements between operator and intelligent system for real
time systems. And every one of the NASA systems examined included color graphic, multiple
window interface capabilities to hopefully expand the communication bandwidth. The question
is how to use these technologies to establish collaboration and communication between the
human practitioner and the intelligent system.
For aerospace applications, it is necessary to expand on the model in figure 1-1 because the
goal of the human operator and the intelligent system is to control/manage an engineered
system -- what we will call the monitored process. Figure 1-2 shows a wall between the
human and the monitored process. This territory can be addressed in terms of human-
computer interaction without any role for intelligent advisory systems. However, the portion
of the human-computer interface that is most relevant is concerned with what Woods (1991)
calls design for information extraction in HCI -- in other words, how does the computer
interface help the human operator understand what is going on in the monitored process.
The introduction of AI systems added a new player to the picture (at least in the typical fashion,
although see Appendix C for discussion of cognitive tools). This creates new coordination
tasks as the human has to understand what his partner, the intelligent system, is thinking or
doing (see figures 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4). But it is important to keep in mind that the ultimate
purpose of the human operator in fault management (and the intelligent system) is to track what
is going on in the monitored process, recognizing and correcting anomalies.
Figure 1-2 shows a situation where an event, a change, has occurred in the monitored process.
The window available to the human operator (the representation of the monitored process; cf.,
Woods, 1991) is a kind of display which was typical of the systems examined in the case study
research -- a schematic of the physical topography of some part of the monitored process where
the active state is represented by digital values. The user's cognitive task is recognizing if a
significant event occurred. The representation of the monitored process affects the ability of
the operator to do this.
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In this case the human operator is trying to recognize and track significant changes in the
monitored process.
Figure 1-2. Expanded View of Communication Barriers for Dynamic Fault Management
Applications
1-7
a ,. # ;_,, .._
___N -
I ToIS:
"Whatdoyouthink
isgoingon?"
O I_l WoodJ. Pmlr. J.ollamL itk)llo,,vmy
In thiscasethehuman operatoristryingtocollaboratewith theinmlligcntsystem insituation
asscssrncnL
Figure I-3. Interaction Across Barrier Between Human Practitioner and Intelligent System for
Dynamic Fault Management
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Figure 1-4. Interaction Across Barriers Where Human Operator Tries to Understand What is
Going on in MonitorraJ Process in Relation to Intelligent System's Assessment and Actions
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Figure 1-3 illustrates the collaboration between the human and intelligent system for this
hypothetical scenario. The collaboration is influenced by the kinds of representational
windows available to assess the intelligent system's view of the situation. Typically in the
systems examined in the case study, there is some kind of message list or menu of options for
the kinds of messages or other displays that can be called up. The human must interpret these
displays, decide on where additional information may be available within the computer
workspace, remember how to get there, examine and integrate the data in order to understand
the intelligent system's situation assessment, what faults are present, what corrective actions
might need to be taken, what sating actions need to be taken as well as trying to understand
how the state of the monitored process is changing (see figure 1-4). Again, the representation
of the intelligent system available to the operator affects his or her ability to collaborate with the
intelligent system.
The example explored in figures I-2 through I-4 shows how designers can inadvertently
reinforce barriers that make it difficult to see what the intelligent system is thinking about or
what the intelligent system thinks is going on in the monitored process or to see the flow of
events in the monitored process. This brings us to one of the major themes that re-occurs
throughout the examples, problems, principles and techniques described in this report --
visualization. A very simple criteria to use when evaluating a system is to ask, can I see what
is going on? Can someone like the user see what is going on?
This report explores some of the ways that designers inadvertently reinforce barriers resulting
in inscrutable systems and identifies some design techniques that break down these barriers
enhancing the human operator's ability to visualize the monitored process and the intelligent
system.
1.5 Organization of Document
This report is the first volume of a two volume Set documenting the results of the case study.
This volume (Volume 1. Human-Computer Interaction Design) presents preliminary HCI
design guidance for intelligent system developers. Volume 2. Fault Management System
Cases (Matin et al., 1991) contains the interview reports describing each application in the case
study.
Section 1 of Volume 1 identifies the problems associated with the design of intelligent fault
management systems and describes the resulting objectives of the case study. Section 2
presents an evaluation of the methodology used in the case study. Section 3 describes fault
management tasks in aerospace domains and summarizes the information and agent activities
required to perform these tasks. Section 4 presents the preliminary recommendations and
design issues identified by the case study. Section 5 discusses designing for visualization of
the monitored process and intelligent system activity. Section 6 summarizes recommendations
and issues related to the design process observed during the case study. Section 7 summarizes
the conclusions of the case study. Four appendices are also provided. Appendix A lists the
points of contact made during the case study. Appendix B discusses the cognitive aspects of
managing disturbances and introduces a model for disturbance management Appendix C
presents the styles of collaborative interaction between human and intelligent software agents.
Appendix D summarizes the information required to perform real-time fault management.
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Section 2
Survey of Intelligent Fault Management Systems
2.1 Approach to the Case Study
A casestudywasinitiatedasameans of collecting information that would assist in the design
of human-computer interaction with intelligent systems. The objectives of this case study were
to:
Describe real-time monitoring and fault management in aerospace operations using
intelligent system
Provide preliminary HCI design guidance in the form of recommendations and examples
for designers
• Identify HCI design issues for further investigation
Evaluate the observed design processes for ideas concerning effective delivery of
guidance.
The remainder of this section describes the approach used to conduct the case study.
Selection of Cases
The applications selected for this case study were chosen as representative of typical NASA
intelligent system design efforts for monitoring and fault management tasks. Prototypes for
both Space Shuttle and Space Station were selected. Other applications were selected that
support unmanned spacecraft at Jet Propulsion Lab, the X-29 aircraft at Dryden Flight
Research Facility, and military aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 at Edwards Air Force Base.
The aircraft applications were chosen because they use the Real Time Data System (RTDS), a
hardware and software environment from JSC that provides data acquisition software and
intelligent system prototyping tools. See section 2.2 for a description of each application in the
case study.
A challenging issue in the selection of cases was determining what waits distinguish an
intelligent system from more conventional software. The goal was to select applications that
have addressed the advanced HCI issues commonly encountered with intelligent system
technology (see section 1.4 for a discussion of these issues). A number of criteria were
applied, including the use of an heuristic or model-based design approach and the application
of advanced methodologies and concepts.
Methods for Collecting Information about Cases
The report is based on a review of existing research on human-intelligent computer cooperation
(Woods, Roth and Bennett, 1990; Woods, Johannesen and Potter, 1990) and on the results of
a case study of NASA intelligent fault management systems. The case study examined human
interaction styles, human-computer interface capabilities, and the design process used in
ongoing NASA projects to develop intelligent fault management systems.
The primary method for collecting information about these applications was interview of the
system designer or user. All individuals that were interviewed were very cooperative and
information was frequently volunteered. In many cases, these interviews were accompanied
by a detailed demonstration of the application. Where possible, available documentation (e.g.,
briefings, requirements documents, papers, etc.) was used to supplement the information
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gained in the interview. Phone calls and additional visits were used to clarify uncertain
observations and correct inaccuracies. In one case, the Space Station Module/Power
Management and Distribution (SSM/PMAD), a second visit included review of updates
suggested on the fh'st visit that had been incorporated into the application, allowing "before and
after" evaluation. The final interview reports were reviewed by the individuals that had
provided the information to ensure that the application was accurately described. See appendix
A for a list of contacts made during the interviews.
For one case -- the Space Shuttle Payload Deployment and Retrieval System (PDRS) Decision
Support System -- the authors had the opportumty to participate in the design of the HCI for
the intelligent system. For this system, an intelligent prototype existed that had no user
interface design. The system developers were flight controllers from the PDRS flight support
group. The authors provided HCI consultancy and design concepts to .the flight controllers.
Information about the system was collected by (1) studying, crew.and flight controuer training
manuals and related fault management documentation, (2) mtervlewmg me prototype
developer, (3) close review of the prototype, including source code, (4) working meetings with
PDRS flight controllers involved in this prototype. The background of one of the authors
(Debra Schreckenghost) as a Space Shuttle flight controller was also of material use in this
effort. Based on this information, a storyboard of HCI design concepts was developed for the
PDRS Decision Support System (Schreckenghost, 1990) using the MacDraw ® graphics
software. Where possible, examples and suggestions from the case study were incorporated.
This storyboard was presented to flight controllers, review comments were elicited, and
upgrades were suggested. The storyboard was later implemented by the HCI Lab (Space and
Life Sciences Directorate/SP34 at JSC) as an interactive display using the prototyping software
tool Prototyper on a Macintosh® and used for demonstration. This effort is part of the on-
going collaboration between the developers of the PDRS Decision Support System (DF44)
within the Mission Operations Directorate and HCI designers within the Intelligent Systems
Branch (ER2) of the Engineering Directorate at JSC.
Analysis of Case Study Information
The information collected during the case study was evaluated to accomplish the objectives of
the case study. The first objective was to describe fault.mana.ge .r_. nt .operations using _n
intelligent system in aerospace operations. To accomplish this objecuve, a sequence o
activities were performed. The resources available to the fault management team were
identified, including characterizations of aerospace operations, agents and teams, and
information. Types of agent activities and interaction between agents during fault management
were described. Fault management activities of both the human and the intelligent computer
system in aerospace environments were characterized and a typical fault management
operational scenario was outlined. Based on this activity description, the information required
for fault management with intelligent systems was discussed. The results of this analysis are
provided in section 3.
The next two objectives were to specify preliminary recommendations and issues concerning
the design of HCI for intelligent systems. These recommendations and issues were derived by
analyzing the case study observauons (1) to characterize the types of activities, information,
and intelligent agent interaction required for fault management with intelligent systems, and (2)
to identify effective methods of information management and display. Good designs from the
case study were incorporated into the examples illustrating these recommendations and issues.
® - MacDraw is a trademark of Apple Computer, Inc.
® - Macintosh is a trademark of Apple Computer, Inc.
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Design problems and useful design techniques were also identified. The results of this
evaluation are summarized in sections 4 and 5.
The fourth objective was the evaluation of the observed design processes for ideas concerning
effective delivery of guidance. Again, case study observations were evaluated to identify
effective HCI design strategies. A number of issues related to integration of HCI design
guidance into the design process were identified for future investigation. The results of this
evaluation are presented in section 6.
Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) provides the detailed analysis of each application in the case
study.
2.2 Intelligent Systems in the Case Study
The following applications were evaluated in the case study:
Real-Time Data Systems (RTDS) Applications
Johnson Space Center
Space Shuttle Guidance, Navigation & Control (GNC) Intelligent Systems
Monitor for orbiter sensors and Reaction Control System (RCS) jets and to
detect Loss of Control of vehicle during ascent
Space Shuttle Instrumentation and Communications Officer (INCO) Expert System
Project (IESP)
Monitor of command and telemetry paths
Space Shuttle KU Band Self Test Expert System
Monitor of checkout procedures for KU band radar
Space Shuttle DATA COMM Expert System
Monitor telemetry recording by the onboard flight recorders and downlist of
telemetry from these recorders
Space Shuttle Payload Deployment and Retrieval System (PDRS) Decision Support
System (DESSY)
Monitor of the subsystems for operation of the Space Shuttle Remote
Manipulator System (RMS)
X-29 Remotely Augmented Vehicle Expert System (RAVES)
Ames Research Center's (ARC) Dryden Flight Research Facility
Assist real-time, ground-based trajectory control of X-29 aircraft
Military Aircraft Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) Real-Time Interactive Monitoring
System (RTIMES)
Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB)
Monitor of thrust nozzle control during Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) of
aircraft
Space Shuttle Onboard Navigation (ONAV) Expert System
Johnson Space Center
Monitor navigation state and sensors during entry
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SpaceShuttleRendezvousExpertSystem(REX)
JohnsonSpaceCenter
Monitor procedure execution during Space Shuttle rendezvous and proximity
operations
Space Station Operations Management System (OMS) Prototypes
Johnson Space Center
Monitor for fault diagnosis, recovery planning, and execution of procedures for
OMS
Space Station Module/Power Management and Distribution (SSM/PMAD)
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
Plan, schedule and manage secondary power distribution of Space Station's power
rcsources
Space Station Human Interface to Thermal Expert System (HrFEX)
Joint project of Ames Research Center and Johnson Space Center
Provides user interface to the Thermal EXpert SYStem (TEXSYS) and displays
information about thermal bus system
Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP)
Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL)
Monitor health and status of multi-mission, unmanned spacecraft and ground data
systems operations
Space Shuttle Knowledge-Based Autonomous Test Engineer (KATE)
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
Diagnoses anomalies and controls the Environmental Control System (ECS)
application
Space Shuttle Intelligent Launch Decision Support System (ILDSS)
John F. Kennedy Space Center
Assists NASA Test Dir_or (NTD) in visualizing and managing time relationships
prior to launch of spacecraft
Observations from each case based on interviews and demonstrations arc documented in
volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991). Hardeopies of the displays from each case are also provided for
many cases.
It should be noted that most of the systems investigated were under development at the time of
the case study reports. As the systems continue development, the case study reports will no
longer accurately represent the system. These reports are not intended as critiques or
summaries of the systems, but rather as snapshots in the development of each system, which
we then used to to illustrate trends and issues in the design of human-intelligent system
interaction.
2.3 Evaluation of the Case Study Process
The case study was an effective method for identifying preliminary guidance. Many useful
ideas and examples were observed and important issues identified. However, it was the
combination of the case study with the participation in an HCI design effort that was most
productive. The experience gained by actually participating in a design effort greatly enhanced
the utility of the case study. First-hand observation of the design process was possible. The
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development of the storyboard of HCI design concepts provided an opportunity to exercise
much of the preliminary guidance collected during the case study and to test ideas for the
delivery of guidance. This effort contributed materially to the generation of guidance and was
vital in evaluating the use of guidance in the design process.
The case study provided a good source of "raw" observations about interfacing to intelligent
system. The design concepts effort provided a testbed for retrming these observations into
useful recommendations and meaningful issues and for testing delivery techniques. This
"testbed" involvement in the PDRS DESSY design process gave first hand experience of how
HCI affects design of both the intelligent system and its user interface. This experience
assisted in defining difficulties with the current intelligent system design process (i.e., the HCI
design problem) and in identifying what can be done to improve this process and the designs
generated by this process. The "before" and "after" examples used in section 4 to illustrate
recommendations for improving intelligent system design are based on the experience gained
during the PDRS design effort.
Another means of testing design guidance using actual applications is the presentation and
consultancy sessions planned between intelligent system developers within NASA and the
conductors of the case study.
It is recommended that future use of the case study approach be combined with some "hands-
on" testing of design concepts and recommendations, because these forms of guidance are
preliminary and require such testing to refine them. For example, the investigation of issues
identified by this study could combine a survey of relevant research ideas with evaluation of
these ideas in a specific domain using operational scenarios.
2-5

Section 3
Fault Management Operations with Intelligent Systems
Fault management has traditionally been performed by teams of human operators. The
introduction of intelligent systems into real-time flight support has altered this traditional mode
of operation. The team now consists of human and computer agents. Activities are distributed
between these agents. This distribution of activities to software agents and the resulting joint
human-computer tasking represents a key change in operations. The availability of multiple
agents requires allocation of tasks to specific agents and introduces the need for dynamic task
allocation in situations where an agent's capabilities to perform a task are altered in real time
(e.g., intelligent system fails and the human must take over its task). Also inherent in the
availability of multiple agents is the need to coordinate the activities of these agents, particularly
when they are working jointly on a task. These coordination activities are independent of and
in addition to the fault management activities. Finally, intelligent systems represent a new
source of fault management information. The use of an intelligent system increases need for
innovative information management approaches to handle the already large amounts of
information used for fault management. An understanding is needed of how the operator and
the intelligent system must interact to manage the monitored process and coordinate shared
activities.
This section provides a description of fault management operations for aerospace domains.
This description is provided to orient the reader about typical fault management operations, to
describe how the use of intelligent systems affects those operations, and to assist in identifying
agent activities and information requirements for use in designing fault management intelligent
systems. This description of fault management operations (including terminology) and the
resulting specification of information and agent activities is based primarily on observations of
Space Shuttle operations, discussions with Space Shuttle flight controllers (see RTDS points of
contact in appendix A, especially Don Culp, Kristen Farry, and Joe Watters), and Space
Shuttle flight operations support documentation (e.g, JSC, January 1989; JSC, October 1983;
Farry, 1987). The emphasis on Space Shuttle is a result of the greater availability of
information for an operational program such as Space Shuttle than for a program in design
such as Space Station. This description is generally representative of ground operations for
most space programs. The reader is forewarned, however, that it may not fully represent all
aspects of flight control and is superceded by official flight support documents. Where
possible, aspects unique to a specific vehicle are identified.
3.1 Fault Management Task Description
A task description is a delineation of the task goals and the actions required to achieve those
goals. Fault management is the process of detecting anomalous situations and behavior,
determining the causes of anomalies, and repairing anomalies for a monitored process, while
maintaining safety and the ability to perform planned operations. Thus, a fault management
task description will specify the goals and actions required to detect, isolate, and recover from
faults in the monitored process while maintaining safety and operational capability.
A few definitions are required to understand the fault management task. Anomalies are
irregular system behavior or conditions that can be caused by a variety of influences, including
faults, environmental factors, operator error, etc. A fault is the cause of failure in a system,
subsystem, component, or part. A failure is the inability of a system, subsystem, component,
or part to perform its required function within the specified conditions, (i.e., lost capability)
(JSC, January, 1989). For example, one anomaly of a Display and Control panel is that a light
did not glow when expected. The resulting failure is the inability of that panel light to glow
and the fault is a burned out light bulb. A mission corresponds to a set of tasks associated with
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a payload or other specific objective. For Space Shuttle, a mission is usually delineated by the
period on orbit. For Space Station, a mission will be delineated by the period assigned to
specific mission tasks.
The fast order of business in fault management is to determine if nominal, planned operations
can be continued under the anomalous circumstances. If not, immediate action must be taken
to minimize the impact of anomalies to safety and mission objectives. If possible, lost
capability will be recovered. If recovery is not possible, mission objectives must be evaluated
in light of the capability that remains.
Fault management tasks may vary between different vehicles. For Space Shuttle, the
maximum contiguous time in space is less than two weeks. For Space Station, this time span
jumps to 30 years. Thus the fault management task for Space Station must include
considerable emphasis on recovering lost capability in space instead of just living with reduced
capability until repairs can be effected post-mission on the ground.
Real-time fault management of dynamic processes differs from the more traditional forms of
troubleshooting failures. Real-time fault management must be performed on-line. Often
failures produce multiple, cascading disturbances (i.e., abnormal conditions) over time.
Woods has characterized this type of fault management as disturbance management..
Appendix B discusses the cognitive aspects of disturbance management and introduces a model
for disturbance management that includes cascading disturbances over time.
The fault management task can be partitioned into three primary goals:
Monitoring and Fault Detection
Evaluation of the status, state, and configuration of the monitored processes and
associated peripheral systems (e.g., sensors, source providing power to monitored
process, etc.)
Safmg, Mission Impact Assessment, and Reconfiguration
Determination of functionality loss due to a fault, leading to sating procedures, mission
impact assessment, and re.configuration
Fault Isolation, Testing, and Recovery
Isolation (i.e., identification) of faults through testing, and recovery of lost capability
The fault management actions associated with these goals are described in detail in the
following section.
Monitoring and Fault Detection
Under nominal circumstances, the state, status, and configuration of the primary monitored
process are assessed continuously. This includes maintaining awareness of the status and
configuration of peripheral systems that could impact the primary monitored system (e.g.,
sensors, systems providing required resources). Nominal, on-going operations involving the
primary system are monitored to ensure that mission objectives are accomplished.
When off-nominal events occur, alarm conditions and fault indicators from the primary
monitored system or peripheral systems arc detected. A variety of procedures planned to
respond to off-nominal events may be executed as a part of the fault management task. The
execution of planned, off-nominal procedures is monitored to determine if the procedures are
executed properly and to ascertain the effects of the procedure. Off-nominal procedures
include safmg and reconfiguration to minimize the impact of a fault on crew safety and mission
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objective, testing to reduce fault ambiguity (i.e., isolate the fault), and malfunction correction to
repair the fault. Monitoring of state, status, and configuration continues throughout the fault
management process to detect additional changes in behavior.
Sating, Mission Impact, and Reconfiguration
Sating, mission impact assessment, and re.configuration arc actions that occur when an event
with potentially negative impact occurs (i.e., an alarm condition is detected or an unschedulexl
procedure is requested). Safmg is the process of identifying safety impacts resulting from an
event and taking appropriate action to put the crew and vehicle in a safe configuration. Sating
can occur automatically (e.g., fuse blows at power glitch) or can require executing saf'mg
procedures. The need for sating should be evaluated whenever an alarm condition occurs.
Mission impact is the process of determining how an event affects the capability to accomplish
mission objectives, both on-going and scheduled operations. Reconfiguration is the process of
altering the configuration of the affected system to minimize safety and mission impacts.
Reconfiguration is considered a temporary change in configuration and represents a transient
state of the system under supervision.
When an alarm condition indicates anomalous behavior in the monitored process, the f'trst
response is to minimize impacts to crew and vehicle safety. If the situation poses an immediate
safety threat, indicated by violation of baseline safety criteria (e.g., sudden, large drop in cabin
pressure), sating procedures will automatically initiate.
Next, lost functionality and remaining capability must be identified. The anomalous behavior
is translated into a functional loss in the primary monitored process or related peripheral
systems. Once functional loss has been determined, the criticality of that loss must be
assessed. Criticality is the importance of a capability in achieving safe operations while
satisfying mission goals. Both near-term and potential, long-term safety implications must be
determined. Typically, NASA defines three levels of criticality (i.e., (1) loss of life or vehicle,
(2) loss of mission, (3) everything else; see section 3.4). Criticality is mitigated by the
availability of redundant capability. Redundancy is the availability of equivalent, independent
capability. Should crew or vehicle safety be endangered by the functional loss, procedures to
minimize the risk to crew and vehicle will be initiated. Safety impact must also be assessed
when an unscheduled procedure is requested.
Once the crew and vehicle safety has been ensured, the impact of the anomalous behavior on
both on-going and scheduled operations is determined. Notice that the execution of safmg
procedures may in themselves represent a mission impact. These mission impacts are
determined by evaluating the ability to complete mission objectives with the remaining
capability while satisfying the mandatory flight conditions described in the flight rules (i.e.,
document defining nominal and off-nominal conditions and behavior and specifying the
constraints of the monitored processes). Mission impacts are then minimized by
reconfiguration of the monitored or peripheral systems (e.g., switching to redundant capability)
or by altering the scheduled activities (e.g., delay or eliminate activities). There may be
multiple options available to minimize impacts. The best option is selected by considering (1)
the cttrrent configuration of the monitored and peripheral systems (including remaining
redundant capability), (2) on-going operations, (3) the criticality of any suspected faults
(functional or hardware) in current configuration, (4) an assessment of whether the lost
capability can be re-gained, and (5) the potential for suspected faults to propagate into other
systems.
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Fault Isolation, Testing, and Recovery
Once crew and vehicle safety has been ensured and necessary reconfigurations have been
determined, the process of identifying and correcting the fault is initiated. Identifying the fault
is usually an iterative process, consisting of diagnosis to isolate a minimum set of suspected
faults and testing to distinguish between faults within that set.
The fn'st step in diagnosis is the identification of a set of suspected faults that could cause the
anomalous behavior and resulting functional loss. Next, these suspected faults are compared
to faults already diagnosed, to determine ff a known fault could cause the current situation.
Finally, since this process occurs over time and conditions may change in the interim, all faults
that are not consistent with the current conditions are eliminated from the set of suspected
faults.
The fault symptoms and the set of suspected faults are used to identify tests that could reduce
the remaining ambiguity between faults (both hardware and functional). The identified test
procedures are evaluated for their impact to safety and mission goals. If this impact is deemed
acceptable, the test procedures are scheduled for execution. An important factor in determining
the acceptability of these test procedures is the criticality of the functional loss (i.e., just how
important is it that the lost functionality by recovered). If the impact to recover lost capability is
not acceptable, mission goals must be revisited in light of the remaining capability. An altered
schedule is then created to reflect these new goals.
When the time to perform scheduled test procedures arrives, the fault management team
ensures that the affected system has been properly configured for testing. The results of these
tests are monitored and compared to expected behavior. Execution of a test procedure alters
current conditions to provide additional information about the fault. This information is then
used for further diagnosis. Once testing is complete, affected systems are returned to their
configuration prior to the test.
If is is possible to isolate the fault (i.e., resolve all fault ambiguity) and the fault can be
repaired, the recovery process is initiated. Malfunction correction procedures are identified and
evaluated for safety and mission impact. These procedures may be executed immediately or
scheduled for later execution. If it is not possible to isolate the fault, mission objectives must
be altered to reflect reduced capability.
When execution of recovery procedures is imminent, all systems impacted by recovery must be
placed into the proper configuration. The fault management team will monitor the results of the
recovery procedures to determine if they are effective in recovering lost functionality. Once
recovery is complete and verified, all systems reconfigured for recovery are configured for
nominal operations. If recovery procedures fail, the fault management team must evaluate
remaining options for recovery.
It was observed that some faults in Space Shuttle systems with acceptable mission impact were
not isolated during the mission. In these cases the fault was isolated and repaired on the
ground after the mission was complete. Since the Space Station does not return to the ground,
it will not have the luxury of postponing fault isolation and recovery and must deal with the
issue of performing difficult maintenance tasks in space.
3.2 Team Resources and Constraints
Fault management goals and actions have been specified independent of the means of
accomplishing these goals and actions. The "means" consists of the resources and constraints
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of the fault management team and the flight support environment. These resources and
constraints include the availability and capability of agents, the availability and reliability of
information, and the attributes of the operational environment. When multiple agents are
available, the interaction between agents to accomplish fault management actions must also be
considered. The resources and constraints that determine specific agent activities are described
below.
3.2.1 Characteristics of Aerospace Operations
Aerospace operations and the environment in which such operations occur impose constraints
on the fault management task and introduce challenges for the fault management team.
Literature from both aerospace operations and process control was reviewed to characterize the
constraints imposed by the aerospace domain on flight support systems and personnel. Both
process control and aerospace operations involve complex systems operating in high risk, real-
time environments.
Real-time constraints are recognized as a key element of complex monitoring and control
systems, whether in the area of process control or aerospace operations. These constraints
levy performance requirements on the agents controlling these systems. Operational support
must be continuous and on-line, which introduces the prospect of vigilance problems for
human operators required to support for long duration periods (Buck, 1989). These problems
manifest themselves in such forms as errors in observation and failure to remember pre-
existing conditions (Shaw, 1988). Vigilance problems can be introduced by the intelligent
system also. If the operator is not adequately aware of on-going operations (i.e., "in the
loop"), it will be difficult for him to handle unanticipated situations outside the scope of the
intelligent system (Buck, 1989) or take over from the intelligent system when it fails.
Changes in both the domain environment and the support environment are propagated through
the monitored process in complex ways. Propagation delays can be so long that humans are
unable to detect these changes or so short that human response time becomes a critical
limitation. Changes in the domain environment occur even under normal operations, when
physical devices alter their operating characteristics (e.g, normal operating range, stable points)
with use. These evolutionary changes must be recognized and accounted for by human
operators (Jakob and Suslenschi, 1990). Intelligent systems can be effective in compensating
for human perceptual limitations in detecting changes occurring over very short or very long
time periods.
Intelligent systems have characteristics that can affect their ability to improve flight operations
support. They represent an addition_ information source to be managed in an environment
already inundated with information. I'he information provided by an intelligent system is not
always informative, especially when statements or recommendations are provided with no
context for interpretation or clarification of the reasoning behind these conclusions. Intelligent
systems are subject to errors also. They can be brittle, failing catastrophically in situations that
exceed the bounds of their encoded knowledge. Thus, the intelligent system must be
monitored by the human. This can increase operator workload in an already high workload
environment.
The monitored systems often reside in space, which is a hostile, constrained environment for
human activities (e.g., microgravity) (Rudisill, April 1990). Hostile environments complicate
access to the monitored process and peripheral systems for fault management activities.
Protection for humans against the hostile space environment represents a significant cost in the
design of manned aerospace systems. The high cost of transporting payload to orbit also
results in significant resource constraints on orbit. These constrained resources limit the
number of humans that can be sustained in space, resulting in frequent ground-controlled
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operations. Operation of aerospace systems is thus characterized by remoteness of control.
This remoteness between the operator and the monitored process can be increased by adding an
intelligent system in the monitoring and control loop, unless the HCI reinforces the operator's
model of the monitored process (Buck, 1989).
Aerospace systems can also be characterized as complex systems (Jakob and Suslenschi, 1990
and Rudisill, April 1990). This includes both structural complexity (i.e., large numbers of
components with multiple connections) and functional complexity (i.e., significant, diverse
capability). Correspondingly, there are multiple tasks performed in parallel by multiple
cooperating agents (e.g., ground flight controllers, crew onboard the spacecraft, and intelligent
systems), resulting in complex operational sequences and large amounts of information
required to monitor and control the monitored system (e.g., procedures, planned activities,
sensed data, design specifications). Alarm systems used to detect faults in the monitored
process often produce an over-abundance of related alarms that must be evaluated (synthesized)
to identify the fault (Shaw, 1988; appendix B). This wealth of information and activity results
in high data rates and complex mechanisms to access this information, which can overload the
human operator. A human-intelligent system team can be effective in reducing activity
complexity and information overload by providing coordinated multi-tasking and HCI designed
to manage information.
In addition to the quantity of information required for complex, aerospace systems, the quality
of the available information can complicate operations. Uncertainty exists in both the sensed
data and in the models of expected behavior. Sensed measurements can be corrupted by sensor
failures or degraded while being measured (i.e., limitations or mis-calibrations of the sensor
can add noise or bias to the data) and while being transmitted (i.e., alteration by the
transmission media). Due to the weight constraints on orbit, the number of sensors is often
limited. Limited sensors can result in a lack of available information to clarify ambiguous
behavior.
A variety of expected behavioral states exist for the monitored process, corresponding to
operational contexts (e.g., start up, shut down, steady-state, degraded operations, normal or
crisis management). Many of these behavioral states are well-understood and anticipated from
models of the monitored process coupled with operational experience. Models of expected
process behavior (e.g., mathematical, procedural) are inherently approximations, however, and
can produce erroneous results when modeling assumptions do not match environmental
characteristics. Such unanticipated situations represent uncertainty in behavioral models and
must be accommodated by the fault management team.
The difficulty of making decisions in the face of uncertain information is complicated by the
criticality of operations (Woods, 1986). The hostile space environment results in frequent
hazardous operations. An incorrect response/decision by an operator under such conditions
can have serious repercussions (i.e., threat to life or vehicle) (Shepard, 1990). The dangers
inherent in such high risk situations are exacerbated by typical, frequent interruptions during
critical operations (Mitchell, 1990).
There is a need to provide intelligent support systems for flight operators to assist human
operators in managing the complex, highly constrained aerospace operational environment just
described. The very nature of this environment, however, complicates the development of
intelligent flight support systems. The complexity of the operator's task requires extensive
training, often with limited training resources, resulting in a lack of available, operational
expertise for development of intelligent systems (Remington, 1990). This problem is enhanced
by the fact that development of large-scale aerospace projects often extend over long periods of
time (Rudisill, April, 1990), posing the potential for further loss of expertise.
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In summary, the challenges of aerospace operations fall into three broad categories:
Complexity of design and operation
High rate of dynamics
Deficiencies in information andcapability
These challenges areintegral to DistributedArtificial Intelligence (DAD Open Information
Systems (OIS) as well, which are defined as "large-scale information systems [i.e., complex
systems] that are always subject to unanticipated outcomes in their operations [i.e.,
deficiencies] and new information from their environment [i.e., dynamics]" (I-Iewitt, 1991).
Table 3-1 provides a summary of aerospace fault management characteristics that impact the
development and use of intelligent fault management systems. Details of how these
characteristics affect agent activities and information requirementswill be discussed in later
sections.
Table 3-1. Characteristics of Aerospace Fault Management
Characteristics of Aerospace Fault Management
Complexity of design and operation
• Resident in hostile, constrained environment (e.g., microgravity)
• Remoteness of control
• Complexity of engineered systems (structural and functional)
• Decisions under conditions of high risk
• Criticality of making correct response
• Continuous, long duration support periods for operators
• Multiple tasks performed in parallel by multiple operators
High rate of dynamics
• Real-time constraints and performance requirements
• High data rates due to physical dynamics
• Large amounts of information due to complexity of systems and operations
• Dynamics often ouside range of human perception
• Frequent interruptions during critical operations
Deficiencies in information and capability
• Uncertainty of information (data and models of behavior)
• Unavailable information (inadequate sensors, limited bandwidth for
transmission to ground)
• Limited resources onorbit, both human and expendable
• Unanticipated situations
• Decisions under conditions of uncertainty
3.2.2 Characteristics of Agents and Teams
In section 1, the concept of a joint human-intelligent system team was introduced. This team
consists of an operator(onboard crew member or ground flight controller) and an intelligent
system. As a team, the operatorand intelligent system actively cooperate in the
accomplishment of fault management tasks. This team metaphor is furtherqualified where the
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intelligentsystem assiststheoperator.Thisqualificationimpliesthattheoperatorisincontrol
ofthe faultmanagement process.The operatormakes thefinaldecisionsinfaultmanagement
situationsand bearstheresponsibilityof theresultsof thosedecisions.The concept of a fault
management team includesa differentview of theuser.Typically,theuserisenvisionedas an
entity separate from the system. The analogy of a fault management team brings the user into
the system as an integral part of the system. Both the the user and the intelligent system are
"agents", entities responsible to accomplish specific fault management tasks. This difference
means that the user becomes an essential part of the system design, and that specifcation of
usercapabilitiesand responsibilitiesi a centraldesignactivity.
Tasks axe assigned to specific agents of the fault management team based on the available
capabilitiesand allowablebehaviorof each agent.The assignmentofa taskimpliesa
responsibilityforaccomplishment of thetask.Tasks shouldbe assignedtoutilizethestrengths
and skillsof each agent and tocompensate forindividualweakness. When the team consistsof
both human agentsand intelligentsoftwareagents,itisimportanttocharacterizeach typeof
agent. For example, humans areeffectiveatrecognizingconstantpatternsin varying
situations,so tasksrequiringthisskillshouldbe allocatedtohumans (Wexelblat,1989).
Alternately,humans areperceptuallylimited(section3.2.I).The intelligentsystem can easily
detecteventsoutsidehuman perception(e.g.,eventsoccurringvery fastor very slow).
Another insightintohuman diagnosticbehaviorcomes from thefieldof decisionmaking.
Humans tend toform subjectivebiasestodistinguishypothesesduringdecisionmaking.
These biasesaremanifestedasa tendency to (Arkesand Hammond, 1988):
Focus on one hypothesis,which delaysor eliminatesconsiderationof alternatives
Forgetevidence tothecontraryof afavoredhypothesis(te_ "favorablememory
eTroTs')
These biases can seriously impact the ability of an operator to make correct decisions. Yet the
final decision making responsibility lies with the operator. The intelligent system does not
necessarily have these biases, and can thus compensate for them by providing an unbiased
evaluation of all alternatives and by reminding the operator of evidence contrary to a selected
hypothesis.
Performance shouldbe a considerationinassigningtasks.Some tasksmay impose timing
constraintsthatareoutsideof theboundariesof human perception(i.e.,eithervery fastor very
slow). Hardware isalreadyused toperform some such tasks(e.g.,the use of a fusein an
electronicircuitopreventpower surgesfrom overloadinga powered system). Such tasks
thatarenot amenable tohardware solutionsareprime candidatesforthe intelligentsystem. An
example where softwareisused tomeet performance requirementswith minimum timing
constraintsistheuse of softwareinitiatedsatingproceduresinsteadof manually initiated
procedures.An example where softwareisused tomeet performancerequirementswith
maximum timingconstraintsistheautomated detectionof long-termtrendsinfault
characteristicsinsteadofexpectingoperatorstonoticesuch trends.
The reliability of the agent in performing a task and the criticality of the results of that task
should also be considered when assigning tasks. The reliability of an agent can be seriously
affected by the assigned workload and the number of interruptions that the agent is subject to in
the course of performing a task. Tasks should be assigned such that workloads are balanced
between team members and to minimize the interruption of a task by another team member.
Design of the display for management of large amounts of dynamic information can reduce
operator workload also.
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Differences in system design and operation that arc inherent in the monitored process software
can affect the task assignments of the fault management team. For example, the Space Station
software includes software, the Operations Management Application 1 (OMA), to coordinate the
primary vehicle systems (e.g., Electrical Power System). For Space Shuttle, this coordination
task is entirely a human responsibility. Thus the Space Station fault management
responsibilities would include monitoring the OMA for failures as well as monitoring the
primary vehicle systems for failures.
It is possible that as tasks are better def'med/understood over time (maturity), nominal task
allocations will shift (e.g., tend to automation over time). The system should be designed to
allow such evolution.
An agent role corresponds to a specific set of agent capabilities and behavior. Agents may
fulfill multiple roles. Agent capabilities and behavior may differ significantly in different roles
(e.g., agent may be able to issue commands when fulfilling one role (real-time control) and
unable in another (planning)). Agent roles are not necessarily fixed for the duration of flight
support. As circumstances change, the operator and the intelligent system can alter their roles
to meet the requirements of a given support situation.
A software mode is a manner of specifying valid activities and agent behavior by limiting the
available information and software capabilities. Software modes represent a constrained
approach to variable or dynamic task sharing between the operator and the intelligent system by
pre-specifying the range of acceptable agent behaviors (Johns, 1990). The mode can directly
indicate task allocation (e.g., MANUAL mode means the human operator executes the task) or
the mode can imply the task allocation (e.g., MONITOR mode implies that the human operator
does not execute the task). Modes for the intelligent system can affect the reasoning used, the
available knowledge base, or how information is displayed. They represent a context for the
actions of agents. A number of intelligent system modes were observed in the course of the
case study. See Table 3-2 for examples of these modes.
1 The original OMA concept has been restructuredas the Integrated Station Executive (ISE).
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Table 3-2. Examples of Software Modes Obscrv_l during the Case Study
Examples of Observed Software Modes
Task Modes with Implied Task Allocation
• WHAT-IF
What-if mode provides the ability for the operator to suspend or submerge into the background
nominal fault management activities while evaluating the current situation under conditions of
greater control than reel-time modes. This mode permits the operator to conjecture a
hypothesis about the current situation, alter the conditions seen by the intelligent system to
match that conjecture, and observe the results of that alteration (i.e., "What would happen
if .... ?') without affecting currant nominal operations. It is closely tied to simulation,
prediction, and envisionment. WHAT-IF can be used to:
-Look ahead and describe the impacts of current actions and events
- Diagnose faults by postulating faults to see if they yield the current fault symptoms
-Investigate response options in unanticipated situations
• MONITOR vs CONTROL
In Monitor mode, team agents evaluate data and draw conclusions, but do not exercise control
over the monitored process or the intelligent system. The results of a monitor mode are
recommendations. In CONTROL mode, team agents actively participate in altering the
monitored process or the intelligent system. Control may either be exercised by the operator,
by the intelligent system, or bo_.
• REAL-TIME vs REVIEW
During REAL-TIME mode, dynamic hformation is used as soon as it is available (in real-time).
Dynamic information can also be recorded in real-time for later use. REVIEW can consist of
re-displaying information recorded previously (playback) or it can involve operating on
recorded information to generate new results (replay).
Modes Explloltly Deflnlng Task Allocatlon
• AUTOMATIC vs MANUAL
AUTOMATIC is a mode where the ha[lware or software (including the intelligent system)
takes action without intervention from the operator. MANUAL mode is a mode where the
operator must initiate each action taken relative to the fault management task.
• USER vs DEVELOPER vs EXPERT
Throughout the lifecycle of an intelligent system, a variety of humans with distinctly different
goals interact with the system. These modes all represent types of HCI with the intelligent
system that correspond to the rob of the human with an associated set of goals. The USER
mode represents the HCI used durklg real-time operation of the intelligent system. Both the
DEVELOPER and EXPERT modes are of-line modes. The DEVELOPER mode is used by the
software implementer to develop, test, and upgrade the intelligent system. The EXPERT mode
is used by the domain expert to enter domain knowledge into the intelligent system.
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All information used for fault management has the following three attributes (although they are
not always explicitly provided for operational use):
Source and Authority
Information source is the point of origination of an information item. Authority of
information is the ability of information to influence the behavior of the entity
receiving the information. Information sources typically have an associated
authority based on the reliability and accuracy of the information produced by the
source.
Data Quality
Data quality assesses the presence and severity of imperfections in the content of an
information item.
Timing
There are two aspects to timing of information: availability and sequence.
Availability indicates access to the most current value for a parameter. Sequence
refers to the order in which information is sampled for transmission.
These attributes are described in greater detail in the following discussion.
Source and Authority
The information used during flight activities comes from a wide variety of sources. The ability
to distinguish where an item of information comes from is useful because it allows the agent to
associate a level of confidence in the accuracy of the information or believability of the source.
This confidence represents the ability of information from that source to influence agent
behavior, i.e, the authority of the source.
The authority of a source will depend upon the role defined for the source in the fault
management process and the capabilities possessed by the source. The assessment of
capabilities includes a recognition of the design constraints of the data generator (e.g., a model
with simplified assumptions can reduce the accuracy of generated information). Authority will
be altered by the agent's experience with data from the source (e.g., this radar has a history of
providing biased data due to infrequent calibration). The existence of alternate sources of
information will also affect the authority of a source, since redundancy allows comparison of
information items resulting in increased confidence when they agree and decreased confidence
when they do not.
One way to characterize information sources is by the identity of the source. This
characterization supports association of believability with source. The sources of information
for fault management can be separated into four categories:
Sources of Dynamic Information
(data updated in real time)
Vehicle and payload software and hardware
Intelligent system software and hardware
Ground support software and hardware
Communications software and hardware
Crew of vehicle
Ground flight controllers
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Baseline Operations Information Sources
- Operations Documentation
- Operations Expertise (e.g., Space Shuttle generic training in integrated simulations)
and Experience (e.g., actual flight support)
Mission Specific Operations Information Sources
- Mission Definition Documentation
- Mission Specific Expertise (e.g., Space Shuttle mission specific training in
integrated simulations) and Experience (e.g., previous support of similar mission)
Sources of Design Knowledge
- Design Documentation
- Design Expertise (e.g., design engineers and implementing contractors)
Another way to characterize information source is to indicate how the information was
generatedat thesource.Method of generationoftenimpliesthetypesof inaccuraciesthatthe
resultinginformationissubjectto.Four categoriesofinformationgenerationhave been
identified:
• Sensed: perceivedby a sensorymechanism, such as a measurement deviceor a human
Sensed informationcan be degraded by imperfectionsintheprocessofperception(e.g.,
noiseintroducedby themeasuring device,sample ratetoo slow tocapturedynamics).
• Computed: mathematical combination of sensed information
The accuracy ofcomputed informationisdependent upon theexactnessofthe algorithm,
thecorrectnessofthe sensedinformation,and theprecisionof theimplementation
environment (e.g.,thehardware platformand softwaretoolused toimplement an
algorithm).
• Simulated: information derived from a model of the source of information
The accuracy of simulatedinformationisdependent upon thedesignassumptions (e.g.,
fidelityofmodel) and theprecisionof theimplementationenvironment (e.g.,the
hardware platformand softwaretoolused toimplement simulation).Predicted
information is a type of simulated information that references events expected to occur in
the future.
• Inferred:derivedby evidentialreasoning
The accuracy of inferred information is affected by the reasoning strategies of the
inferencer, the completeness of the knowledge base (including experience, or previous
exposure to wide range of situations or behavior), imperfections in the evidence, and the
simplifying assumptions.
Data Quality
Data qualityis an assessment of thepresenceand severityof imperfectionsinthe information
content.Imperfectionsininformationaffecttheaccuracyof allconclusionsbased on the
imperfect information. Imperfections in information can be introduced by the information
source (as described previously in this section) or by the transmission media (e.g. noise
introduced by the communication channel). Examples of data quality assessments within flight
operations include statistical evaluation of data (e.g., used for selecting radar measurements)
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and bit error checks (e.g., use of a code attached to each information item to detect
transmission errors that alter individual bits).
The ability to use imperfect information is dependent upon the type of imperfectionand the
planned use of the information. In some cases it is possible to correct the imperfection or to
minimize the effect of the imperfection. Post and Sage (1990) characterized imperfections by
the degree of uncertainty and incompleteness that they introduced into the information. Three
types of imperfect information were delineated. These types are described to clarify the
considerations that affect an agent's assessment of data quality:
• Ambiguous: supporting multiple interpretations
Ambiguity implies a need for more information but does not apply when information
normally available is missing (i.e., incomplete data set). Equivocality is intentional
ambiguity to mislead or confuse the receptor of the information. Equivocality will be
ignored for the purposes of civilian aerospace, although such an imperfection is quite
conceivable for military applications. An example of ambiguous information is a sensor
measurement that can be interpreted as either a failed component or a failed sensor.
• Inconsistent: conflicting or in disagreement with
Inconsistency implies that a comparison of information has occurred. This comparison
can be with respect to an alternate source of the information or with respect to the san_
source of information evaluated over time (i.e., intermittent behavior). An example of
inconsistent information occurs when measurements from two radars locate a vehicle at
different positions.
• Imprecise: inexact or lacking accuracy
A lack of precision represents a loss of information (i.e., incomplete). An example
where imprecise information occurs is when the measurement process truncates a data
value, resulting in loss of precision.
The assessment of uncertainty is a topic of interest for intelligent systems. A variety of
measures of uncertainty have been formulated, including probability, confidence, belief, and
degree of membership (e.g., fuzzy logic). Note that the degree of uncertainty will be affected
by the availability of alternate, redundant sources of information.
The assessment of completeness is dependent upon the planned use of the information. The
missing information may be implicit or irrelevant, depending upon the targeted application of
that information. Notice that the absence of information can be informative (e.g., the absence
of data updating indicates Loss of Signal). Information that is totally missing (not just loss of
precision) is considered to be unavailable. The availability of information is discussed in the
following section.
Timing
Information resulting from dynamic processes have values that are updated in real time.
Dynamic information is available when the most current value for a parameter is accessible.
Information can be temporarily unavailable, or static, due to loss of data source. Such a loss
can result from the inability to downlist due to Loss of Signal (LOS) when the vehicle is
outside the range for transmission to the ground or due to failure of the transmission system.
When information is smile, it may be useful to indicate a range within which the static value
remains valid for use (i.e., an assessment of information staleness). This validity range can be
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delimited by time interval or event. Information can be pcrmanendy unavailable due to inherent
limitations in transmission media (e.g., insufficient bandwidth on downlist) or simply because
it is not provided for transmission (e.g, value is not stored for downlisting).
Constant information remains fixed for the duration of a mission. Constants are assumed to
always be available. For Space Shuttle, there are two classes of constants, mission specific
constants that are loaded prior to a mission and design constants that remain the same for all
missions. For Space Station, there should be corresponding types of constants for both the
payloads and the orbiter.
Sequence implies an ordering of values based on a timetag associated with each value. These
timetags typically refer to the time that a value was stored for transmission (e.g., sampled or
computed) and thus reflect the order in which events that influence data values occurred. The
sequence of parameters can be very important when diagnosing faults in complex systems, for
the order of fault symptoms is important in isolating the source of a fault.
3.3 Agent Activities
Activities are actions that have been assigned to specific agents and which employ available
resources (e.g., information, capabilities) to achieve the goals supported by these actions
(Lochbaum and Sidner, 1990). Typically, agent activities operate on the monitored process, or
its related peripheral systems, to achieve mission goals in the presence of anomalies. These
activities are called fault management activities. When multiple agents are working together as
a team, however, it is necessary to consider a class of activities that describe how team
members interact to jointly accomplish tasks. These coordination activities ensure effective
synchronization of agents and ascertain that agents are performing as expected (Gasser, 1991).
The introduction of intelligent systems into the flight support team introduces the need for agent
coordination activities between the operator and the intelligent system. An intelligent system
can greatly reduce the operator workload for monitoring and control. However, it also adds
another potential source of error. The operator must not only assess errors in the monitored
process, he must assess erroneous behavior in the intelligent system as well. Since the
intelligent system is an active participant in problem-solving, a likely dilemma is the situation
where the intelligent system mis-concludes or makes an error, either through limitations in the
knowledge base (i.e., brittleness, section 3.2.1; Gasser, 1991) or erroneous input. The
operator should be able to prevent errors in the intelligent system by intervening to redirect its
actions or alter the conditions perceived by the intelligent system. This is similar to the human
interaction between an expert and a less experienced but oriented person. The ability to
observe, understand, and control intelligent system behavior is important, because intelligent
systems are likely to he regularly upgraded due to iterative development process, and therefore
less fully tested and more likely to fail.
Two scenarios can result from an intelligent system that is not understandable or controllable:
either the operator blindly follows the intelligent system or he entirely ignores it. If the
operator relies too heavily on the intelligent system without evaluating its conclusions, he may
become less attentive than without the intelligent system and ultimately lose necessary skills for
flight support. If the operator ignores the intelligent system, then at best the operator does his
job as before and flight support performance is the same as before the intelligent system was
provided. At worst the introduction of the intelligent system may have removed operator
access to critical information and flight support performance is worse than before the intelligent
system was provided.
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The concept of a fault management team consisting of human (operator) and computer
(intelligent sysmm) agents is investigated to define the activities required for multi-agem fault
management. The types of agent activities necessary to accomplish fault management goals are
described. Agent interaction to support joint/shared tasking is discussed. Specific activities
associated with fault management are identified in section 3.5.1.
3.3.1 Types of Agent Activities
Agent activities suptxm two objectives, managing the monitored process and coordinating
agents. Both objectives require similar types of activities. Evaluation of the fault management
goals defined in section 3.1 reveals that goals are accomplished by three basic types of actions,
specifically (1) monitoring and assessment of situation and s.ystem/agent behavior, (2) planning
of activities with dynamic re-plan at anomalies or contingencaes, and (3) intervention and
control to alter actions or conditions in response to situation or behavior. Table 3-3 lists these
actions and associates with each action a classification of the type of activity required. These
types of activities are discussed in more detail below.
Table 3-3. Types of Activities Associated with Fault Management Actions
FAULT MANAGEMENT ACTION TYPE OF ACTIVITY
Monitoring and Fault Detection
Assess state, status, operations, and configuration
of the monitored process and support systems
Monitor state, status, and configuration of related systems
Initiate execution of procedures for nominal operations
Monitor on-going operations and procedure execution
Detect alarm conditions and fault indicators
Sating. Mlaeion Impact, and Reconllguratlon
Identify lost functionality and remaining capability
Determine potential safety implications of functional loss
Initiate necessary sating procedures
Assess if lost capability is retrievable
Determine mission impact of functional loss and required
procedures
Identify reconfiguration options and schedule changes
Fault leolation, Testing, and Recovery
Determine set of suspected faults
Identify tests to reduce remaining ambiguity in suspected
faults
Initiate test procedures to isolate fault
Monitor execution of test procedures
Identify malfunction correction procedures when fault
diagnosed
Monitor execution of malfunction correction procedures
Initiate malfunction correction procedures when fault
ambiguity is resolved
Monitoring and Assessment
Monitoring and Assessment
Intervention and Control
Monitoring and Assessment
Monitoring and Assessment
Monitoring and Assessment
Planning
Intervention and Control
Monitoring and Assessment
Planning
Planning
Monitoring and Assessment
Planning
Intervention and Control
Monitoring and Assessment
Planning
Monitoring and Assessment
Intervention and Control
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Monitoring and Assessment
The predominant activity of the fault management team during nominal situations is detecting
significant changes in dynamic data indicating off-nominal behavior, or monitoring and
assessment of information. Once off-nominal behavior has been detected, the assessment
process continues. Functional loss must be assessed to determine what capability remains to
accomplish mission goals. Off-nominal behavior and the procedures that respond to such
behavior must be assessed for safety and mission impacts. Faults must be associated with
symptomatic behavior.
There are two approaches to Assessment. One approach is a quick scan of important
information to provide a summary view of the events associated with the monitored process,
the intelligent system, and other operators. This approach is termed Walk-up Assessment.
The second approach is assessment by In-depth Analysis. This approach is used when the
details of some portion of the overall health and configuration or on-going operations require
further investigation. Both approaches are required for flight suPIX_. Walk-up Assessment is
useful when the operator must quickly orient himself to the current situation (e.g., at handover
between operators). In-depth Analysis is useful when the operator must analyze the detailed
data supporting the summary information or closely monitor an operational segment (e.g.,
isolating a fault). Both types of assessment must be performed in the presence of frequent
interruptions and with deficiencies of information and capability.
A variety of methods for assessing situation and system behavior were observed during the
case study. Table 3-4 summarizes some of these methods. Although these observations do
not provide a complete listing of methods used for fault management, they are representative of
typical approaches and are included as examples of such.
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Table 3-4. Examples of Methods for Assessing Situation and System Behavior
Observed Methods for Assessing Situation and System Behavior
Detection of a problem can result from a direct comparison of the expected behavior
of the monitored system to the actual behavior of the monitored system under a given
set of conditions. Expected behavior may be determined from:
• Limits specified in the flight rules (values, rate of change)
• Predictions from system models (including statistical prediction)
• Expectations based on operational observation (heuristic)
• Mission specific predictions based on pre-flight studies (i.e., tlight techniques)
Alternately, when direct symptoms of a problem are not available (for example, due to
limited bandwidth on the downlisted telemetry stream), problems may be detected
inferentially, by observing (or hearing via a communications loop) evidence of behavior
that indicates the existence of a problem. An example of such indirect evidence is the
observation of crew keypad entries associated with an activity to confirm that the
activity occurred.
Inferential evidence may also be useful for fault isolation by elimination. Consider the
example where a problem can be atlributed to one of two faults, A or B. By performing
a test that determines that fault A does not exist, it can be inferred that fault B exists,
though no direct evidence of fault B is observed.
Redundant, independent capabilities are frequently used to provide backup capability. If
redundant sources of information are available and healthy, they can be used to assist in
fault detection and isolation (e.g., use of majority vote to determine which of 3 redundant
IMUs have failed, use of redundant radar measurements to determine which source is in
error).
Another method of fault isolation resembles the "generate, test, and debug" paradigm
(Simmons and Davis, 1987) used for event reconstruction. In this method, an event
(i.e., this fault is the cause of the problem) is postulated and the resulting constraints
and conditions (i.e., alarm conditions (behavior) would be observed for this fault) are
estimated. These expected alarm conditions are then compared to the actual alarm
conditions to see if the fault could have yielded the correct failure signature. This
method iterates over the space of possible causes untila satisfactory match is found
or no other hypothetical causes are available. A variation of this technique, "what-if"
testing, is a useful technique to explore alternatives and anticipate problems when
predicting mission impact of a fault and determining reconfiguration options to
minimize impact.
Planning and Dynamic Re-planning
Procedures are elements of a plan that specify the sequences of activities perf_ to achieve
mission goals within the constraints of flight rules. Procedures relate goals to required actions.
Agent activities are actions that have been assigned to a specific agenL These activities are
conditioned upon access to and manipulation of specific information. Thus, procedures assist
in linking task goals to agent activities and information requirements.
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The planning a_ivity for fault management is proformed in two phases. The first phase
consists of a pro-mission planning activity. Prior to the initiation of a mission, mission plans
are developed consisting of pre-specified sequences of procedures designed to meet mission
objectives. The pro-mission planning process consists of overlaying specific mission criteria
(e.g., payload constraints) onto a template of standard operational procedures. The resulting
plans may simply link proceduros taken directly from documents of standard, operational
procedures (e.g., malfunction procedure workbook, such as JSC, April 1988) or may include
additional custom procedures that meet unique mission criteria (e.g., specification of trajectory
of manipulator during berthing, such as JSC, February 1989).
The second phase of planning is dynamic, real-time re-plan. Re-plan is the process of altering
planned procedures in response to unexpected or contingency situations. Re-plan can be as
simple as the use of operator experience to interpret a procedure (see table 3-5 below) or as
complex as developing an entirely new method for performing an action.
Three approaches to the development of procedures have been observed in flight operations:
(1) procedures are generated and documented pro-mission, (2) undocumented procedures are
derived from previous flight support experience (i.e., operator heuristics), and (3) contingency
procedures are mated in real time when documented procedures and operator heuristics are not
effective. Each of these approaches is discussed below.
Documented procedures are written prior to a mission for both nominal activities and off-
nominal activities. For nominal situations, procedure sequences are constructed to accomplish
planned activities. These activities may be standard for all missions (e.g., must always deploy
the Space Shuttle manipulator arm prior to flight operations) or may be mission specific
activities generated to resolve issues related to unique mission objectives (e.g., position a
payload attached to the manipulator arm at a specific location for special payload operations).
For off-nominal situations, procedure sequences are constructed to minimize the negative
impacts resulting from behavior in the monitored process and its support systems that is
outside of the limits specified in the flight rules.
A variety of off-nominal, documented procedures exist. Self-test and checkout procedures are
conducted during nominal operations to detect faults. Once a failure occurs, sating and
reconfiguration procedures are used to stabilize the affected system in a safe configuration.
Fault isolation when fault ambiguity exists is accomplished by executing test procedures that
will force the affected portions of the faulty system to exhibit distinguishing behavior.
Malfunction procedures are used to isolate and recover from faults.
The second approach to procedure development is the synthesis of operational observations
made by operators during multiple support situations into operator heuristics. Operator
heuristics are procedures typically not written down that result from operational experience
gained through training simulations and missions. Operator heuristics do not replace written
procedures, but address situations not fully resolved by written procedures. Some examples of
observed operator heuristics ate shown in table 3-5.
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Table 3-5. Examples of Typical Heuristics used in Flight Operations
Examples of Typical Heuristics used In Flight Operations
• Delay response to alarms near start-up of a device, since they can be due to temporary
misconfiguration of the device hstead of a device fault.
• Use design knowledge or observed trends in reliability and quality of a component or capability
to interpret an alarm condition (e.g., these components rarely fail, measurements from this
radar are usually noisy; for redundant capabilities, one may be higher fidelity than the other).
• Use patterns of faults or alarms as an indicator of faults at a higher level of system
abstraction (i.e., a fault signature, such as normal input pressure, low output pressure,
and reduced outflow rate at a node indicate a leak at the node).
To clarifyhow an operatorheuristican modify a writtenprocedure,considerthefollowing
example. A procedure might include the conditional:
"Ifalarm Q isissued,
then system Q has failedand recoveryproceduresshould be initiated."
Application of the first heuristic in table 3-5 to this statement results in the following modified
conditional:
"If alarm Q is issued and system Q was recently powered up,
then check for misconflguration of system Q.
"If alarm Q is issued and system Q was not recendy powered up,
then system Q has failed and recovery procedures should be initiated."
The thirdapproach to development ofprocedures is thereal-timecreationof contingency
procedures. Contingency proceduresarerequiredwhen documented procedures and operator
heuristicsdo not resolvean anomalous situation.Since such situationsarenot anticipated
during mission planning, they are termed unanticipated situations. Unanticipated situations
result from behavior either inconsistent with or not specified by flight rules or operational
observation and experience. Contingency procedures are developed b.y modifying or adapting
existing procedures and operator heuristics to accomm(_te the new cn'cumstances.
Intervention and Control
Itisnecessarytoprovidecapabilitiestoagentsthatallow them tomeet assignedtask
responsibilities.These capabilitiesincludeissuingcontrolcommands tothesupervisedsystem
and alteringtheinformationprocessedby thatsystem. The abilitytoredirectorissue
commands tothesupervisedsystem iscalledinterventionand control For thefault
management team,theoperatorwilltypicallyperform interventionand control.
Intervention into and control of a system under supervision (i.e., intelligent system or
monitored process) is accomplished by either altering the actions of the system or forcing a
condition affecting the system. These actions or conditions are altered to correct or redirect the
associated processing into a more profitable path. When intervention affects the activities of
multiple agents, it should be performed in a graded way, where only small changes are
introduced over time. Intervention into and control of the monitored process is accomplished
by executing the class of procedures that are appropriate for the type of situation (see the
discussion of planning in this section).
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Successfulinterventionandcontrolrequirestheoperatorto thoroughlyunderstandboththe
situation and the operating characteristics of the system being altered. Prior to intervention in
either the intelligent system or the monitored process, the expected behavior resulting from that
intervention should be closely inspected for deleterious effects. This inspection could include
testing the effect of executing scheduled procedures, evaluating new or modified procedures
created in response to unanticipated situations, and observing the effect of redirecting the
intelligent system. Such prediction of behavior could require simulation capability. If the
operator attempts an ill-advised intervention or control activity, the intelligent system could
inform the operator that it is not a good idea to intervene at this point in the activity timeline.
To permit recovery from unanticipated effects of intervention, intelligent system state should be
stored prior to any intervention.
Intervention may not always correct the faulty behavior. It may not be possible to recover from
some types of errors or the knowledge base of the intelligent system may be sufficiently
incomplete with respect to the given situation to allow the intelligent system to continue its
nominally allocated tasks. In such situations, the operator should be able to assume the
responsibilities formerly allocated to the intelligent system. Responsibilities can be reassigned
selectively or, in critical situations, a complete override (or takeover) can be performed.
3.3.2 Interaction Between Agents
For complex systems, such as those built for aerospace, the monitoring and control process
results in a number of related activities that must be coordinated to accomplish a task. When
multiple team members are working simultaneously on a fault management task, information
from independent activities must be exchanged and discussion relating this information to
system behavior must occur. Such a joint effort may be described as collaboration between
agents of the fault management team.
The intelligent system and the operator must collaborate to accomplish joint tasks.
Communication - the exchange of information between individuals -- is a key element of
collaboration. Exchange is the important concept here. Typically, intelligent systems arc
designed for one-way communication, where the intelligent system tells the operator status and
recommendations. Intelligent systems should be constructed to allow the operator to
communicate with the intelligent system as more than a data gatherer (Roth and Woods, 1989).
As the team leader, conu'ol rests with the operator. The operator has the responsibility to make
f'mal decisions and to act upon those decisions To do so effectively, he must be able to utilize
the capabilities of the intelligent system and compensate for its deficiencies. He must be able to
understand intelligent system conclusions and assess their correctness and applicability for a
given situation. Such an exchange represents a meaningful dialogue between team members
(what Fischer (1989) terms natural comrramicatioa). Natural communication can only occur
when team members have a similar model of the monitored process behavior and an
understanding of the scope of each team member's expertise. Such shared knowledge
represents an implicit communication channel (Fischer, 1989).
Models of Agent Interaction
The intelligent system and the human can collaborate (interac0 in a variety of ways. It is useful
to evaluate the ways that humans interact as metaphors for the ways in which the intelligent
system can interact with a human. Typically, the intelligent system serves as a consultant or
advisor. As an advisor, the intelligent system provides a resource for the human problem-
solver. It is usually assumed that the human knows very little in the intelligent system's area of
expertise and is thus a passive agent in the interaction (Woods, 1986). This resembles the
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novice/expert metaphor, where information passes primarily in one direction, from the expert
to the novice (Fischer, 1989). Some variations of the advisor metaphor include:
Critic
The intelligent system critiques the conclusions of the operator
Substitution
The intelligent systems substitutes for the human as problem-solver
Reminding or Broadening
The intelligent system reminds the operator of pre-existing conditions and alternative
approaches
Teaching
The operator learns from the intelligent system
Informational
The intelligent system serves as another information source
A more productive approach to advisory interaction is the cooperation between partial,
overlapping experts (Roth and Woods, 1989). Here both the intelligent system and the
operator are experts, but their areas of expertise differ. Additionally, both have a working
knowledge of the expertise of the other. Thus, the human-computer role becomes that of a
partial expert interacting with a specialist. As the situation varies, different kinds of expertise
will be needed and the roles of partial expert and specialist will shift between the operator and
the intelligent system.
Active communication between agents is a key element of the partial-expert metaphor. In his
model of agent communication (Fischer, 1989), Fischer asserts that the listener must be more
intelligent than the speaker. He concludes this because the listener bears the responsibility of
achieving an understanding of the implications of the situation while the speaker already
understands those implications. Such considerations emphasize the importance of HCI for
effective intelligent systems.
An extensive discussion of styles of collaborative interaction between human and intelligent
software agents is provided in Appendix C.
Coordination Activities
The coordination activities introduced in section 3 are the means of achieving effective
collaboration between agents of the fault management team. They include such activities as re-
allocation of responsibility between agents, re-direction of an agent in error, or override of a
malfunctioning intelligent system. Only by examining the interaction between agents and the
expected activity sequences is it possible to identify coordination activities.
Tasks can be accomplished either by a single agent or by multiple, cooperating agents. When
multiple agents are assigned to perform a task, they must coordinate their individual activities
and collaborate to exchange necessary information. An important aspect of agent coordination
for shared tasking is the allocation of responsibility for portions of a task to specific agents.
The activities supporting these sub-tasks may be independent or they may have inherent
dependencies (e.g., required exchange of information). A full specification of agent interaction
during shared tasking requires defining these dependencies between joint agent activities and
the handovers of responsibility that must occur during joint performance of activities.
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Coordinationof agentactivities will involve some combination of the following modes of task-
sharing:
Supervisory
Some agents perform activities while other agents oversee the performance of these
activities to guarantee that task goals arc satisfied as well as possible.
Simultaneous
Multiple agents perform activities in parallel, with possible dependencies between
activities.
Sequential with Handovers
Multiple agents perform activities serially, with possible dependencies at handover of
responsibility between agents.
Stand-alone
A single agent performs all activities requiwa:l for a task with no dependencies on the
activities of other agents.
This model is based in part upon work done for teleoperations (Backes et al., 1990).
Underlying all activities that require interaction between agents is the need for low-level
support capabilities to coordinate cooperating agents (MDSSC, 1989). These support
capabilities include such activities as synchronizing agents and arehiving and reviewing
information.
Explanation is another important collaborative capability. Recommendations concerning
explanation with intelligent systems axe provided in section 4.1.2. Coordination activities are
described in greater detail in section 3.5.1.
3.4 Fault Management Scenarios
In section 3.3, the agent activities associated with fault management were specified. These
activities are illustrated in a simple operational scenario for fault management shown in Table 3-
6. An operational scenario is a description of a realistic sequence of events during a segment of
flight operations. For this study, the fault management segment will initiate with the detection
of anomalous behavior and conclude with the restoration to nominal operations. This simple
scenario will be considered the Baseline Fault Scenario. It will be used as a starting point to
characterize the more complex fault scenarios that are encountered during actual flight
operations. Note that nominal monitoring of systems and operations unrelated to the
anomalous behavior will continue in parallel to the fault management activities outlined in the
Baseline Fault Scenario.
Typically, a fault scenario would include the assigmnent of activities to specific agents and the
specification of how agents will interact to perform those activities. In the Baseline Fault
Scenario, however, these assignments have not been made to avoid overlaying a specific
architecture (and implicit application) on a general description of fault management activities.
The intent of providing the Baseline Fault Scenario is to orient the reader about the nature,
scope, and sequencing of fault management activities. During design, a detailed scenario
specific to the application would be developed that includes activity assignments and agent
interaction specification. Such a scenario would be used to test the HCI design both for the
ability to effectively perform fault management activities and the ability to coordinate multiple
agents who are simultaneously performing these activities.
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Table 3-6. Baseline Fault Scenario
Baseline Fault Scenario
Detection of Failure
• Monitor state, status, and configuration of primary monitored system and pedpheral
systems
• Monitor status of on-going operations with respect to planned mission activities
• Observe anomalous behavior in monitored system
Note: monitoring incoming data for symptoms of anomalous behavior will continue
throughout the fault management process
Safing
• If behavior represents immediate safety threat, then automatic sating
• Determine potential, long-term impacts of behavior to crew and vehicle safety
• Perform saflng procedures necessary for long-term safety
Mission Impact Assessment and Accommodation
• Determine functional loss due to anomalous behavior
• Determine impacts of functional loss to accomplishment of mission goals
• Minimize mission impacts by
- Reconflguratlon monitored process or peripheral systems
-Delay or elimination of scheduled activities requiring lost fundlonality
Diagnosis
• Isolate anomalous behavior to specific sub-systems within the monitored process
• Determine list of suspected faults that would cause anomalous behavior
• Compare suspected faults to known faults
• Continue to diagnose and test until fault is isolated to a replaceable or repairable unit
Testing
• Identify tests to distinguish between faults in suspect list
• Evaluate safety and mission impacts of proposed test procedures
• Select test procedures with acceptable safety and mission impact
- Criticality of the lost functionality will affect the definition of "acceptable Impact"
• If no test procedure has acceptable impact, alter mission goals to reflect remaining
capability
• Schedule test procedures
• When time to execute test procedures, configure affected systems for testing
• Initiate test procedures
• Monitor behavior observed dudng tests with respect to expected behavior
• Eliminate some suspected faults based on the results of tests
• Reconflgure for nominal operations after testing
Recovery
• Identify repair or recovery options
• Evaluate safety and mission Impacts of proposed recovery procedures
• Select recovery option to minimize impact to safety and mission
- Criticality of the lost functbnallty will affect the definition of "acceptable impact"
• If no recovery procedure has acceptable impact, alter mission goals to reflect
remaining capability
• Schedule recovery procedures
• When time to execute recovery procedures, configure affected systems for recovery
• Initiate recovery procedures
• Monitor recovery procedures to verify that functional capability is restored
• Reconfigure for nominal operations after recovery
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In thedescription of the BaselineFaultScenario,thecharacteristicsofthe anomalous behavior
were not specified. There are multiple types of anomalies that would initiate fault management
activities. Anomalies identified during the course of the case study include:
Failure of monitored system, sub-system, or component
During test and checkout
During use in mission operations
Failure of sensor
During test and checkout
- During use in mission operations
Failure of peripheral system, sub-system, or component that degrades the primary
system, sub-system, or component
Error in timing or synchronization of systems
Poor data quality (e.g., noise, bias)
Onboard crew error (e.g., enter wrong key strokes)
Ground operator error
Intelligent system error or failure
Misconfiguration of the system under supervision
The Baseline Fault Scenario represents a simplified case of the types of situations that actually
occur during flight operations. Possible complications to this basic scenario include:
Interruptions unrelated to fault management operations
Actual fault management operations rarely follow the sequential steps illus_ated in the
Baseline Fault Scenario. In the complex environment of aerospace operations, many
activities are on-going simultaneously. The fault management team must continue to
assess behavior of all sub-systems within the monitored process, execute operations
unrelated to the current fault situation, coordinate with other members of the fault
management team as well as with the control teams of the other primary vehicle systems,
and handle sporadic events of the support environment (e.g., phone call, CRT fails).
These activities represent interruptions to the fault management tasks that must be
accosted with minimum impact to the accomplishment of those tasks.
Loss of data
The types of problems that can result in unavailability of data are (1) failures in the data
transmission systems (e.g., loss of downlist to ground, Data Management System failure
onboard Space Station, Display and Control failure on Space Shuttle ), (2) Loss of Signal
(LOS) outside regions of acquisition, and (3) change in transmission mode resulting in
reduced bandwidth of downlist that limits the parameters transmitted to a subset of
normal downlist (for ground only). Most of these problems affect only the ground
support systems. For Space Station, however, the use of distributed processing onboard
the vehicle introduces the possibility of loss of data due to failure in the data distribution
system.
Intermittency of anomalous behavior
In the Baseline Fault Scenario, the anomalous behavior remains consistent throughout the
fault management process. It is possible for the anomalous behavior to be sporadic and
only appear intermittendy, however (e.g., loose wire that makes contact to short a circuit
erratically). Intermittency of anomalous behavior significantly complicates the fault
management task, since the unique characteristics of circumstances resulting in the
anomalous behavior must fhst be isolated.
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Combinations of anomalous behavior
Anomalous behavior is not guaranteed to be caused by a single type of anomaly.
Combinations of anomalies can complicate the fault management task by changing the
observed symptoms of the anomalies.
Availabilityof redundantcapability
A common riskmanagement techniqueinaerospaceoperationsistheprovisionof
redundantcapabilityforuse when primary capabilityislost.Weight and sizeconstraints
onboard the vehiclelimittheuse of redundancy,however. Additionally,multiplefaults
can resultinlossofredundancy. The lackof redundantcapabilitywillaffectthe
criticalityof a functionalossand affecttheimportanceof faultrecovery.These
considerationswillaltertheprioritiesof thefaultmanagement process.
Criticality of functional capability or hardware item
Hardware items and functional capabilities associated with flight operations arc each
assigned a criticality rating. This rating usually reflects the importance of the capability or
hardware to safety and mission goals. For Space Shuttle, the Critical Items List (OIL)
arc rated as follows (JSC, January 1989):
Criticality 1: loss of life or vehicle
Criticality 2: loss of mission (specifically, first failure results in loss of mission,
next related failure results in loss of life or vehicle)
Criticality 3: all other potential effects of failure
Since the loss of a redundant item can affect the criticality of a item, the following special
rating exist for redundant items (JSC, January 1989):
Criticality 1R: redundant hardware, all of which, if failed, could cause loss of life
or vehicle
- Criticality2R: redundant hardware element,allofwhich, iffailed,could cause
lossof mission
An important factor in determining the acceptability of test and recovery procedttres is the
criticality of the functional loss associated with the anomalous behavior.
Unanticipated anomalous behavior
Although procedures defined prior to a mission address the majority of the situations that
arise during operations, there is the possibility of anomalous behavior that was not
anticipated from the design of the monitored process or observed during previous
operations. The occurrence of unanticipated anomalous behavior complicates the fault
management task,because procedureshave to be altereduringthecourseof themission
(seesection3.3.1concerningre-plan).This alterationcan taketheform of overridinga
scheduledprocedureor executingan unscheduled procedure. Tables 3-7 and 3-8,
respectively,provideexamples of thesespecialsituations.
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Table 3-7. Examples where Scheduled Procedures are not Performed
Examples of situations where a scheduled procedure might not be performed:
In some circumstances, the scheduled procedure may be overridden to accommodate
special cases based on observatbn and flight experience (e.g., ignore an alarm at
start-up, since it results from the device initializingin the wrong configuration; later
procedures will reconfigure the device).
Procedures are written for the worst-casescenario and may be unnecessarily drastic
in situations better than worstcase.
It may not be certain whether a procedure applies to the existingsituation and the fault
management team must judge whetker to execute it or not.
In light of the remaining capablity due to multiple faults, the specified procedure results
in unacceptable mission or safely impacts.
Table 3-8. Examples where Unscheduled Procedures are Performed
Examples of situations where an unscheduled procedure might be performed:
The scheduled procedures did not correct problem but the criticality of the functional
loss requires that some action be taken.
The fault management team anticpates the need to solve a problem due to the potential
for a future fault to result in significant capability loss
A scheduled procedure is altered or a new proceduredevised to meet a unique or
unanticipated situation.
3.5 Fault Management Activities and Information
The types of agent activities required for multi-agent fault management and the types of
information used during fault management axe identified in this section. This description is
based on observations from the case study, especially discussions and informal documents
provided by the PDRS flight control group (i.e., K.Farry, J.Watters, and D.Culp listed in
Appendix A). Additionally, the authors relied on flight control documents, including JSC
(October 1983), Farry (1987), JSC (February 1988), JSC (April 1988), JSC (December
1988), JSC (January 1989), JSC (February 1989), JSC (December 1989), and JSC (June
1990) and one author's experience as a Space Shuttle flight controller (i.e.,
D.Schreckenghost). See appendix D for a detailed description of agent activities and
information for fault managemenL
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3.5.1 Agent Activities for Fault Management
Three types of agent activities were outlined in section 3.3.1:
Monitoring and assessment of situation
Planning and dynamic re-plan
Intervention and control to alter actions or conditions
Specific fault management activities associated with these types of agent activities are described
in this section. Additionally, Coordination activities required for task sharing between multiple
agents are described. Appendix D provides definitions and discussion for each type of activity.
These activities represent the range of activities required for agents of the fault management
team to achieve fault management goals. The activities required for a specific fault management
team would be some subset of this range, dependent upon the scope of the task, the selected
methods, the available agents, and the resources of the actual flight support environment.
Monitoring and Assessment
Monitoring and assessment are performed to detect significant changes in dynamic information
indicating off-nominal behavior or situations. Table 3-9 summarizes the monitoring and
assessment activities required for space flight operations.
Table 3-9. Agent Activities Supporting Monitoring and Assessment
Monitoring end Assessment
• Assess state, status, health, and configuration to determine behavior of monitored
process, related peripheral systems, and the intelligent system
• Compare on-going operations to idanned activities
• Monitor the activities of the fault management team (intelligent system, crew,
ground controllers) for errors and anomalous behavior
• Assess the accuracy and applicability of intelligent system conclusions
• Distinguish between nominal behavior and anomalous behavior
• Relate anomalous behavior and failures to loss of functional capability and hardware
items
• Relate loss of functional capability to resulting impact to safety or mission goals
• Assess ability to perform scheduled mission activities based on impacts and remaining
capability
• Identify possible faults resulting in observed anomalous behavior
• Assess the reliability and quality of information from both the monitored process
and the intelligent system
• Assess the availability of data
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Planning and Dynamic Re-Plan
Planning is the process of specifying desired mission activities prior to the mission. Dynamic
re-plan is the real-time process of altering pre-mission plans in response to unexpected or
contingency situations. Table 3-10 summarizes the planning and dynamic re-plan activities
required for space flight operations.
Table 3-10. Agent Activities Supporting Planning and Dynamic Re-Plan
Planning and Dynamic Re-Plan
• Assess potential for a failure lo propagate and affect other portions of the
monitored process or associated peripheral systems
• Determine reconfiguration options or schedule changes to minimize impact of
anomalous behavior
• Determine options to reconfioure the intelligent system when in error
• Assess the impact of operator intervention into or take over of either the monitored
process or intelligent system pdor to taking action.
• Predict the anomalous behavior associated with a fault
• Explore alternatives for reconflguration and schedule changes after functional loss
• Explore alternatives for recovery after identification of fault
• Assess recovery options based on identified fault
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Intervention and Control
Intervention and control is the ability to redirect or issue commands to a supervised system.
Table 3-11 smnmmizes the intervention and control activities requix_ for space flight
operations.
Table 3-11. Agent Activities Supporting Intervention and Control
Intervention and Control
• Control the Intelligent system
• Redirect the intelligent system
• Control the acquisition of data
• Command monitored process
• Correct spurious or erroneous information from monitored process
• Initiate scheduled procedures
• Alter scheduled activities in response to fault management activities
• Establish alternate modes of operation for both intelligent system and
monitored process
• Select between alternative solutions for
- Reconfiguration and schedule changes after functional loss
-Recovery after identification d fault
• Takeover of intelligent system responsibility by operator
• Takeover of monitored process (crew command, uplink)
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Coordination
Coordination activities are activities required for agent cooperation and communication during
joint tasking. Table 3-12 summarizes the coordination activities required for space flight
operations.
Table 3-12. Agent Activities Supporting Coordination
Coordination
• Clarify intelligent system actimS and conclusions by inspection of relevant
information at intermediate stel_ of the reasoning process
• Review of algorithms, processes, and reasoning strategies used to compute or
derive Information about the Int)lllgent system and the monitored process
• Evaluate data trends and system performance for both intelligent system and
monitored process
• Clarify agent responsibilities end task assignments
• Review previous actions of fault management team in the context of current events
• Synchronization of dependent acllvlties (e.g., wait for a result)
• Archival of Important Information and provision for access to that information at
a later time
• Manipulation of archlved information from both the monitored process and
intelligent system
• Alteration of the appearance of the display to meet information needs
3.5.2 Fault Management Information
In the discussion about sources of information in section 3.2.3, four categories of information
were identified:
Dynamic Information
Mission Specific Information
Baseline Operations Information
Design Knowledge
Specific information associated with each of these categories is delineated below. Appendix D
provides def'mitions and a discussion of each of these types of information.
Dynamic Information
Dynamic information has values that arc updated in real tirnc due to changes in the process
generating the information. There arc a wide variety of information types that can be classified
as dynamic. Table 3-13 provides a summary of the major types of dynamic information.
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Table3-13. Typesof Dynamic Information
Dynamic Information
• Sensed and Processed Data
• Time
• System State, Status, and Configuration of monitored
process, peripheral systems, and intelligent system
• Alarms, Faults and Failures, including suspected faults
and fault ambiguity groups
• Mission Impacts and Failure Propagation Potential
• Context of On-going Operations
• Go/No Go Calls
• Functional Capability
• Operator Inputs to monitored process, data acquistion
system, or intelligent system
• Performance of the monitored process, related
peripheral systems and the intelligent system
• Failure trends and performance trends in archived data
• Dynamic intelligent system information
State, status, health, and configuration
Internal states
Hypotheses and intermediate or alternative solutions
-Activities (previous, current, planned)
Reliability assessment
• Archived Information
Mission Specific Information
Mission specific information includes all information that is unique to the support of a
particular mission. Table 3-14 summarizes the types of mission specific information used in
space flight operations.
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Table 3-14. Types of Mission Specific Information
Mission Specific Information
• Mission Goals
• Schedules and Activity Timelines
• Mission Constraints
• Mission Specific Procedures
• Mission Configuration
• Mission Specific Expertise and Experience
Baseline Operations Information
Baseline operations information includes all operations information that is required for generic
flight support, not including information required to meet specific mission requirements.
Baseline operations information does not change as mission goals change. Table 3-15
summarizes the baseline operations information used in space flight operations.
Table 3-15. Types of Baseline Operations Information
Baseline Operations Information
• Flight Rules
• Procedures
- Nominal activities
-Test and Checkout
Safing
Reconfiguration
Malfunction Diagnosis and Correction
• Modes of Operation
• Operational Performance Requirements
• Failure Signatures
• Operations Expertise and Experience
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Design Knowledge
Design knowledge is the collection of information that specifies the design of the monitored
system, its peripheral systems, and the intelligent system. Table 3-16 summarizes the types of
design knowledge used for space flight support.
Table 3-16. Types of Design Knowledge
Design Knowledge
• Monitored System Specifications
• Intelligent System Specifications
• Design Constraints
• Design Performance Specifications
• Failure Modes and Effects
• Redundancy
• Criticality Ratings
• Design Expertise
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Section 4
Human-Computer Interaction Design for Intelligent Systems
This section provides design guidance in the form of recommendations and issues related to
HCI design for intelligent systems. This guidance supports:
Coordination and management of intelligent systems
Fault management
Information management and display
A section is devoted to each of these topics. Within each section, recommendations and issues
are grouped under specific topics.
Background for the Examples
Many of the recommendations contained in this section are illustrated by examples. Examples
are a powerful tool of communication. One of the dangers, however, of using examples to
illustrate a general concept is that the example will be interpreted too literally while the point is
missed. These examples are provided as illustrations of information problems encountered
during fault management in complex domains. We are NOT recommending that the designer
adopt specific designs or the "look and feel" of the user interface shown in these examples, but
rather hope the designer will apply the more general concept to his own application. Rare is the
development project that must not perform trade-offs and make design compromises based on
cost and performance constraints. Many of the designs used in the examples represent a large
leap away from the way most intelligent systems are designed today. If the designer cannot
make that leap, we hope he will consider a small step in that direction.
Each example consists of two figures. The first figure illustrates the problem BEFORE the
recommendation is applied. The second figure illustrates the improved human-computer
interaction AFTER the recommendation is applied. The reader can compare the two figures to
observe the effect of using the recommendation. This comparative format emphasizes what has
been altered by use of the recommendation and how this alteration improves human-computer
interaction.
All examples are based on a fault management intelligent system for a space-based Remote
Manipulator System (RMS). This intelligent system is hypothetical, but is based on our work
with the PDRS Decision Support System. A single domain has been selected for use
throughout this section to minimize the reader's effort in comprehending the domain problems
used to illustrate the recommendations. Domain information required to understand the
examples is provided below.
Four scenarios have been defined for use in the examples. All are derived from post-mission
reports of anomalies observed by the PDRS flight controllers (JSC, 1988). Actual events have
been used as the basis of these scenarios because they accurately reflect the problem complexity
and information dynamics and deficiencies of this distributed, multi-tasking environment. The
types of problems experienced by fault management operators and the tasks that fault
management intelligent systems are required to perform can be realistically represented in such
scenarios. The four scenarios selected for use in the examples are described below:
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Scenario1: FalseAlarmsin RMS Powerup Prior to RMS Operations
(STS-3 and STS-4)
This scenario is used to illustrate alarm management.
The RMS Select Switch has 3 possible settings: (1) OFF - power off to all RMS, (2)
PORT - power to RMS mounted on left side of vehicle, (3) STRBD (shortened form of
starboard) - power to RMS mounted on right side of vehicle. Since the RMS is typically
mounted on the left side of the vehicle, the RMS is powered up by selecting the PORT
setting on the RMS Select Switch.
In this scenario, the RMS is mounted on the left side of the vehicle. When the RMS is
powered up, an alarm is immediately issued from two wrist joints (i.e., pitch and yaw).
This alarm results from a delay (exceeding nominal 1 second) in transmitting the powemp
signal. This delay is caused by the low temperature and is considered a false alarm.
Scenario 2: Undocumented Malfunction Procedure in Deployment of the RMS (STS 41-
G)
This scenario is used to illustrate situations where the intelligent system must be
redirected or informed of information and activities not in its knowledge base.
The deployment of the RMS occurs in two stages. First the arm is rotated away from the
Space Shuttle body using the the Manipulator Positioning Mechanisms (MPMs). This
puts the ann in the DEPLOY state. Next, the attachments (Manipulator Retention Latches
or MRLs) that secure the arm to the Space Shuttle are released. The arm is then
considered fully deployed (MPMs deployed and MRLs released).
The MPMs have dual, redundant motors located at the point where the arm is
permanently attached to the Space Shuttle (shoulder). A deploy with two motors takes 34
seconds and a deploy with a single motor takes 68 seconds. There are three MRLs (fore,
mid, and aft). Each MRL has two motors. A release with two motors takes 8 seconds
and a single motor release takes 18 seconds.
In this scenario, the deploy indication is lost. Operators have observed this failure on
previous missions and attribute it to maladjustment of the sensor that detects deployment.
A re-command of the deploy will reset this sensor and the deploy indication will be
reacquired. This is an undocumented procedure, however, which an intelligent system
would not have in its knowledge base. Instead, the intelligent system recommends the
initiation of malfunction procedures, based on its list of suspected faults.
Scenario 3: Situation-specific Violation of Malfunction Procedures during RMS
Operations (STS 51-I)
This scenario is used to illustrate impact assessment and violation of procedures based on
unique conditions.
There are three joints on the RMS: shoulder (point of attachment with the Space Shuttle),
elbow, and the wrist (point of attachment with the End Effector, the device connected to
the payload). Four control modes are available to move these joints: (1) automatic
(AUTO), (2) single-drive joint control (SINGLE), (3) direct-drive joint control
(DIRECT), and (4) backup (BACKUP). Nominally, AUTO mode is used. BACKUP
mode is the most constrained and is thus usually considered the least desirable. Other
modes are selected based on the planned operation.
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In this scenario, a power failure has resulted in the loss of all control modes for the elbow
joint except BACKUP. The use of BACKUP mode for elbow joint control represents a
potential impact to operations, however. If the power failure is due to a shorted motor
winding, use of the BACKUP mode for the elbow will fail the entire BACKUP system.
Based on specified malfunction procedures, other joints (i.e., should and wrist) would be
operated in SINGLE mode. In this case, however, these malfunction procedures are
violated because of additional constraints in this situation (i.e., position hold constraints
resulting from the planned operation to open a sunshield on a deployed satellite). The
operator selects DIRECT mode for shoulder and wrist, since it results in improved elbow
joint position hold..
Scenario 4: Bad Sensor Data during Temperature Monitoring of Stowed RMS
(STS 41-D)
This scenario is used to illustrate alarm management.
While the RMS is stowed, the temperature of joints are monitored to ensure that
temperatures do not exceed normal limits. Three sets of joints are monitored (1) pitch
and yaw at the shoulder, (2) pitch at the elbow, and (3) pitch, yaw, and roll at the wrist.
In this scenario, redundant sensors arc available for each joint (called sensors 1 and 2).
An error in assembling the wrist roll sensor 1 has resulted in it constantly reading 71
degrees. The operator detects the bad measurement from wrist roll sensor 1, since
measurements from all other sensors indicate the more normal temperature range of 30 -
40 degrees. The bad sensor will result in a false alarm, however, which the intelligent
system must interpret.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the format used for BEFORE and AFTER examples. Two figures are
provided, the first illustrating the BEFORE case and the second illustrating the AFTER case.
Within each figure, sequences of events are often illustrated, with time increasing from left to
fight (e.g., Step 1 at time 1, step 2 at time l+n, etc.). Above each time point (indicated by
"STEP" at the bottom), the important events, recommendations, and display changes occurring
at that time are shown. The following information is provided for each example (refer to figure
4-1):
Summary of events and actions by operator and intelligent system (e.g. STEP 1 The
intelligent system ..... )
Timeline illustrating events detected by the intelligent system ("Intelligent System
Conclusions") and recommendations made by the intelligent system ("Intelligent System
Recommendations")
Windows from the user interface illustrating important information (e.g., data, operator
actions, etc.) and demonstrating how the display changes over time
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Information
Window A at time 1
and
J Winclow B at time 2 I
I Window C at time 2 I
Window A at time 3
retem Recommendatlonel
im
Recommendation at Itime 1.
I
Conclusions
Ir
Recommendation at J i
time 2.
Event at time 1
time 1 time 2
'' I
I Event at time 3 I
I
time 3
STEP 1
The intelligent system ....
STEP 2 STEP 3
The operator .... Notice the display
change ....
end Events and end
st TIME 1. st TIME 2. st TIME 3.
Figure 4-1. Illustration of Format Used in the BEFORE and AFTER Examples
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Examples have been designed with an effort to use a consistent style in the presentation of
information. The user interface conventions used in this section are summarized in table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Symbols Used in the Examples
SYMBOL
0
Text
,f_'dV4rJ',
OEeCRIPTION SYMBOL DESCRIPTION
Mouse-sefectebie Control Button _ Scroll,=ble Region
Status Region, not mouse-selectabie(c.. beco.o,-co_d) J_....0. J EventM.._, onTirn.,_,
Radio button I(if selected black, else white) Time Scale, Greenwich Mean Time
xxx:yy:zz:qq
Warning Message
Region that has been mouse-selected
Breek in timeline, indicating
extended time interval
I Function I
I°_/°,, I Mouse-ealecteble Menu Function=
Paper document
This concludes the discussion that provides background for the examples. Examples are used
throughout Section 4. Refer to this section when questions arise about the scenarios used in
examples or the format of examples. The remainder of Section 4 discusses specific design
recommendations and issues.
4.1 Support for Coordination and Management of Intelligent Systems
An important conclusion of this study is the need to design intelligent systems to perform
activities in coordination with humans. To assist in identifying recommendations for building
such systems, the concept of a fault management team was investigated. Both the human
operator and intelligent system function as agents within this team. Tasks are distributed
among agents and can be reallocated if necessary. Tasks may be jointly performed by both the
human and the intelligent system. As the team leader, however, the human has the final
decision-making authority and retains control of the intelligent system.
Design recomrnendations for coordinating multiple agents as a fault management team are
discussed in this section. Design issues requiring further study are also identified. Distributed
tasking between multiple agents is addressed, including dynamic assignment of tasks for
handling contingencies and balancing agent work load. Collaboration between agents of the
fault management team is defined as the process of information exchange between agents to
establish a consistent viewpoint of a situation or event. The management of erroneous
intelligent system behavior is investigated, including both detection of erroneous behavior and
methods of compensating for the negative effects of this behavior.
4-5
4.1.1 Multi-tasking and Dynamic Task Assignment
Integral to the the fault management team concept is the distribution of tasks between human
and computer agents. Typically, the fault management team will consist of multiple human
operators as well as intelligent software agents. In such an environment, tasks may be
performed jointly or independently. As the situation mandates, tasks can be reallocated to
different agents.
The objective of this section is to assist in designing systems for multi-tasking by multiple,
intelligent agents. Recommendations address both the initial allocation of tasks to agents as
well as changes to these allocations that can occur during the support period. The allocation of
tasks to specific agents is related to the capabilities of each agent. Dynamic re-assignment of
tasks is discussed, including the use of software modes to implement variable task
assignments. Task re-assignment as a method of responding to contingency situations is
investigated. Handover of task responsibility between agents during both nominal operations
and contingency operations is considered. Changes in either the monitored process or the
intelligent system may alter agent task priorities. Interruption of on-going activities caused by
new information or activity requests is discussed.
Task Allocation
Human problem-solving can vary significantly from computer problem-solving, due to the
different capabilities of each. To avoid inappropriate task allocation, the strengths and
weaknesses of both humans and computers should be considered when allocating
responsibility for fault management tasks (Wexelblat, 1989). In section 3.2.2, the
characteristics of human and intelligent system agents were discussed in relation to agent task
assignment.
Tasks allocated to the intelligent system should either amplify the capability of the operator or
compensate for an inability. Task allocation should attempt to keep the operator in the loop for
all decisions and important tasks. Should the intelligent system become unable to perform the
tasks assigned to it (e.g., due to failure in the intelligent system), the operator must be able to
take over its tasks. Thus, the operator must remain aware of on-going events and activities and
be cognizant of the entire fault management process.
Tasks should also be allocated to support on-the-job training of operators. In-depth
understanding of the monitored process is often achieved as a by-product of viewing
information required to perform monitoring and fault management tasks. Task allocation
should support development of the following types of operator expertise (Bloom, 1991):
• Understanding fault management goals, tasks, and procedures
• Developing models of process dynamics and process control systems
Acquiring skills to interpret state information from data and decide a course of action
based on that state information
The task allocation should balance the need to provide for on-the-job training with the need to
amplify or compensate for operator capabilities.
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Problem: Task Allocation with Task Sharing
Recommendation: Tasks should be allocated to utilize the strengths and skills of
each agent of the team (human and intelligent system) and to compensate for their
weaknesses. Redundant allocation should be provided to allow for shifting a task
allocation to another agent (e.g., intelligent system has primary responsibility for
a task with the operator as backup). On-the-job acquisition of expertise by the
operator should also be considered when allocating tasks.
_F,21illnp_: An example of inappropriate allocation to the operator is illustrated in
figure 4-2. The activities for the monitoring illustrated in figure 4-2 are reallocated
in the example of figure 4-3 to include assistance by the intelligent system. Both
examples are based on Scenario 2 described at the beginning of section 4.
Human characteristics affecting task allocation are related to perceptual and cognitive traits.
Computer characteristics affecting task allocation are related to processing traits, including
processing speed, robustness of knowledge base, and reliability of reasoning strategy.
Identification of the appropriate task assignments for coordinated human-intelligent system
activity requires further study.
Issue: Additional research is needed to determine appropriate task assignments for the
intelligent system and effective partitions of responsibility in task sharing between the
operator and the intelligent system (Johns, 1990; Shalin, 1990).
Most intelligent systems in the case study performed monitoring tasks for detection and
diagnosis of failures. Procedure monitoring was observed in some cases as well. Less
common allocations were control of the monitored process and agent activity planning. See
Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) for a description of the tasks performed by the intelligent
systems from the case study.
Regardless of the role, however, the human should be consulted when the potential impacts of
a decision threaten mission or crew safety (with the exception of built-in hardware safety
features) or when these impacts are uncertain. Intelligent systems often fail completely in
situations outside the scope of their encoded knowledge. Humans perform much more
robustly at the boundaries of their knowledge and can rely on a significant substrate of related
knowledge and experience in making decisions.
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Problem: Task Allocation with Task Sharing
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this situation, the MPM of the Space Shuttle RMS is being deployed. The operator is
responsible for monitoring the deployment for problems and for ascertaining when the
deployment is complete. The figure shows the activities that the operator must perform
for this monitoring task. Notice how the operator must closely watch the display to detect
state changes and elapsed time. This degree of vigilance represents an unnecessary load
on the operator. A lapse of attention (such as an interruption) at the wrong time could
result in the operator missing important events.
Time 000:01:02:00
MPM COMMAND
_(_OW )
I.P. ST,TEI I I
Time 000:01:02:36
MPM COMMAND
Time 000:01:03:04
MPM COMMAND
(o.. oY)(STow)
I "P"s'EI I
STEP 1
Operator initiates DEPLOY
and monitors the deployment
STEP 2
Operator is distracted and
fails to observe evidence
for MPM motor failure
(elapsed time exceeds
expected 34 seconds)
STEP 3
Operator observes DEPLOY
complete; incorrectly con-
cludes that DEPLOY was
nominal. One of two MPM
motors failed, indicated by
longer deploy time (68 sec).
Figure 4-2. BEFORE: Example IUustrafing Inappropriate Task AUocadon
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Problem: Task Allocation with Task Sharing
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the operator is assisted by the intelligent system. The intelligent
system performs vigilance tasks such as monitoring elapsed time and state changes
and sends messages identifying important events to the timeline portion of the display.
The timeline summarizes both events and the timing of events. The operator is freed
from closely monitoring time and state and now refers to the timeline of messages to
identify important events occurring during the deployment. Notice that the operator
can still access time and state information if needed, but is no longer required to watch
them for transient values of interest.
I MPM COMMAND
_(_ow )
MPM COMMAND
_(_w)
MPM COMMAND
(_oY) ( stow)
J'"ST'_I=owl] J'"ST'TEITRANs"lJI"P"ST'_I_OYIJ
[ Intelligent System Conclusions I
• _Tpl j_lplj, p jj.l J _ I
' "-I _/' Single MPM motor;
I failed.I 'T"'"""" I
000:01:02:00 000:01:02:36 000:01:03:04
STEP 1
Operator initiates DEPLOY;
intelligent system begins
monitoring elapsed time
STEP 2
Intelligent system concludes
MPM motor failed after 34
sec. have elapsed with no
DEPLOY
STEP 3
Intelligent system observes
single motor DEPLOY
complete
Figure 4-3. AFTER: Example Illustrating Improved Task Allocation
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Problem: Maintaining Operator Control of Monitored Process
Recommendation: The operator should be consulted in decisions with potential
mission or safety impacts. The intelligent system and its user interface should
provide the operator with sufficient information about its reasoning and its activities
associated with the monitored process to make fault management decisions and to
effect these decisions. This includes access to information from the monitored
process independent of the intelligent system, since the operator may be required
to take over from the intelligent system (see section 4.1.3 on operator take over).
Example: The example shown in figure 4-4 illustrates a situation where the operator is
excluded from an important decision affecting the monitored process. In figure
4-5, the example is altered to allow the operator the ability to control the monitored
process. The intelligent system no longer prevents the operator from re-commanding
the deploy. This example is based on Scenario 2 (refer to beginning of section 4).
Dynamic Task Assignment
In the concept of a fault management team, the initiative to perform operational tasks is shared
between the operator and the intelligent system. This shared initiative allows both the operator
and the intelligent system to alter their task assignments depending upon the current goals of
the team and the ability of each agent to achieve those goals (what Johns (1990) calls variable
or dynamic task sharing). For example, tasks can be dynamically re-assigned to balance work
load between agents or to compensate for a loss of agent capability (i.e., failure). Note that
only the team leader (i.e., human operator) can initiate re-assignment of tasks in this concept of
the fault management team.
The operator should be cognizant of the alternate task assignments that are supported by the
intelligent system. Often, intelligent systems have multiple levels of automation (e.g., activity
executed automatically by intelligent system versus recommended activities executed by the
operator) (Hefley, 1991). Each level represents a different task assignment. The operator
should understand the range of available task assignments, know conditions under which each
task assignment is appropriate, and be able to alter task assignments as needed.
Dynamic task sharing results in a set of possible activities for each agent, not all of which are
performed under normal circumstances. This set consists of the nominal activities as well as
activities that can be performed in atypical or anomalous situations. Compositely, all agents
and their activities represent a structure, or team architecture, that def'mes the range of allowable
activities for each agent and specifies how these agents must interact to jointly accomplish
tasks. It is necessary to specify this architecture of agents and activities to identify complete
information requirements.
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Problem: Maintaining Operator Control of Monitored Process
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
This example illustrates a situation where the operator is excluded from an important decision
affecting the monitored process. The indication of deployment has not been received from the
sensor detecting deployment. RMS operations cannot continue until deployment is indicated.
Based on his flight experience and the visual view of the RMS position, the operator concludes
that the RMS is actually deployed, but the sensor detecting a deployment has failed. He
recognizes that a re-command of deployment should put the sensor into the correct
configuration. The intelligent system, however, is unaware of this undocumented procedure.
It concludes that there is no reason to re-command deploy and prevents the operator from
doing so. Thus, the operator has lost control of the monitored process and is prevented from
taking the correct action.
MPM COMMAND
I.P. sT,TEI stowI Power failed J
MPM COMMAND
[.P.sT,TEI stowI
I Intelligent System
I MPM Deploy failed. I
Initiating failure
recovery procedures.
000:01:03:04
Conclusions I
1.lvi_r_l_'Jll I
MPM Deploy command;
# invalid recovery S
# procedure. I
_' J' h" J'_T h" J'_" f _r J" h'h',f J
000:01:03:54
STEP 1
Intelligent system concludes
that Deploy has failed. A list
of suspected faults are
postulated.
STEP 2
The operator reviews sus-
pected faults and concludes
that faulty sensor Is problem.
STEP 3
Operator attempts undocu-
mented recovery procedure
(recommand of Deploy) to
reset faulty sensor. Intelligent
system prevents this.
Figure 4-4. BEFORE: Example Illustrating the Loss of Operator Control over the Monitored
Process
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Problem: Maintaining Operator Control of Monitored Process
AFTER - Example illustrating Solution:
In this example, the intelligent system no longer prevents the operator from re-commanding
the deploy. It now issues a warning that MPM deploy is an invalid recovery procedure and
provides the operator with an option to continue the re-command or abort the attempt. The
operator chooses to continue and the intelligent system records that the operator overrode
its recommendation. Since the appropriate corrective action has been taken, the deployment
would now be completed.
I MPMST,TEI I I
2 Motors failed I
Power failed
MPM COMMAND
MPM Deploy command in- #
valid recovery procedure. ;
LI,,,,.,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,.,,,,,,,,,,,/,
i Intelligent System Conclusions ]
I y
I MPM Deploy failed. I
Initiating failure I I
recovery procedures.J
I
000:01:03:04
v, T I
MPM Deploy command in- I I Override: MPM Deploy I
valid recovery procedure. I I command initiated. I
I I
000:01:03:54 000:01:04:00
STEP 1
Intelligent system concludes
that Deploy has failed. A list
of suspected faults are
postulated.
STEP 2
The operator reviews
suspected faults and
concludes that faulty
sensor Is problem.
STEP 3
Operator executes undocumented
recovery procedure (re-
command of Deploy) to reset
faulty sensor. Intelligent system
warns that this is not a recognized
procedure, but allows the operator
to make the desired entry.
Figure 4-5. AFTER: Example Illustrating the Provision for Operator Control over the
Monitored Process
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JProblem: Specifying the Architecture of Agents and Activities
Recommendation: Define the expected agent task assignments, corresponding
agent activities, and ways that agents will interact to perform these activities. This
specification of an architecture of agents and activities is essential in identifying the
information required to achieve fault management goals and to coordinate joint agent
activities.
These information requirements will affect the design of both the intelligent system (i.e., can it
generate the required information?) and the user interface (i.e, does it provide access to the
required information?).
The specification of an architecture of agents and activities should include activities in addition
to those supporting normal domain tasks. Such activities include agent coordination activities
required for the human and computer to work together effectively and contingency activities in
response to unanticipated situations (section 4.2.3). Investigation of the interaction between
between humans when collaborating provides insight into human-computer coordination
(section 3.3.2 and appendix C). Research is needed, however, into methods for identifying
the complete range of agent activities.
Issue: Methods are needed to assist in defining this architecture of agents and activities,
especially in identifying agent coordination activities for joint tasking.
In reality, it will not be possible to identify every possible way that the intelligent system and
human will interact. Experience with teams of human operators has shown that unanticipated
(and unplanned for) situations do arise during fault management and must be accorrmaodated
with new and unique activities. Unanticipated situations occur when either the monitored
process or the intelligent system exhibits unexpected behavior. The tasks assigned to the
operator and the intelligent system may be altered in such situations. The intelligent system
should be designed to accommodate real-time alteration of normal activity sequences (i.e., the
chronological series of activities performed by agents of the fault management team). See also
section 4.2.3 for recommendations relevant to handling unanticipated situations.
Problem: Handling Alteration of Planned Activity Sequences
Recommendation: Unusual and possibly untried sequences of activities can be
performed by team members during workaround to accommodate unanticipated
situations. The intelligent system should be designed to allow changes in expected
activity sequences.
Example: The example in figure 4-6 illustrates difficulties arising from the inability
to alter activity sequences in real time. In figure 4-7, the operator is allowed to alter
the activity sequence expected by the intelligent system. The intelligent system can
now respond in a more useful fashion to on-going events. This example is based
on Scenario 3 (refer to beginning of section 4).
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Problem: Handling Alteration of Planned Activity Sequences
BEFORE- Example illustrating Problem:
A power failure affecting the elbow pitch joint has resulted in loss of all but the BACKUP
control mode. Normally, four control modes are possible. Malfunction procedures specify
that the SINGLE mode would be used for the remaining joints (wrist and shoulder). The
operator, however, decides to use DIRECT mode to ensure that the elbow joint position will
remain fixed (i.e. the only restraint in SINGLE is gearbox friction) during the planned
operation to open a sunshield on a deployed satellite. The intelligent system's expectation
of SINGLE mode operations cannot be readjusted and its recommendations become irrelevant.
Joint Control - Elbow Pitch
O AUTO O DIRECT
O SINGLE • BACKUP
IMPACT: Power Failure
Elbow Pitch Joint
AUTO control unavailable
DIRECT control unavailable
SINGLE control unavailable
Joint Control - Wrist Pitch
O AUTO • DIRECT
O SINGLEo BACKUP
_:PROCEDURES
Temp Monitor
_MS Checkout l
RMS Checkout Procedure:
"IV Camera Checko"k"'o'_
Single Drive Test _]
i Intelligent System Recommendations i
[ •
Recommend SINGLE
joint control on wrist
and shoulder
Intelligent System Conclusions
Power Failure in Elbow
Pitch joint servo
Recomme LE Recommend halt checkout
joint control on wrist of DIRECT joint control
and shoulder
000:02:33:06
f f///_V/f/4r/'///'_
# Unexpected wrist and #. ; Unexpected checkout of #
; shoulder joint control _ i DIRECT joint control #
# modeDIRECT #. /////J #///////_
/////////_////_V,
000:02:33:38 000:02:33:54
STEP 1
Intelligent system recommends
use of SINGLE drive control
mode on wrist and shoulder
after loss of all but BACKUP
mode on elbow (servo failure)
STEP 2
Operator decides to select
DIRECT drive control for
improved restraint in elbow
joint position hold
STEP 3
Operator initiates checkout
of DIRECT control prior to
operations; intelligent
system still expects SINGLE
Figure 4-6. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Intelligent System with Fixed Planned Activity
Sequence
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Problem: Handling Alteration of Planned Activity Sequences
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the activity sequence expected by the intelligent system can be altered.
The operator informs the intelligent system of the changes to planned activities. The
intelligent system now assists the operator by assessing the potential impacts of the
new sequence. Based on these impacts, the operator decides to contklue with the new
activity sequence and normal operations continue.
Joint Control - Elbow Pitch
O AUTO O DIRECT
O SfqC-,LE • BACKUP
IMPACT: Power Failure
Elbow Pitch Joint
AUTO control unavailable
DIRECT control unavailable
SINGLE control unavailable
Checkout SINGLE all joints
ure SINGLE all
Unberth Payload
I Intelligent System Recommendations I
Select Activities:
i Checkout BACKUP elbow _J
i Checkout DIRECT other mjoints
Confiqure BACKUP elbow
Possible loss of all BACKUP_
'S control at use of BACKUP l
v
I V
I
I Recommend SINGLE joint control Ion wrist and shoulder
I Intelligent System Conclusions
, + ' I
I Power Failure in ElbowIPitch joint servo I I New Activity Sequence: BACKUP Icontrol on elbow and DIRECT onwrist and shoulder
1
000:02:33:06 000:02:33:42
STEP 1
Intelligent system recommends
use of SINGLE drive control
mode on wrist and shoulder
after loss of all but BACKUP
mode on elbow (servo failure)
STEP 2
Operator decides to select
DIRECT drive control for
improved restraint in elbow
joint position hold; alters
planned activity sequence
STEP 3
Intelligent system informs
operator of possible impact
of new activity sequence;
normal operations proceed
Figure 4-7. AFTER: Example Illustrating Intelligent System with Altcration of Planned
Acdvity Sexlucncc
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Modes of operation are a way of varying agent task assignments in a controlled manner. Each
mode represents an operational context that defines and constrains what the agent can do within
that mode. Modes can also be a means of organizing and associating information for
presentation based on goals associated with the operational context. Agent capabilities, the
available information, and the style of agent interaction can vary in different modes. When
modes are used to define contexts for agent activity and interaction, they should be clearly
indicated to the operator at all times. Both the currently active mode and the remaining
available modes should be evident to the operator. The display should be designed with a
"uniquely different appearance" to clearly indicate the current mode (Johns, 1990).
Problem: Distinguishing Active Mode of Operation
]_ecommendation: When the intelligent system can operate in more than one mode,
the user interface should clearly distinguish the currently active mode. The method
used to identify mode should be easily discemable and should minimize the cognitive
effort required by the operator.
F.,,xaml_: The example in figure 4-8 illustrates problems arising when the active
mode of operation is not clearly distinguished on the user interface. In figure 4-9,
active mode is indicated by a unique screen background pattern. This example did
not require use of the scenarios outlined at the beginning of Section 4.
As illustrated in the example in figure 4-9, use of a distinctive background on displays relies on
perception instead of cognition to indicate mode. Refer to user interface guidelines such as
JSC (May 1988) or Smith and Mosier (1986) for a discussion of other coding techniques.
Example of systems from the case study with modes include the Procedures Interpreter (one of
the OMA prototypes), the RTDS GNC Jet Control application, the Rendezvous Expert System,
and the KU Band Self Test Expert System. See Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) for details of
these cases.
Handover
Another situation where the task assignments of the operator and the intelligent system will
change is at a handover of responsibility between agents. Handovers may occur between
human operators at shift changes and between the human and intelligent system to balance
work load or during joint tasking. The intelligent system should be designed to support both
handover of task responsibility and to assist handovers between operators.
The discussion of agent coordination activities presented in section 3.3.2 includes a description
of the ways in which agents can share a task. During supervised operations, the overseeing
agent may temporarily assume responsibility from another agent (e.g., operator may switch to
manual control of manipulator to avoid collision with intruding object). During sequential
activity sequences, responsibility alternates between agents. For both types of operations, it is
necessary for the agent assuming responsibility to be aware of relevant events preceding the
handover to guarantee adequate understanding of the current situation.
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Problem: Distinguishing Active Mode of Operation
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the intelligent system provides a number of modes of operation. These modes
affect the available information and functionality provided by the intelligent system. The
operator enters the REVIEW mode, to allow viewing of previous events using the windows
provided for REAL-TIME support. Notice that there is no visible indication that intelligent
system mode has changed. Due to intervening work demands, the operator forgets that he is
in REVIEW mode and attempts to perform an operation only permissible in REAL-TIME mode
(alteration of activity sequence). The operator is reminded of current mode by a warning from
the intelligent system that the requested activity is not valid during REVIEW.
lib
IIII
lib
[] Select Mode of Operation:
O REAL-TIME O WHAT-IF
• REVIEW
STEP 1
Operator selects REVIEW
mode to peruse previous
events using same windows
as are used in real time
STEP 2
Mode change Is not distin-
guishable from screen
_ Vie_# Invalid action in #
REVIEW mo_
JlllllllllllJ
STEP 3
Operator forgets that REVIEW
mode is active; tries to
perform a real-time operation
(alter activity sequence)
Figure 4-8. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Difficulty in Distinguishing Currently Active
Mode of Operation
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Problem: Distinguishing Active Mode of Operation
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, active mode is indicated by a unique screen background pattern. A black
background is used for REAL-TIME and a figured background is used for REVIEW. When
the operator desires to change the activity sequence, he Is immediately reminded of the
active mode and makes the appropriate mode change prior to altering the activity sequence.
17 Select Mode of Operation:
O R L-TIMEO WHAT-IF
• RENEW
STEP 1
Operator selects REVIEW
mode to peruse previous
events using same windows
as are used in real time
STEP 2
Mode change Is obvious from
change in screen background
STEP 3
Operator remembers to select
REAL-TIME mode prior to
performing real-time operation
(alter activity sequence)
Figure 4-9. AFTER: Example Illustrating Clear Distinction of Currendy Active Mode of
Operation
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rProblem: Orienting M-coming Operator at Handover
Recommendation: Defme and provide access to the information necessary to orient
an agent assuming responsibility at handover about the current support situation.
This information will include changes to scheduled activities and the baseline
configuration of both the intelligent system and the monitored process as well as the
current state and status of the monitored process and the on-going activities of other
agents.
_: The examples in figures 4-10 and 4-11 illustrate the need to orient in-coming
operators at a handover about important events preceding his shift. In figure 4-10, the
in-coming operator receives no information about these events. In figure 4-11, the
intelligent system provides the in-coming operator with a summary of these events.
This example is based on Scenario 3, with a handover from operator 1 to operator 2
inserted during the scenario.
During the development of the PDRS HCI design concepts, some simple features were
provided for use by the in-coming operator at handover. An option to review all configuration
changes to monitored process and intelligent system made by previous operators was provided.
The description of these changes included useful annotation such as when the change was
made, what the change was, who made the change, and why the change was made. This
mechanism allows the operator to quickly orient himself on the current configuration of the
monitored process and the intelligent system and provides a pointer for additional information
by identifying the operator who made the change. The in-coming operator can then review the
detailed activity logs of that operator or even personally discuss the changes.
To construct such a summary of events, the intelligent system must have access to information
about important system configuration changes. If this information is not available in electronic
form, the operator must provide it to the intelligent system. The intelligent system should also
be informed when handovers occur and who the in-coming operator is (to allow annotation of
changes). See also section 4.1.2 for discussion of visibility into intelligent system and 4.2.2
for discussion of visibility into the monitored process.
Interruption of Operator
As the situation changes in a dynamic environment, the importance of scheduled activities may
change. New task priorities may require an agent to discontinue an on-going activity in order
to perform a different activity. Such interruptions of agent activity are common in multi-
tasking support environments with multiple, interacting agents.
The variety of sources of information typical of the flight support environment can result in
situations where conflicting demands for operator attention occur. The potential for operator
interruption is enhanced by the richer and more frequent dialogue and the more variable
allocation of tasks resulting from the shared responsibilities and distributed tasking of the
human-computer fault management team. The usual approach is to interrupt the operator with a
new activity request and let him decide if the request should be pursued (i.e., provide the
operator all of the information all of the time). An alternate approach is for the intelligent
system to assist the operator in managing interruptions.
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Problem: Orienting In-coming Operator at Handover
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, a handover from operator 1 to operator 2 occurs. Operator 1 fails to inform
operator 2 of the change in activity sequence that was performed a few hours ago. This change
affects the joint control mode used dudng RMS operations. When operations are initiated later,
operator 2 erroneously attempts to select the nominal control mode (AUTO). He Is then informed
that another control mode Is expected (BACKUP). Operator 2 must review logs from the past
two hours to isolate the reason for this control mode change.
_Alt er activii-ies-t
select Activities:
;heckout BACKUP elbow
Checkout SINGLE other
joints
ure ;KUP elbow
C EDIT _) ('-IMPACT _}
(c_,_cB_)
I o,n.Con.o,o P.chI
AUTOO DmCT II
I_ AUTO control mode is #
# not available for elbow_.
# --¢
# pitch #
J Intelligent System Recommendations I
J Intelligent System Conclusions J
New Activity Sequence:
BACKUP control on elbow
and DIRECT control on
wrist and shoulder
000:02:33:42 _;r_"
y I
J Recommend use BACKUP Jelbow pitch joint control
I
JHandover to C )erator 21
000:04:22:04 000:04:22:58
STEP 1
Operator 1 alters activity
sequence due to power
failure affecting elbow
joint
STEP 2
Shift change from operator 1
to operator 2; operator 1
forgets to inform operator 2
of activity sequence changes
STEP 3
Operator 2 tries to select
AUTO control for elbow
joint and intelligent system
issues warning
Figure 4-10. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Need to Orient Incoming Operatorsat Handover
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Problem: Orienting In-coming Operator at Handover
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, configuration changes made in previous shifts are made accessible to
operators at handover. Operator 2 procedurally reviews these changes at the beginning
of his shift. He thus becomes quickly familiar with events preceding his support period and
responds correctly to the off-nominal control mode selected for RMS operations. Note that
this type of capability requires _at the intelligent system have access to information about
these configuration changes, including when the change was made, what the change was, who
made the change (i.e., Identify of current operator), and why the change was made
(e.g., operator annotation).
Select Activities:
I Checkout BACKUP elbow _
Checkout SINGLE other
joints
Confl,qure BACKUP elbow
( IMPACT )
C )
elbow pitch due to _1
power failure
00:02.'06:12 Oper 1
Return from Checkou_
Joint Control - Elbow Pitch
O AUTO O DIRECT
0 SIqGLE • BACKUP
I Intelligent System
[ Intelligent System
y
New Activity Sequence:
BACKUP control on elbow
and DIRECT control on
wrist and shoulder
000:02:33:42
Recommendations I
T
Recommend that in-coming
Operator 2 examine previous
configuration changes for altered
activities
Conclusions_,,_;p, J _pr
I Handover to Operator 2 I
_:_ 000:04:J2:04
r
lnttiate RMS
l
operations J
000:04:22:58
STEP 1
Operator 1 alters activity
sequence due to power
failure affecting elbow
Joint
STEP 2
Shift change from operator 1
to operator 2; intelligent system
informs operator 2 of Important
events, Including activity
sequence changes
STEP 3
Operator 2 does not change
control mode for elbow joint
prior to RMS operations
Figure 4-11. AFTER: Example Illustrating Intelligent System Orienting an Incoming Operator
at Handover
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Interruptionscan initiate from a variety of sources and for a variety of reasons. The operator
can decide to stop the current activity in favour of another activity deemed more important. The
intelligent system can interrupt the operator with new information or activity requests. Other
support personnel can desire to collaborate with the operator. Events in the flight support
environment independent of the flight support task can interrupt on-going activities (e.g.,
failure of a workstation). Situations associated with the fault management task can interrupt the
operator, including the occurrence of an anomaly, the completion of a background task
requested by the operator, or a contingency situation (section 4.2.3).
There are two issues associated with managing interruptions of the operator. One issue is
deciding which activity the operator should pursue based on the potential impacts of
discontinuing the current activity or ignoring the new activity. The other issue is orienting the
operator about the suspended activity when it is resumed after an interruption (either the former
activity or the new activity).
Problem: Handing Interruptions and Suspended Activity
Recommendation: Agent coordination activities should include specification of how
interruptions will be handled. New information and activity requests should be
presented in a context that assists the operator in determining the impacts of
discontinuing the current activity or ignoring the new activity until later. A means of
suspending an operator activity while another is pursued should be provided.
Information to orient the operator about a suspended activity when it is resumed
should be provided.
Example: In the example in figure 4-12, nominal activities are interrupted by an
anomaly. No capability has been provided to manage interruptions and the operator
is required to do significant rework to resume to nominal activity at a later time. In
figure 4-13, the operator is provided the capability to suspend and restore activities,
allowing a quick resumption of nominal activities after the anomaly is addressed. 1
This example is based on Scenario 3 described at the beginning of section 4.
In Johns (1990), some techniques for managing the presentation of new activity requests are
discussed. An icon can be used to indicate that an activity is waiting for the operator's
attention. This suspended activity can be the request for a new operator activity (e.g., the
review of new information) or a former activity waiting to be resumed.
Issue: Research is needed into ways to effectively manage the presentation of new
information and activity requests to the operator when other activities are on-going. This
issue is especially important in real-time, multi-tasking environments where multiple
sources of information exist and requests are often time-dependent.
1 Note that the capability to suspend activities introduces design challenges. The effects of a later activity could
alter conditions required for a suspended activity or suspended activities could accumulate as task priorities
change during an anomaly. Possible solutions to these challenges could include requiring the operator to verify
conditions prior to activity resumption, limiting the number of activities that can be queued in suspension, and
preventing the resumption of very old activities (i.e., activities that are more likely to have invalid conditions).
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Problem: Handling Interruptions and Suspended Activity
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the operator is interrupted during a nominal activity to manage an anomaly
that has just occurred. The nominal activity is the alteration of an activity sequence. The
operator is editing this sequence when the intelligent system detects an anomaly in the end
effector. This anomaly requires execution of the End Effector Checkout procedures. The
operator cancels the nominal activity and initiates activities to diagnose the failure. Much
later, after the failure has been diagnosed and repaired, the operator desires to return to
his previous activity of altering activity sequence. He must completely reccnfigure the
screen for this activity and then redo all editing changes.
Select Activities:
Checkout BACKUP elbow
Checkout DIRECT other
joints
_CKUP elbow
{IMPACT.)
_ L____J
Tamp Monitor
RMS Checkout
RMS Checkout Procedure
Augmented Mode Chec_l
tAIter activities _1
I View activities /Monitor activitie I
I Intelligent System Recommendations I
I T PP
J ecommend Checkout of JEnd Effector
I
II Intelligent System Conclusions I
I F J" J' ,f ar_r J'S'.f _r ar .f Jr 4r J',_ II ,l WARNING'. Anomaly in _ End Effector Checkout
' end effect°rdetected _ I initiated I
000:02:33:42
000:01:41
:04
STEP 1
Alteration of an activity
sequence is in progress
when intelligent system
detects an anomaly;
operator cancels current
activity to handle anomaly;
STEP 2
Initiate checkout of end effector
procedure as first step in
diagnosing the anomaly
STEP 3
Operator returns to altering
the activity sequence; he must
completely redo the new
activity sequence (i.e., his
previous inputs were lost)
Figure 4-12. BEFORE: Example Illustrating No Capability to Handle Interruptions
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Problem: Handling Interruptions and Suspended AcUvlty
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the operator is provided the capability to suspend and restore activities.
Suspend performs a temporary save on the current state of the activity. The operator
suspends the activity to alter planned activity sequence before initiating diagnosis of end
effector anomaly. The operator then restores the suspended activity after the anomaly
has been diagnosed and repaired.
Alter activities ,_
Select Activities:
Checkout BACKUP elbow !_
Checkout DIRECT other mjointsConfigure BACKUP elbow
C IMPACT )
(CANCEL)( DONE)
[_Suspen__'_
I "r'v'°u'"°"v't'lunc,or..,or.
PROCEDURES
Temp Monitor
RMS Checkout
RMS Checkout Procedure:
Augmented
OCAS Check
Undo restore I
_Alter activities
Select Activities:
Checkout BACKUP elbow W
Checkout DIRECT other
joints
,,Configure BACKUP elbowl_]
(IMPACT)
CANCEL ) ( DONE )
I Intelligent System
i T
Recommendations J
I
Recommend Checkout of I
IEnd Effector
,stem Conclusions I
WARNING: Anomaly in I
end effector detected
",J ,,#'_w,_,,F ,/' ,#" J'At" J J' p p ,F ,#%
I
End Effector Checkout I
Iinitiated
I
000:02:33:58000:02:33:42 _7"_r 000:02:41:04
STEP 1
Alteration of an activity
sequence is in progress when
intelligent system detects an
anomaly; operator suspends
current activity (i,e., saves
current state of user interface)
STEP 2
Initiate checkout of end effector
procedure as first step in
diagnosing the anomaly
STEP 3
Operator restores the state
of the user interface prior
to the anomaly
Figure 4-13. AFTER: Example Illustrating Assistance in Handling Interruptions
4-24
/f
//-
Techniques for handling interruptions that were observed in the case study include the use of
icons indicating that new information is available for review (see Volume 2 (Malin et al, 1991),
the DATA COMM Expert System ) and the coding of messages to indicate the priority or
importance of a message (see table 4-2 for an example from case study).
Table 4-2. Example of Coding for Message Priority (Brown and Kalvelage, 1988)
OPEP_TOR RF._ON_
1
2
3
4
5
Immediate attention
Attention as soon as possible
Attention as soon as practical
Advisory, possible problem
Information, no problem
Red, long tone
Yellow, short tone
Blue, short tone
Blue, short tone
Blue, short tone
4.1.2 Collaboration between Agents
Collaboration between agents is essential to the coordination of agents for joint tasking. The
goal of this collaboration is to establish a common understanding between agents of the team
concerning some situation or event. This shared frame of reference assists in the interpretation
of information provided by and activities performed by these agents.
A common understanding between the operator and the intelligent system is achieved by an
exchange of information between the two about the environmental situation, the state of the
monitored process, the beliefs of the intelligent system, and the beliefs of the operator. A
human analogy to this is communication between partial, overlapping specialists, where the
role of expert shifts depending upon the topic under discussion (section 3.3.2). In this
scenario, both the intelligent system and the operator can be enlightened and their joint goal is
to correctly perceive and respond to the current situation. The key issues in designing for
collaboration are:
• What information should each agent provide?
• How may this information be effectively presented?
This section provides recommendations on the design of intelligent systems for collaboration.
Traditional forms of explanation are investigated as a means of collaboration. Design of
intelligent systems with access to system reasoning is presented as a way to improve operator
understanding of system conclusions. Review of previous events is discussed as an approach
for developing a shared view of situation between agents. Joint review of previous events
leads to a common interpretation of these events. Joint prediction of the consequences of an
event (section 4.2.2) can also establish shared expectations between agents and assist in
identifying appropriate agent activities.
Visibility into Intelligent System Activities and Reasoning
Visibility can be described as providing an unobstructed view of an item of interest. Thus,
providing visibility into intelligent system processing means providing the operator with access
to information which characterizes the system processing, including internal or intermediate
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states of the system. The operator should have access to the same information as the intelligent
system to enable him to reach the same conclusions. Even the simplest form of explanation,
the rule trace, requires some access to intelligent system internals. The ability to clarify
intelligent system reasoning and actions becomes especially important when the system fails.
Such a capability can be very useful in detecting software errors (section 4.1.3), both for
debugging during software development (Chandrasekaran et al., 1989) and during operational
support.
Problem: Providing Visibility into Intelligent System Reasoning
Recommendation: Visibility into the intermediate intelligent system hypotheses,
alternate solutions, and internal states should be provided as a means of clarifying
intelligent system processing/reasoning.
_: In the example in figure 4-14, the operator is provided no visibility into the
intelligent system. He has no ability to evaluate if the intelligent system is pursuing a
productive path of investigation. In figure 4-15, access to interim information is
provided, which clarifies the reasoning paths being pursued by the intelligent system.
This example is based on Scenario 2.
Visibility into the intelligent system can include the display of interim information, including
intermediate conclusions, hypotheses, and alternative solutions when available. Interim
information is often conditioned on dynamic data and is thus highly variable. The display of
such information should dynamically update as the situation changes (as represented by data).
As illustrated in figure 4-15, interim information (such as hypotheses) should be clearly
distinguished from facts.
Problem: Distinguishing Hypotheses from Facts
RecommEndation: Providing access to interim results requires that hypotheses be
distinguished from facts. The user interface should clearly identify the degree of
certainty associated with displayed information to differentiate between the
established and the inconclusive.
There are a number of coding methods that can be useful in discerning information items (e.g.,
methods identified in Herrman (1988) include color, intensity, reverse video, blinking, font,
text size, and bolding). Symbols can also be useful in uniquely !.dentify'.m.g char .acteristics of an
information item. Johns introduces the context zcon, a symbol displayed m proxarmty with a "
display item that provides the context for interpreting this item (Johns, 1990). Refer to the
OMA Prototypes in Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) for an example from the case study that
included access to intermediate information (e.g., list of suspected faults) from the intelligent
system.
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Problem: Providing Visibility Into Intelligent System Reasoning
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the operator must walt untll a message Is issued to determine what the
intelligent system Is Investigating. Even after messages have been issued, It is not clear
how the system reached a conclusion and what hypotheses were eliminated. The intelligent
system becomes an inscrutable "black box" to the operator.
i Intelligent System Recommendations i
I T I
I Intelligent System Concluslonsl
, 1,
MPM Deploy initiated J
I
I Single MPM motor Ifailur
I
Recommend:
• Check power fall
• Visual assessment
of arm position
i--o'o0*OOn=Icomplete in expected time
I
000:01:03:00 000:01:03:34 000:01:04:08
STEP 1
Intelligent system detects
initiation of Deployment.
STEP 2
Intelligent system concludes
one of two MPM motors has
failed.
STEP 3
Intelligent system concludes
MPM Deploy did not complete
as expected and recommends
procedures to Identify cause
of failure. Operator has no
way to determine current
hypotheses about cause of
failure.
Figure 4-14. BEFORE: Example Illustrating No Visibility into IntcUigcnt System's Reasoning
4-27
Problem: Providing Visibility into Intelligent System Reasoning
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
The operator is provided access to intedm hypotheses in this example. This visibility
improves operator understanding of the intelligent system's reasonlr_ and also provides a
possible means of altering information used in that reasoning (see also section 4.1.3).
HYPOTHESES
Deploy _ot
detected
SUSPECTED
FAULTS
Sensor
Fail
Power
t Check EGIL ]for powerfail
t Check crew]for visual I
assessment]I Intelligent System Recommendations I
I Deploy I_
failed r_
f Motor 2fall
External
obstruction
totem Conclusions I
J MPM Deploy Initiated J
I
000:01:03:00
I Single MPM motor Ifailur
I
000:01:03:34
I'
Recommend:
• Check power fail
• Visual assessment
of arm position
MPM Deploy did not I
complete In expected time I
I
000:01:04:08
STEP 1
Intelligent system detects
initiation of Deployment.
STEP 2
Intelligent system concludes
one of two MPM motors has
failed.
STEP 3
Operator can investigate
intelligent system failure
hypotheses In addition to
reviewing conclusions of
the intelligent system.
Figure 4-15. AFTER: Example Illustrating Visibility into Intelligent Systems Reasoning
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Providing access to information and presentation of that information during collaboration will
affect the intelligent system architecture and knowledge representation. The intelligent system
must be able to provide information about its goals, hypotheses, interim states, alternative
conclusions, and reasoning processes as well as the state of the monitored process. The
knowledge base must be structured to provide this information in a usable form. The
information required for agent collaboration should be defined as part of the initial system
design. The internal knowledge representation and reasoning structure of the intelligent system
should be accessible by the operator and should be used in communicating with the operator.
Such a mental model assists the operator in evaluating intelligent system conclusions.
Problem: Understanding Intelligent System Reasoning Strategy
Recommendation: A representation of the reasoning strategies used by the intelligent
system is an effective means of presenting information during collaboration between
the operator and the intelligent system about the results of that reasoning.
Example: The example in figure 4-16 illustrates difficulties arising from no access to
intelligent system reasoning strategy in real time. In figure 4-17, an explicit
representation of the process for detecting anomalies is used to clarify this strategy.
This example is based on Scenario 2.
Multiple levels of automation in the intelligent system can result in variations in the reasoning
process of the intelligent system. Visibility into the intelligent system reasoning strategy
should include clarification of the available levels of automation when more than one level is
provided. The representation of this reasoning strategy should assist the operator in
understanding and using these levels of automation. See also the discussion of dynamic task
assignment in section 4.1.1.
As seen in figure 4-17, a functional diagram can be used to represent the reasoning strategy
used by an intelligent system. This functional diagram can be explicitly represented in the user
interface. This explicit representation reinforces the operator's understanding of the intelligent
system's capabilities and can serve as a means of accessing interim conclusions and alternative
states used in the reasoning process.
The use of functional diagrams for display can introduce the problem of insufficient display
space, especially if the diagram is complex (Czerwinski, 1990). One method for managing the
use of display space by the diagram is to partition it into major functional blocks and employ
optional overlay for investigation of the details of a functional block (Chu, 1990). When the
use of overlay results in only a portion of the flow chart being visible, an overview of the entire
flowchart should be displayed, with the currently visible portion highlighted (see also section
4.3.2 and section 5). These techniques were used in the PDRS HCI design concepts
(Schreckenghost, 1990).
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Problem: Understanding Intelligent System Reasoning Strategy
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
in this example, the operator does not understand why the intelligent system has decided to issue
an alarm at this time. He recognizes that the MPM is not In the desired state, but is not clear
about the timing of the alarm. By reviewing the history of messages issued by the intelligent
system, the operator infers that timing criteria are exceeded, but it still not clear what those
criteria are. He finally has to resort to looking the information up in a manual and assuming
that the intelligent system is using the documented criteria.
ji .assa,.L,std
I Schematics I
I Tab,as I
[] Event Summary
U
000:01:01:46 The MPM deploy did not []
complete within the expected tim,= M000:01:00:00 Expect single motor ckivetime.
000:01:00:00 MPM deploy commanded
Imm
I Flight
I Control
_ H_k
i Intelligent System Conclusions J
I ,Ir
MPM Deploy did not
complete in expected time
000:01:04:08
STEP 1
Intelligent system detects
anomaly - MPM Deploy did not
complete as expected. Operator
calls up intelligent system message
list to investigate why
alarm was issued at this time.
000:01:04:36
STEP 2
Operator scrolls through
list looking for an
indication of alarm
criteria. He determines
that he needs to identify
MPM deploy timing criteria.
000:01:05:06
STEP 3
Intelligent system timing
criteria are not accessible by
the operator. He goes to a
manual listing MPM deploy
timing cdteria and assumes
these are same as used by
intelligent system.
Figure 4-16. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Inability to Access Intelligent System Reasoning
Strategy
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Problem: Understanding Intelligent System Reasoning Strategy
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, diagrams illustrating portions of the reasoning process are used as a means of
accessing information about the reasoning strategy. These diagrams provide a context for
interpreting the information provided (i.e., how was this information conduded?). Additionally,
these diagrams serve to reinforce the operator's understanding of Intelligent system reasoning.
[] Diagnostic
Reasoning
I GenerateFault I
Hypotheses I
Evaluate Fault
Hypotheses
Construct
Suspect Ust
[] Anomaly Detection Process
I I"'"ur" IExpected State Actual State
differences
differences
Generate Alarm
[] Alarm Generation
Alarm: I_
MPM Deployment Not
Complete M
Criteria:
Actual MPM Sensor State !_
does not agree with
Expected MPM Sensor
State within Single Motor
Deploy Times.
Relevant Parameters:
Single Motor Deploy
Time: 68 sec
Elapsed Time: 70 sec
I Intelligent System Conclusions I
i V 1
MPM Deploy did not
complete in expected time
000:01:04:08
STEP 1
Intelligent system detects
anomaly - MPM Deploy did not
complete as expected. Operator
accesses Overview of Diagnosis
Reasoning to investigate why
alarm was Issued at this time.
000:01:04:36
STEP 2
Operator accesses the
Anomaly Detection Process
Diagram from the Overview
of Diagnostic Reasoning.
000:01:05:06
STEP 3
Operator accesses a list of
Alarms Issued and Criteria
used to trigger alarms from
the Anomaly Detection Process
Diagram. From criteria, operator
concludes alarm generated after
68 seconds had elapsed with no
deployment.
Figure 4-17. AFTER: Example Illustrating Explicit Representation of Intelligent System
Reasoning Strategy
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Explanation
Explanation is an iterative process of identifying, organizing, and presenting information to
satisfy an agent's inquiry about some situation (or event). The on-going activities of the
participating agents establish a context for the interpretation of information that will affect the
response provided (Chandrasekaran et al., 1989). The currently-active goals and activities of
the inquirer should be considered by the responding agent when formulating the answer to a
question. This context should influence the presentataon of information and the style of agent
interaction. For example, when the intelligent system is monitoring data in real time, it should
explain its conclusions based on the current situation. When the intelligent system is assisting
in predicting the effects of some hypothetical event, it should explain its conclusions based on
the hypothesized situation.
Problem: Responding to Questions in Context
Recommendation: If the intelligent system is to provide an explanation capability, it
should be designed to interpret and respond to questions within the context of relevant
situations and agent activities. This consideration affects both the information content
and presentation of the answer.
_: In figure 4-18, the example illustrates operator confusion resulting from no
consideration of context by the intelligent system during collaboration. Figure 4-19
illustrates improved collaboration when the on-going activities are used to provide
context. This example is based on Scenario 3.
Effective communication requires shared modalities and compatibility with information
processing capabilities between the communicants. It is important for intelligent systems to
include knowledge which is at least similar in important respects to the knowledge of their
human parmers. Research suggests that human experts use mental models, systematic
inferential schemes grounded in their commonsense models, in reasoning about physical
systems (Gentner and Stevens, 1983). In artificial intelligence, qualitative physics grew out of
the attempt to formalize mental models and engineering problem solving. Qualitative physics
seeks to formalize reasoning about the physical world, from the commonsense intuitions of the
person on the street to the technical analyses performed by expert scientists and engineers
(Weld and de Kleer, 1990).
Domain experts rely on a shared substrate of knowledge about the physical world. For
example, human physicists have grown up in such a way to arm them with intuitive notions of
space, time, matter, and so on, which provide a foundation for more technical knowledge
gained in schools and laboratories. To be sure, this foundation is (ideally) rebuilt during the
process of learning. Both experts and novices can often solve textbook problems, but one mark
of a true expert is that their intuition has been systematically informed and upgraded by their
technical education 1. But the point is that this shared experience provides the starting point for
communication between domain experts (see section 3.3.2 and appendix C for discussion of
modes of interaction between experts).
1 Although the Clement and McCloskey chapters in (Gentner and Stevens, 1983) indicate that this conceptual
restructuring does not always occur during physics education.
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Problem: Responding to Questions In Context
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem :
In this example, nominal activities are interrupted by an anomaly requidng the operator's
immediate attention. This transition In activities represents a context change. The operator
is now focused on diagnosing the anomaly and communications about the previous activity can
be confusing. In this case, two impact assessments have been requested. Since diagnosis of the
anomaly is the operator's current activity, he Is expecting to see impacts of the anomaly. When
the impact of the activity sequence change (i.e., the interrupted activity) is provided instead,
the operator misinterprets it as the anomaly impact and fails to take action to compensate for the
impact.
  it;;-aciiviii;; d
Select Activities:
Checkout DIRECT all joints_
Configure DIRECT all lointfc_J
Unberth Payload J_
C' EDIT ') _IMPACT:iii_
(CANCEL)( OC_E )
[] Anomaly Information
Loss of BACKUP control Iin Elb w
 (CORRECT)
( DESCRIBE )
[-J IMPACT: Control Mode
DIRECT
No computer-assisted
control
Intelligent System Recommendations
V
Recommend SINGLE joint control
on wrist and shoulder
_E
Intelligent System Concluslona J
FJPPPlJJ_JJlJ_
# Power Failure in Elbow;
Pitch joint servo #
I f ,,#"J',f J' J" J' J',f ,J' J' I/'_
000:02:33:06
ossofBACKUP control
in Elbow I
//////_////////_
000:02:33:22
STEP 1
Operator is altering activity
sequence due to power fail.
He requests the impact resulting
from use of DIRECT control mode
instead of SINGLE control mode.
STEP 2
An anomaly is detected in
BACKUP control mode. The
operator requests immediate
impacts of this anomaly.
STEP 3
Intelligent system returns
with results of impact assess-
ment from the altered activity
sequence, which the operator
mis-interprets as impact of
anomaly. Operator fails to take
needed action to recover from
loss of elbow operations.
Figure 4-18. BEFORE: Example Illustrating No Consideration of Context during
Collaboration
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Problem: Responding to Questions in Context
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the intelligent system recognizes the transition to another activity and alters
its activities correspondingly. The operator is provided with the _pected anomaly impact
assessment while the impact assessment for modifying activity sequence is suspended until the
anomaly is under control. The operator then proceeds to compensate for the loss of elbow
operations.
Select Activities:
Unberth Pa
C EDIT )_
C CANCFI )C D(_E )
[] Anomaly Information
i oss of BACKUP controlin Elb w
CORRECT)
{ DESCRIBE )
"_Fllllllllllllllll
#El IMPACT: Control Mode
BACKUP #
WARNING: Elbow operations
# not possible. #
#_ J4Tf J'l'f f Jf J'J JJ'J Jl'_
I Intelligent system Recommendations I
I
I
I Recommend SINGLE joint control Ion wrist end shoulder
I
I Intelligent System Conclusions I
T_////////,S'//AIT4F _'/,4T/// f///I/I/I.
Power Failure in Elbow: ;, Loss of BACKUP control ;
• T
Impact Assessment for ]
activity sequence suspended Idue to Joss of BACKUP.
i
# Pitch joint servo #
_llllllllllllJ
000:02:33:06
I in Elbow #
_lllllSllllllllJ
000:02:33:14 000:02:33:22
STEP 1
Operator is altering activity
sequence due to power fail.
He requests the impact resulting
from use of DIRECT control mode
instead of SINGLE control mode.
STEP 2
An anomaly is detected in
BACKUP control mode. The
operator requests immediate
impacts of this anomaly.
STEP 3
Intelligent system recognizes
that current activity is anomaly
management. Suspends other
activities until anomaly under
control. The expected impact
(the anomaly impact) is provided
and operator takes action to
compensate for loss of elbow
operations.
Figure 4-19. AFTER: Example Illustrating Improved Collaboration using Context of On-
going Activities
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Obviously, our computer programs have not had the benefit of this shared experience. And
this puts them at a serious disadvantage, both in reasoning about physical systems and in
communication regarding them. Since a general-purpose, human-grade intelligent system
which could learn from living in the world seems a rather long way off, the only way to bridge
this gap is for us to articulate this tacit knowledge of the physical world, in a precise form
which our programs can then use. Using this concrete representation of intuitive knowledge,
the operator and intelligent system can share knowledge about the monitored process that is
normally gained by only through experience. The key point for human-computer interaction is
that, just as the visual and auditory aspects of user interface must match the constraints of the
human information processing system for maximum effectiveness, the information content of
the user interface must also match the constraints of human conceptual systems if we are to
ever make computers into collaborators.
Problem: Making Abstract Entities Concrete
Recommendation: A variety of abstract, conceptual entities are often used in
reasoning about complex physical systems. Many of these concepts are gained
through shared experience. The HCI design should make these abstract entities
concrete. One obvious kind of conceptual entity needed to support communication
is the existence of a specific physical process (e.g., chemical reaction, evaporation).
Such information could be provided as annotations to the artifact's schematic, or
used as the basis for a completely different display organization.
Annotated schematics seem to be the dominant display organization in today's model-based
systems. While they clearly have an advantage in being familiar to domain experts, it is far
from clear that they are optimal for most purposes. One alternative class is functional
descriptions, which can provide valuable suppression of detail. Displaying the block currently
attended to provided an excellent indication of the system's reasoning.
The operational goals of the system should be made explicit and displayed along with their
connection to performance parameters of the system (the formalisms used in cognitive
engineering may be useful in this regard). A good example of this was the "efficiency meter"
in the Recovery Boiler Tutor (Woolf et al., 1986). No such meter existed in the actual plants,
but it proved so useful in the evaluation of the tutor that the addition of such a meter was under
consideration.
An alternative to organizing parameters visually using a schematic is to draw the presumed
causal structure connecting them. Such a display could provide a very rapid indication of
where to look to pinpoint faults and would be useful in a joint effort to verify a diagnosis.
A qualitative summary of the artifact's behavior, in the form of an event sequence, could be
useful for many purposes. This low-level description could be continually parsed using a goal-
oriented vocabulary to provide concise descriptions of what is going on. (For example, "it
managed to compensate for the start-up of the semiconductor furnace already, but the
temperature is still a bit high from the shutdown of the B evaporator."). See also section
4.3.1.2 on qualitative representation.
The ability to collaborate about the current situation requires that the operator understand both
the environmental evidence (i.e., data) suggesting the situation and the knowledge and
reasoning used by the intelligent system to draw conclusions about that evidence (i.e., shared
knowledge between operator and intelligent system). Typically, explanation addresses
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questionsabout the monitored process that generated environmental behavior. The operator
also should be able to ask questions about the intelligent system decision-making process --
what reasoning strategies were used, what were the interim states that lead to a decision?
Agents should be able to exchange information about (1) the environmental influences, (2) the
behavior of the monitored process (including the control strategies that affected that behavior),
(3) intelligent system beliefs, goals, and strategies, and (4) operator commands. This
information should be presented within the context of what has preceded the current situation
and why specific activities were performed. Such information exchange will assist the operator
in evaluating the conclusions of the machine and aid in identifying ways to redirect intelligent
system reasoning if required. If collaborative exchanges are logged, they can also be used off-
line to refme the intelligent system's knowledge base.
Information sharing 1 should occur in both directions, where both the intelligent system and the
operator can inform the other about its beliefs. Since the operator is the "team leader",
however, his beliefs will predominate. Designing the intelligent system for improved
collaboration should allow the intelligent system to influence the operator's beliefs more
effectively.
Problem: Promoting Shared Understanding of Situation
Recommendation: Explanation should promote a shared understanding of situation
by participating agents. It should assist the operator in identifying problems and their
relation to task goals. It should include background about the perceived situation and
describe on-going activities and events that affect this situation.
_: The example in figure 4-20 illustrates problems that can arise when the
intelligent system is not designed to assist the operator in understanding its
conclusions. In figure 4-21, an example of a design for shared understanding is
illustrated. This example is based on Scenario 2.
Techniques for explanation need not be limited to textual presentation. The example presented
previously in figure 4-21 shows how a graphic illustration of function may be used as a type of
explanation. Notice that the use of graphics for explanation does not preclude the use of text.
Just as human-human explanation uses the spoken word to supplement graphical illustration,
human-computer explanation using graphical displays can be improved by text annotation
(Johns, 1990).
Explanation for real-time monitoring and fault management is affected by the time constraints
of the support task. There is no time to wait until an anomalous situation has stabilized to
conduct a retrospective dialog with the intelligent system (i.e., reconstruct what actually
happened after the situation has fully developed). The intelligent system must provide
assistance as the problem is unfolding, assisting the operator in formulating a response to the
anomaly by clarifying goals, identifying impacts, and evaluating alternatives.
1 Note that the concept of information sharing does not imply the need for user modeling in the intelligent
system.
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Problem: Promoting Shared Understanding of Situation
BEFORE - Example Illustrating ProMem:
In this example, the operator is investigating why the intelligent system issued the alarm
"MPM deployment not complete" at this time. The only means provided to assist the op_ator
in understanding the reasoning of the intelligent system are • summary of event messages and
a rule race. The rule trace is e time-consuming approach, however, requiring an operator to
become very familiar with implementation-level details of the system. Also, this approach does
little to clarify the overall reasoning structure of the system.
[] Event Summary
000:01:01:46 The MPM deploy did not complete within the expected time.
000:01:01:10 Expect single motor drive time.
000:01:00:36 MPM deploy commanded.
000:00:59:20 RMS Powerup complete.
000:00:55:04 RMS Powerup initiated.
STEP I
The operator first reviews messages from the intelligent system by scrolling through the event
summary. Although messages summarize important events, there is lime indication of how these
events were identified.
STEP 2
Rule Fired RMSIOO9-mpm-deploy-not-complete
Fact mpm_state stowed
Fact mpm_commend deploy
Fact mpm status single-motor-tin_-depioy
Fact current time 000:01:01:46
Fact elapsed_timedeploy 70
Rule Fired RMS1108-mpm-single-motor-deploy
Fact mpm state stowed
Fact mpm command deploy
Fact mpm status single-motor-time-deploy
Fact current_time 000:01:01:10
Fact elapsed_time, deploy 70
Rule Fired RMSIOOg-mpm-deploy-commanded
Next the operator calls up a rule trace which shows the rules that fired and the state of the
knowledge base at each firing. Given a listing of the rules and a large amount oftkne, it is
possible to identify how the intelligent system came to a specific conclusion. The operator's
understanding of overall system reasoning, however, is not improved by this approach.
Figurv 4-20. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Difficulty in Achieving Shared Understanding of
Situation between Operator and Intelligent System
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Problem: Promoting Shared Understanding of Situation
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
The reasoning process of the intelligent system is explicitly represented to assist in establishing a
shared understanding of the current situation as well as familiarizing the operator with this process.
[]
Anomaly Detection Process
Predict Measure
Expected Actual State
state Compare
to
differences
Detect Significant
significant
differences
Generate Alarm
RESULTS OF HIGHLIGHTED STEP
Expected state MPM sensor is DEPLOY
RATIONALE
The currently active procedure DEPLOY MPM
has the goal of moving RMS from stowed
state to deployed state. RMS deployment is
indicated by MPM sensor set to DEPt.C_
C NExT
STEP 1
The reasoning process of the intelligent system is represented in the diagram to the left. The
operator can step through this process using the control buttons. The first step of the Anomaly
Detection Process is illustrated in this figure, including the rationale for the expected state
Anomely
Predict
Expected
state
Detection Process
Measure
Actual State
Compare
to Actu;
differences
Si
Differences
differences
Generate Alarm
RESULTS OF HIGHLIGHTED STEP
Actual state MPM sensor is STOW
RATIONALE
MPM sensors are located at the shoulder,
fore, mid, and aft of the RMS. All sensors
must be in the target state (DEPLOY) before
the MPM state transition occurs.
Current values of measurements are:
C
1
STEP 2
In this illustration, the operator has used the NEXT button to move to the second step of the Anomaly
Detection Process. This illustration continues until the operator understands why the intelligent system
generated the alarm.
Figure 4-21. AFTER: Example Illustrating Shared Understanding of Situation between
Operator and Intelligent System
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JProblem: Improving Explanation for Agent Collaboration
Recommendation: Retrospective dialog is insufficient for explanation during real-time
monitoring and fault management. The intelligent system must assist the operator in
formulating a response to anomalous situations as these situations develop.
Chandrasekaran has identified three types of explanation (Chandrasekaran et al., 1989). Most
explanation facilities fall into one of two of these categories: explaining how data match
knowledge (e.g., in its simplest form, a rule trace) or explaining knowledge (e.g., in its
simplest form, rationale in the form of pre-defined text blocks). The third type is explaining
the problem-solving strategy of the intelligent system itself. Much research is needed for all
three types of explanation. For example, while pre-defined blocks of text can often be woven
together to generate simple situation-specific explanations, a generative capacity is needed to
respond when the user does not comprehend the initial explanation. Making intelligent systems
into real team players will require them to include some capabilities to model their colleagues'
knowledge and problem-solving skills.
Often, explanation systems assume that the operator is wrong and that the intelligent system, as
the most knowledgeable agent, has the task of correcting human understanding (Wick, 1989).
Human-computer collaboration, however, requires mutual exchange of information to achieve
a common understanding of situation between agents. Collaboration is interactive and dynamic,
where the perceptions of both participants may change in the course of the discussion.
Research into explanation that promotes collaboration is required.
Issue: Explanation formulated to correct or train the user is not sufficient for agent
collaboration. Research is needed into techniques that promote exchange of information
and enable a shared viewpoint between agents.
Research relevant to agent collaboration issues spans the fields of HCI and artificial
intelligence. Within the HCI field, Woods, Roth, and Bennett (1990) have proposed a joint
human-computer cognitive system, with collaboration that parallels two human, partial experts
working together to gain mutual understanding about a problem (see also section 3.2.2 and
appendix C). Also from the HCI perspective, Johns (1990) has investigated the use of
schematics (graphic forms) to support explanation for agent collaboration. Based on his
experience in developing intelligent systems, Wexelblat (1989) has proposed a broader concept
of explanation and defined types of dialog that would assist in collaboration (see table 4-3).
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Table 4-3. Queries Promoting Agent Collaboration (Wexelblat, 1989)
Queries Promoting Agent Collaboration
• How do I do what you ask me to do? (ie, provide instructions)
• Why do you ask me to do this task? (ie, define purpose of task)
• How did you come to this question or conclusion? (ie, clarify
your reasoning process or strategy)
• By what steps did we get here? (ie, delineate the history of
recent operations)
• What do I do next? (ie, define tasks allocated to the human and
intelligent system)
• What do you know about? Do you know about X? Can I do Y?
(ie, machine recognizing it limits, what it doesn't know)
Fischer (1989) has evaluated the dialog between humans with different experience levels (i.e.,
a novice and an expert). This evaluation provides interesting insight into mechanisms for
dialogue between human and computer agents. For example, the less experienced agent may
require assistance in articulating questions or may require more information than is provided in
the original answer by the experienced agent. When expertise levels differ, misconceptions are
possible. One of the agents may perceive that the other has misunderstood him and take some
action to correct the misunderstanding. Sometimes the more experienced agent will provide
information that he perceives to be useful, even if that information has not been explicitly
requested.
There are areas in current explanation research that complement the proposed research into
human-computer collaboration, including:
Providing responses to follow-up questions based on the premise that human-human
explanation is interactive (Wick, 1989)
Employing levels of user expertise (i.e., novice to expert) to tailor the content and
presentation of explanatory information (Wick, 1989)
Explaining the problem-solving strategy of the intelligent system using an explicit
representation of control strategy in the knowledge base (Chandrasekaran et al, 1989)
Other areas of research that are needed but are currently immature include (Wexelblat, 1989):
• Unsolicited assistance (i.e., an agent does not recognize the need for assistance)
Machine recognition of the scope and limitations of its knowledge (e.g., What do you
know about?)
Most intelligent systems surveyed in the case study has some type of rule trace. Rationale in
the form of pre-defined text blocks was observed in the DATA COMM Expert System, GNC
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Air Data Probe, IESP, and the KU Band Self Test Expert System (Volume 2, Malin et al.,
1991).
Review
The ability to review recorded information about past situations can assist in establishing a
shared agent viewpoint. This approach can be used to provide additional information about the
monitored process (i.e., support of fault management) or to clarify the reasoning of the
intelligent system (i.e., coordination of agents). Review mechanisms can be as simple as
providing a scrolling capability on a message list or as complex as a complete playback of
recorded, real-time information with annotations provided by the intelligent system. For the
purposes of human-computer collaboration, a capability closer to this second type of review is
needed. Review using playback of recorded information can be very effective in clarifying
both the situation with respect to the monitored process and the behavior of the intelligent
system.
Problem: Providing Access to Event History
Recommendation: The operator should be able to review the sequence of events
leading to the diagnostic conclusions and recommendations made by the intelligent
system. This review should include access to information and activity sequences
used by the intelligent system during its reasoning process.
_: The example in figure 4-22 illustrates limitations arising from inadequate
ability to review information. Figure 4-23 illustrates an improved review capability
which allows the operator to use real-time displays to review information. This
example is based on Scenario 2.
There are two approaches to reviewing previous information that support agent collaboration.
Playback consists of re-displaying the output of a previous execution of the intelligent system.
It should be distinguished from replay, which is the re-execution of the intelligent system using
recorded input information. In replay, the output information driving the displays is actually
generated at the time of the display. Since the operator can alter parameters affecting the
execution, the output of replay may not be the same as the output of the original execution,
even though the input information is the same. Replay is also useful for re-executing the
intelligent system after restarting from some checkpoint in the past (section 4.1.3).
Playback may be conducted in a variety of ways. The recorded information can be viewed
through the same set of displays as were available in real time (i.e., taking another look). In
this technique, the operator controls the review process, including the rate of stepping through
the recorded information and the display formats that are viewed. This capability was observed
in some of the prototypes in the case study (e.g., GNC intelligent systems). An alternate
playback technique is to allow the intelligent system to control the display of information and
add supplementary information and annotation to focus operator attention on important events
and activities. An example of this capability is shown in Johns (Johns, 1990) when discussing
the use of schematics to explain a causal relationship.
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Problem: Providing Access to Event History
BEFORE - Example Illustreting ProMem:
In this example, the operator's only recourse for review is to scroll through the
history of messages generated by the intelligent system. This approach provides
a very limited view of events that occurred in the past.
[] Event Summary
000:01:01:46 The MPM deploy did nOt complete within the expected time.
000:01:01:10 Expect single motor d'ive time.
000:01:00:36 MPM deploy commanded.
000:00:59:20 RMS Powerup complete.
000:00:55:04 RMS Powerup initiated
Figure 4-22. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Limited Capability to Review Event History
Problem: Providing Access to Event History
AFTER - Example llluetratlng Solutlon:
Replay of information recorded in real time can be useful in clarifying sequence of events
leading to diagnostic conclusion of intelligent system, in this example, a control panel display
was provided to allow the operator to step through recorded information and view this
information using displays availal_e in real time. The control panel was adapted from a
display developed for RTDS intelligent systems (see Volume 2 of this report).
/SS###//#S/S//##S#
[] Review Log File
( START ) (_ STOP )
( PAUSE ) _iii/i/ili/iSTEP_li_]
000:01:00:30
ENTER FILE NAME ....
Deploy not Sensor
detected Fail
Power
Fail
Motor 2
fail
External
obstruction
Check EGIL
for power
fail
for visual
assessment
STEP I
Operator loads log file containing
information to be reviewed. He
begins to step through the informa-
tion sequentially using a display
resembling a control panel.
STEP 2
Operator can access same windows as are available
in real time, but can peruse them more closely than
in real time. In this example, operator investigates
intelligent system hypotheses about why MPM did
not deploy as expected. Notice use of distinctive
screen background behind windows to indicate
in REVIEW mode.
Figure 4-23. AFTER: Example Illustrating Improved Capability to Review Event History
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The selection of an approach for information review will affect which parameters are recorded.
For playback, information produced by the intelligent system is required. For replay, a log of
all information input into the intelligent system is required. Logs of recorded data used for
review are called state sequences by Johns. An extensive discussion of suggestions for
recording and playing back state sequences are provided in Johns (1990). Design issues
associated with information logs include (1) identification of the parameters necessary to record
while meeting the memory constraints of the system, (2) selection of the sampling rate, (3)
identifying the type of control that the operator should exercise over the playback, (4)
specification of time periods where information will be recorded, (5) mechanisms for storing
information.
Problem: Recording Information for Review
Recommendation: To adequately support review, the designer must define what will
be reviewed and how the review will be conducted. This includes determining which
parameters should be logged for review. If more than one type of review is provided,
the user interface should clearly distinguish the differences between these types and
should visually differentiate the displays used for each type.
See figure 4-23 for an example that clearly distinguishes the type of review currently active
using a distinctive screen background. See also section 4.1.1 for a discussion of modes.
Regardless of the approach, the review of recorded information should not preclude real-time
functionality. Fault management by the intelligent system should continue in the background
while the playback is reviewed in the foreground. Additionally, a means of displaying current
anomalous behavior observed by the intelligent system that distinguishes between the recorded
and real-time information and that attracts the operator's attention should be provided on any
displays viewed during the playback.
Review is most effective in explaining behavior that develops over time (i.e., sequence of
events). Alternative ways of presenting relevant information may be more appropriate for
instantaneous events (i.e., behavior that develops faster than the sampling rate).
Most systems surveyed in the case study had some form of review, with the most common
form being a message list. See Volume 2 (Malin et ai., 1991) for observations about the use of
review in the case study applications.
4.1.3 Managing Intelligent System Errors
The introduction of an intelligent system into flight operations support adds both enhanced
capability and an additional source of error. Since the operator is responsible for making the
final decisions in fault management situations, the operator must be able to manage the
intelligent system. Managing errors in the intelligent system involves two basic activities,
determining the source of erroneous intelligent system behavior and correcting or compensating
for the identified problem.
Intelligent system errors can be due to failures of the intelligent software or due to erroneous or
unavailable input information. Failures of the intelligent software are caused by inaccurate or
incomplete knowledge, incorrect reasoning, or inadequate performance. These errors can often
be identified during the operational support period (i.e., on-line) if the proper information is
provided to the operator.
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Typically, errors in the intelligent system result in shut down of the intelligent system. Error
correction is performed off-line, after the operational support period. The intelligent system
can be designed, however, to permit on-line compensation for errors by operator intervention
into intelligent system processing. To effectively intervene in intelligent system processing, the
operator must first have a good understanding of the knowledge representation and reasoning
strategy used by the intelligent system (section 4.1.2). See also the discussion of the risks of
intervention into intelligent system processing later in this section
Methods for intervention into the intelligent system reasoning process vary from small changes
in information to a complete takeover of task responsibilities from the intelligent system.
Forms of redirection that are discussed in this section include introduction of additional
information or changes to existing information, redirection of the reasoning process, restart of
the intelligent system, and selective override of portions of the intelligent system processing..
For situations when redirection is ineffectual, operator takeover from the intelligent system is
discussed.
Detection of Intelligent System Errors
Erroneous intelligent system behavior indicates either a problem in the information being
provided to the system or a problem in the intelligent system software (excluding failures of
hardware platform and system services (e.g., operatmg system)). The detection of software
errors requires that adequate information about the intelligent system be provided for the
operator to identify the source of the anomaly. Erroneous intelligent system behavior can
include:
Drawing an incorrect conclusion due to:
- Bad input data (errors in data source or errors in transmission)
- Errors or omissions in the knowledge base
- Errors in the reasoning mechanism (i.e., the underlying tool/shell or language used
to build the system)
Being unable to draw a conclusion due to:
- Investigating an unproductive hypothesis
- Failing to investigate a likely hypothesis
- Inability to process data within a pre-specified cycle time (in real time)
The recommended approach for detecting software errors is to provide ready access to the
internal information and reasoning of the system (section 4.1.2).
Problem: Identifying Intelligent System Errors
Recommendation: Identify and provide access to the critical information from the
intelligent system that assists in identifying the source of erroneous software behavior.
This includes information about intelligent system knowledge representation, reasoning
process, and performance.
For complex systems, a large amount of information about the intelligent system may be
required. Providing access to all of this information all of the time may become impractical and
actually complicate operational support by introducing an information overload problem. See
sections 4.3 and 5 for a discussion about designing to manage information overload.
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Intervention by Altering Information
One approach to intelligent system error compensation is altering the information used by the
system. This can be information about the monitored process or the intelligent system.
Information from the monitored process may be altered to accommodate noisy or unavailable
data. The ability to intervene in intelligent system processing by altering the system's internal
information can help mitigate system failures due to an incomplete knowledge base. Alteration
can include changes to existing information or introduction of additional information (e.g.,
provide information that is unavailable in electronic form). See the discussion of the risks of
intervening in intelligent system processing later in this section.
Problem: Altering Information to be Used by Intelligent System
Recommendation: The operator should be able to alter the information that is processed
by the intelligent system. This includes information from the monitored process (Johns,
1990) as well as hypotheses and conclusions of the intelligent system. Alteration should
include the ability to input additional information and delete or modify incorrect
information.
The PDRS HCI design concepts included the capability to alter the information processed by
the intelligent system (figure 4-24). See Volume 2 (Malin et el., 1991) for a description of this
capability.
EXAMPLE FROM PDRS HCI DESIGN CONCB_TS
ALTERING TB.E_ETRY DATA
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|M0411401 El
STEP 1
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this case, MSID refers to the unique
Identifier =,mloclated with each telemetry
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O E_eu_ • [_e_aLED
STEP 2
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Figure 4-24. Example from PDRS HCI Design Concepts Illustrating Alteration of Information
Used by Intelligent System (Schreckenghost, 1990)
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Intervention into Reasoning Process
In addition to altering the information processed by the intelligent system, the operator can alter
the way that the information is processed. Such an approach would be used to redirect a
"disoriented" intelligent system (e.g., the system investigating an unproductive hypothesis or
failing to investigate a likely hypothesis) onto a more productive path of investigation.
Methods of intervening in the method of processing information include modification of the
reasoning process or selection of an alternate reasoning mechanism. Examples of modification
of the reasoning process are (1) setting processing priorities (e.g., what hypothesis to
investigate first, priorities for knowledge base search), (2) alteration (modify, add, or delete) of
hypotheses, and (3) specification of alternate solutions.
Problem: Redirecting Intelligent System Reasoning
]R_¢ommendation: Operator intervention into the reasoning process of the intelligent
system can be used to manage errors in the intelligent system. Methods of intervention
include modification of the reasoning process or selection of an alternate reasoning
mechanism.
Example: The example in figure 4-25 illustrates the difficulties arising when the
intelligent system is pursuing an unproductive path of reasoning. In this example, the
operator must perform a restart to alter the reasoning. In figure 4-26, the operator is able
to alter the intelligent system fault hypotheses, resulting in a return to normal processing.
This example is based on Scenario 2.
The user interface used to intervene should reinforce the operator's understanding of the
reasoning process to assist in identifying appropriate action. See section 4.1.2 for a discussion
of presenting information about intelligent system reasoning. See the discussion of the risk of
intervening in intelligent system processing later in this section.
Restart of the Intelligent System
The use of restart to redirect an intelligent system is a destructive method. All information
processed and derived up to the time of the restart is lost. Restart should only be used in
situations where the current processing strategy cannot be redirected by less drastic means.
Such situations include significant errors in or loss of input information or errors in the
intelligent system processing strategy.
It is possible to design the intelligent system to minimize information loss at restart. Such a
capability requires periodic storage of intelligent system state information (i.e., checkpoint) and
information input to the intelligent system. A checkpoint is the storage of all intelligent system
internal information at a given time. The checkpoint data can be reloaded into the intelligent
system and system processing can be resumed from the checkpoint. The intelligent system is
re-executed (i.e., replayed) using the recorded input information. If the intelligent system is
part of a distributed system, using checkpoints is more complex. Other mechanisms besides
time (e.g., events) may be more effective for synchronizing restart of distributed systems.
Checkpointing can be a useful capability for redirecting the intelligent system, because it
permits reprocessing of data after needed alterations have been made by the operator. Such a
capability if useful when erroneous input has been processed or the intelligent system
knowledge base is flawed.
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4Problem: Redlrectlng Intelllgsnt System Ressonlng
BEFORE . Example lllustratlng Problem:
In this example, the operator is unable to communicate information about a likely fault and its
correction procedure to the intellgent system. Unaware of this information, the intelligent
system continues to pursue fault isolation on an incorrect sot of suspected faults, even when
the actual fault is corrected. The operator finally stops the inteligent system to allow the
re-commend of Deploy.
MPM COMMAND I
ST,TEI STOWI IMPM
I
Restart I
!
I Intelligent System Recommendations I
I T
Recommend initiating Imalfunction procedures I
I
I Intelligent System Concluaione I
i
000:01:03:04
'It
L Recommend initiating 1malfunction )rocedures
MPM Deploy command in- I
valid malfunction procedure.I
I
000:01:03:44 000:01 04:00
STEP 1
Operator issues undocumented
procedure, (re-command of
Deploy) to regain the lost
DEPLOY sensor indication.
STEP 2
Intelligent system does not
allow re-command of Deploy.
Re-Iterates recommendation
to initiate malfunction
procedures to Isolate source
of anomaly.
STEP 3
Operator finally stops the
Intelligent system to allow
re-command of Deploy.
Figure 4-25. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Difficulty When the IntcUigcnt System Becomes
Disoriented
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Problem: Redlrectlng Intelllgent System Reasonlng
AFTER - Example lllustreting Solutlon:
In this example, the ability to affect intelligent system reasoning by altering hypotheses used by the
intelligent system has been provided to the operator. The operator "informs" the intelligent system
about the identity of the actual fault (sensor fallure) and a corrective procedure to "fix" the fault
(re-command of Deploy). The redirected intelligent system can now continue normal processing.
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Alter activities 1
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I
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I
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p sensor failure. / malfunction procedure for I
_"FI_'II_'_'_'I"rJI_'_"F-/ MPM sensor failure. I
/ I
000:01:03:44 000:01:04:00
STEP 1
Operator informs the intelligent
system that there is a fault in
the MPM sensor. All other
suspected faults are eliminated.
STEP 2
Since the intelligent system
has no malfunction procedure
for a sensor failure, the
operator informs the system of
the undocumented procedure
(re-command of Deploy).
STEP 3
Intelligent system recognizes
new procedure and permits
operator to re-command
Deploy.
Figure 4-26. AFTER: Example Illustrating Operator Redirecting Disoriented Intelligent
System
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Problem: Support for Intelligent System Restart
Recommendation: Intervention capability should include restarting the intelligent
system from a saved state (i.e., checlq_inO and replay by executing the intelligent
system using recorded input data. This allows the operator to alter the information
used by the intelligent system (both internal and external) and re-execute from some
time in the past.
Part of providing checkpoint capability is determining when a checkpoint will be taken.
Checkpoints can be manual or autonomous. Autonomous checkpoints can be taken
periodically or when pre-defined events occur. For example, it would be useful to take a
checkpoint prior to major perturbations in either the monitored process (e.g, change software
load onboard the Space Shuttle) or the intelligent system (e.g., unavailable telemetry due to
Loss of Signal). Figure 4-27 illustrates the different types of checkpoint capability provided in
the PDRS HCI design concepts.
Immediate Checkpoint
Create a checkpoint file
at the current timetag
e_ me:knnl rl t _-_
I .... _._ Immediate
Periodic I
Event-drlven ]
Examplee of Checkpoint Optlone
Periodic Checkpoint
Create a checkpoint file
at specified time intervals
[]Create s J;h=_":-krmlql
I i.Oa&_+| Immediate l
l+Perlodlc +_]
["rEvent.drlven ' I
Periodic Checkpoint
Start Time:
• Current Time
0 Enter Time ....
Time Interval:
3o • m
0 MIN
o • so
Event-driven Checkpoint
Create a checkpoint file
when selected, we-defined
events occur
Event-driven Checkpoint
Select Trigger Events:
Figure 4-27. Checkpoint Options Provided by PDRS HCI Design Concepts (Schreckenghost,
1990)
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Problem: Recording Input Data for Replay
Recommendation: The ability to replay the intelligent system using recorded data
requires that the intelligent system have a source of recorded input data. If an external
source of such information is not available in real time, the intelligent system should
provide the ability to archive such data. This ability includes control of the data
archiving from the user interface.
Notice that the ability to replay the intelligent system using recorded data has some off-line
benefits as well. Such a capability can be used for verification and validation by replaying the
system using test cases of recorded input data. Replay can also be used as a source of stand-
alone training for new operators.
The ability to restart the intelligent system was the most common, and often the only, method
of intervening in intelligent system processing observed in the case study.
See section 4.1.2 for related recommendations on the use of replay and playback for review of
information supporting agent collaboration. See also the discussion of the risks of intervening
in intelligent system processing later in this section.
Override of the Intelligent System
An alternate method of redirection is selective override of segments of intelligent system
processing. Selective override is the process of altering the responsibilities of the intelligent
system by providing variable operator control over intelligent system tasks. Override can be
specified with a wide range of authority for the operator, from limited operator involvement in
intelligent system responsibilities (i.e., some level of operator confirmation) to full control by
the operator with no intelligent system assistance (Johns, 1990).
Various approaches to selective override can be used. Modes of operation (section 4.1.1) can
be defined that specify multiple levels of responsibility for the intelligent system (e.g., see table
4-4 for an example of procedure execution modes from the OMA prototypes). Alternately,
portions of the knowledge base can be enabled or disabled to allow the operator to customize
intelligent system knowledge to the current situation (e.g., partition knowledge bases by
mission phase). Knowledge base partitioning can be used to improve intelligent system
performance by off-loading unnecessary portions of the knowledge base or to manage
intelligent system failures by disabling the erroneous portions of the knowledge base.
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Table 4-4. Example of Procedure Execution Modes from the OMA Prototypes (Kelly, 1991)
Five Levels of Automation for Procedures Execution
• Hardware Switch Manual
Execution of procedure by operator
• Software Switch Manual
Execution of procedure by intelligent system at operator request
• Automatic with Confirmation
Step-wise execution of procedure with operator confirmation at
each step; if hardware switch, operator will execute and if
software switch, intelligent system will execute
• Full Auto: execution of procedure by intelligent system with no
operator intervention required
• "Start Stop": execution of procedure as designated, where each
execution step is pre specified as one of the above types
Problem: Support for Selective Override of Intelligent System Processing
Recommendation: Selective override of specific intelligent system activities can be
used to intervene into intelligent system processing to improve system performance
or to control the effects of errors in the knowledge base. Techniques for selective
override include disabling portions of the knowledge base or altering modes of
operation to control allowable activities.
Example: In the example in figure 4-281 , the knowledge base of the intelligent system
does not contain the required knowledge about a malfunction procedure. This results
in the intelligent system pursuing an unproductive path of reasoning. In figure 4-29,
selective override of a portion of the knowledge base provides a less drastic recovery
approach than performing a restart. This example is based on Scenario 2.
The ability to perform a selective override affects the design of the intelligent system. Modes
of operation that specify allowable intelligent system activities must be explicitly provided. If
selective enabling and disabling of the knowledge base is required, the knowledge base must
designed such that portions can be loaded or unloaded during execution. Although selective
override would typically be performed by the operator, it is possible for a higher level
(metalevel) knowledge base to coordinate the selection of mode or the enabling and disabling of
subsystem knowledge bases.
1 Notice that figure 4-28 is an exact duplicate of figure 4-25. This set of examples represents an alternate
approach to the problem posed when discussing intervention into intelligent system reasoning. Figure 4-25 was
duplicated to allow easier comparison between the BEFORE and AFTER cases.
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Problem: Support for Selective Overrlde of Intelllgent System Processing
BEFORE - Example lllustratlng Problem:
In this example, a situation previously considered Is revisited and an alternate solution is
described. Previously, in figure 4-25, we illustrated the situation where the operator
is unable to communicate information about a likely fault and its correction procedure
to the intelligent system. Unaware of this information, the intelligent system continues to
pursue fault Isolation on an incorrect set of suspected faults, even when the actual fault is
corrected. The operator finally stops the intelligent system to allow a re-command of Deploy.
Note that the BEFORE case is a repeat of figure 4-25.
MPM COMMAND I
MPMST,TEl SOWI I
_paR"start I
us" d
I I
l lntelligent System Recommendstlons I
I _r 11'
I Recommend initiating I Recommend initiatingmalfunction procedures malfunctio procedures
I
I Intelligent System
, 4r
I
000:01:03:04
Conclusions I L
MPM Deploy command in- I
valid malfunction procedure. I
I
000:01:03:44 000:01:04:00
STEP 1
Operator issues undocumented
procedure, (re-command of
Deploy) to regain the lost
DEPLOY sensor indication.
STEP 2
Intelligent system does not
allow re-command of Deploy.
Re-iterates recommendation
to initiate malfunction
procedures to isolate source
of anomaly.
STEP 3
Operator finally stops the
intelligent system to allow
re-command of Deploy.
Figure 4-28. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Intelligent System with an Omission in its
Knowlexlgc Base
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Problem: Support for Selective Override of Intelligent System Processing
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the ability to selectively disable rule sets used by the intelligent system has
been provided to the operator. The operator disables the MPM rule set and proceeds with the
MPM Deploy. The Intelligent system will resume normal processing when the next phase of
operations initiates (MRL release_
MPM COMMAND
I Mp.sT,TEIsTowl]
ENABLE RULE SETS
MRL
MClUli_..E_o._i
D&C
I Intelligent System Recommendations I
I Ir
I
i
I Intelligent
, ÷
Recommend initiating J
malfunction proceduresJ
System Conclusions I
• F
I MPM Deploy failed. I
I
000:01:03:04
STEP 1
Operator issues undocumented
procedure to regain the lost
DEPLOY sensor indication.
Operator disabled MPM
rule base.
I
000:01:03:44
STEP 2
Operator realizes that the MPM
rule set is inaccurate. He
selectively disables that rule
set from consideration.
I
000:01 04:00
STEP 3
Once the inaccurate rule set
has been disabled from
processing, the intelligent
system will be on hold until
the next phase of operations
(MRL release), when normal
processing will resume.
Figure 4-29. AFTER: Example glustradng the Use of Selective Override to Correct for
Knowledge Base Error
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ThePDRSHCI design concepts included the capability to intervene into the intelligent system
processing by selectively disabling rule sets. See Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) for a
description of this capability.
In situations where the intelligent system fails unrecoverably, fault management tasks must be
accomplished without any assistance from the intelligent system. In such an event, the
operator should be able to takeover all intelligent system responsibilities. This corresponds to
the level of override "full control by the operator" discussed above (see Hardware Manual
Switch mode in table 4-4).
Implicit in the decision to allow the operator to disable the intelligent system is the requirement
that critical operational information can be displayed independently from the intelligent system.
This can be accomplished by either having a display-only mode of operation for the intelligent
system or by having separate displays that provide access to information and control of the
monitored process. Operators should be trained to take over from the intelligent system to
prevent over reliance on the intelligent system which can result in operators incapable of
performing the task alone. The design of the entire support system (including both
conventional and intelligent software) should support fault management without the intelligent
system. One approach to achieving such a design is to start off with no intelligent system in
the design and only add the intelligent system after designers have addressed fault management
without it. See also section 4.2.2 on visibility into the monitored process.
problem: Support for Complete Override of Intelligent System
Recommendation: The operator should be able to completely take over control of all
activities normally performed by the intelligent system. To allow a complete override
of the intelligent system by the operator, critical telemetry and information derived for
problem diagnosis and recovery of the monitored process should be available for
display independent of the operation of the intelligent system. One approach to
achieving such a design is to start off with no intelligent system in the design and only
add the intelligent system after designers have addressed fault management without it.
When a complete override of the intelligent system occurs, it may be useful to continue passive
background execution of the system. The results of that execution could be logged for use in
correcting the software failure and maintaining the intelligent system.
See the example in Section 4.1.1 (figure 4-5) for an illustration of the operator overriding the
intelligent system. See also the following discussion of the risks of intervention in the
intelligent system.
Risks of Intervention in Intelligent System Processing
There are risks inherent in intervening in intelligent system processing. The effect of an
alteration may not be obvious and unintentional impacts can result in some cases. If the
intelligent system actually controls the monitored process, it may be difficult to reverse
intelligent system actions impacting the monitored process. A cautious attitude should be taken
toward the use of such intervention. Intervention should only be undertaken when the operator
thoroughly understands the situation and is aware of the potential impacts of such intervention.
This awareness could include the intelligent system assessing and informing the operator that it
is not a good idea to execute the desired changes at this time. If possible, analytical tools to
evaluate the impact of intervention should be provided (see section 4.2.2 for a discussion of
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evaluating consequences of events). A checkpoint should be taken prior to intervention to
permit reversion to a former state should intervention be ineffective (see discussion of
checkpoint in this section).
Problem: Avoiding Negative Impacts from Operator Intervention
Recommendation: If the operator can intervene into intelligent system processing, a
means of predicting the impact of this intervention should be provided. Additionally,
a checkpoint should be taken prior to intervention to permit reversion to a former state
should intervention be ineffective.
4.2 Support for Fault Management
Fault management activities are usually initiated by alarm annunciation. As symptoms of
failures, alarms represent important fault management information. Alarms must be associated
with a system failure (or set of suspected failures). The interpretation of alarms involves
assessing the accuracy with which the alarm reflects the current situation (i.e., identify false
alarms) and the severity of the impact of the anomalous behavior on safety or mission goals
(i.e., criticality of the associated failure). Section 4.2.1 discusses the management of alarms as
part of managing faults in the monitored process.
When fault management is performed by a team of agents, fault management activities are
distributed between these agents. For the operator to retain the capability to manage the
monitored process and make decisions in failure situations, he must maintain an awareness of
the overall state and behavior of the monitored process, even when significant portions of the
fault management tasks are conducted by the intelligent system. Section 4.2.2 describes the
diagnostic information critical to understanding situations affecting the monitored process.
Specific topics include assessment of mission impacts, evaluation of consequences and
alternatives, monitoring and execution of procedures, and assessment of functional capability
remaining after a failure.
Not all fault management situations can be anticipated. The intelligent system must be designed
to assist the operator during contingency or unanticipated situations by providing information
required for generating and testing workaround procedures. Section 4.2.3 provides
recommendations for designing systems to handle contingency situations.
4.2.1 Alarm Management
Operator workload often increases dramatically during an anomalous situation (appendix B).
The anomaly can alter conditions in multiple systems, resulting in a profusion of alarms that
must be responded to in a timely manner. The amount of information that must be processed
increases and the performance requirements become more rigorous. An important aspect of
managing this increased workload is managing the alarms that result from the anomaly.
The management of alarms involves a variety of tasks. Important diagnostic information must
be extracted from the wealth of alarm information associated with an anomaly. False alarms
must be distinguished from actual anomalies. Redundant, possibly inconsistent alarms must be
interpreted. Recommendations for alarm management that address these issues are discussed
in this section.
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Interpretation of Alarms
An alarm is a notification of an anomalous event. When parameters defining system behavior
are outside of an envelope of nominal behavior, an alarm is annunciated. The behavior
envelope is usually specified as a set of parameter limits (upper, lower, or both) that bound
nominal behavior. There may be multiple sets of limits for a given parameter, depending upon
configuration or operating level [performance] of the related system. It may also be necessary
to distinguish between parameters out-of-limits and off-scale (JSC, June 1990). For out-of-
limit parameters, the parameter value is a true reading of current state. For off-scale
parameters, the limits of the measuring device are exceeded and the parameter value is set to the
limit of the sensing device. See table 4-5 for a def'mition of alarms used for the Space Shuttle
Caution and Warning (C&W) System.
Table 4-5. Alarm Definition for Space Shuttle Caution and Warning (JSC, June 1990)
Alarm Definition for Space Shuttle Caution and Warning
• Limits
The set of parameter values that define the boundary between nominal
and anomalous behavior. Each set consists of a lower and upper limit.
Multiple sets of limits are possible for some types of alarms, with only
one set active at any time.
• Noise Filter Values
The number of consecutive samples out-of-limit for alarm annunciation
and alarm disable.
• Annunciation Enable/Inhibit Status
The parameter status indicating if a detected alarm condition should be
annunciated.
Before responding to an alarm, the fault management team must ascertain the accuracy of the
alarm. In some cases, it may be possible to eliminate the alarm as false. In other cases, an
indicator of alarm reliability and accuracy may be provided to assist in interpreting the alarm.
Methods for assessing the accuracy and reliability of an alarm include:
Ascertain if other indicators of system behavior are consistent with alarm
If other parameters are available for monitoring system behavior than the parameters
used to activate the alarm, they can be monitored for behavior consistent with the
alarm state. For example, low oil level in an engine can be indicated by both a low
oil pressure and increased operating temperature.
Associate a confidence measure with an alarm
For example, the percentage agreement among redundant alarms can be a measure
of confidence.
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Evaluate previous behavior for trends
Trends can include an observed history of frequent system failures of this sort or a
history of false alarms.
Delay response to determine if behavior is transient
Duration of delay depends on criticality of failure and permanence of the alarm
condition
Verify related system is in the expected configuration
System misconfiguration can appear to be a failure by resulting in unexpected
behavior.
False alarms are discussed later in this section. See this discussion for assistance in managing
false alarms.
Problem: IndicatingAlarm Accuracy
Rc_0mmendation: Inaccurate alarm information should be eliminated from
consideration by the fault management team when possible. If the reliability or
accuracy of the alarm is in question, this should be indicated to the fault management
team. Information useful in assessing the accuracy of alarms includes agreement
between redundant indicators, previous behavioral trends, duration of an alarm, and
system configuration.
Alarm situations, particularly emergency situations (e.g., threat to crew or vehicle safety), are
often accompanied by a flood of information as the anomalous behavior propagates through the
monitored process and related systems. The fault management team must determine which
alarms should be responded to fu'st. The criticality of the failure indicated by an alarm should
be considered when planning response to the alarm. Alarms may also indicate the potential for
a failure to propagate throughout the system and cause other failures. Table 4-6 describes the
classes of alarms used for Space Shuttle to indicate the severity and importance of an alarm.
Later in this section, in the discussion of false alarms, figure 4-31 provides an example that
includes disagreeing, redundant indicators (e.g., discrepancy between sensor 1 and sensor 2).
See also section 4.2.2 for a discussion of critical function loss due to system failures, section
4.1.1 (interruption of operator) for methods used to prioritize messages by criticality, and
section 3.4 for a discussion of criticality
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Table4-6. Alarm Classes for Space Shuttle Caution and Warning (JSC, June 1990)
Alarm Classes for Space Shuttle Caution and Warning
• Emergency
Two types of alarms are in this class: smoke detection/fire
suppression and rapid cabin depressurization.
• Caution and Warning
Includes both primary Caution and Warning hardware system
and backup Caution and Warning software system.
• Alert
Notifies an impending Caution and Warning alarm or a situation
requiring a long (exceeding 5 minutes) procedure to rectify problem.
• Limit Sense
Indicates a parameter out of limits or in an off-nominal state.
Problem: Distinguishing Severity of Alarms
Recommendation: The severity of an alarm should be used to focus operator attention
on important diagnostic information and assist in planning anomaly response. Alarm
severity can be assessed based on the impact of the anomalous behavior and associated
failure, including the potential for the failure to propagate through the system.
Ifthealarm indicatesapossibleemergency, itshouldbc actedupon quicklywith actionto
minimize risk,even ffthereisthepossibilityof afalsealarm.The additionalalarm processing
requiredtodetectfalsealarmscan introducetirncdelays.When an alarm indicatesan
emergency, itmay be requiredtoby-passallalarm pre-processingand immediately annunciate
the alarm (e.g.,Space Shuttleautomaticsatingprocedureswhen crew cabin pressuredrops
significandy(JSC,June 1990). See alsosection3.l foradditionaldiscussionof sating.
In addition to the accuracy and severity of an alarm, the following information about an alarm
can be useful in interpreting the alarm:
Set of possible failures that could cause the anomalous situation
An alarm may be activated by more than one failure. In such cases, the alarm is
associated with a set of possible failures and additional diagnosis is required to
identify the fault. See also the discussion of fault ambiguity under quality of
information in section 4.3.1.1.
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Sequencein whichalarmsoccurred
If multiple alarms are activated, the alarm sequence may convey information useful
in identifying the failure causing the alarm condition. This is especially true when
failures cascade across multiple components or systems (i.e., failure A causes
failure B) (appendix B). See section 4.2.2 for a related discussion of failure
propagation.
Source of alarm
Alarm information can be grouped by physical or structural relationships between
the data sources activating the alarms. This approach reinforces the operator's
model of system structure and clarifies the meaning of alarms. See section 4.3.1.1
for a discussion of source of information.
Procedures for failure compensation and recovery
Once a failure has been identified, these procedures are useful in planning failure
response. See also section 4.2.2 concerning the assessment of mission impacts and
procedures.
Problem: Relieving Operator Overload due to Multiple Alarms
Recommendation: The large amount of information generated during an alarm
situation can overwhelm an operator trying to interpret that information. The human-
computer interface should assist the operator in associating alarms with failures and
in planning response to alarms. Specific information for failure identification includes
the set of suspected failures, the sequence in which the alarms occurred, and the source
of alarms. Information useful in planning alarm response includes the confidence in
the accuracy of the alarm, the severity of the alarm, the identity of the failure (or set of
failures), and the available procedures for failure compensation and recovery.
Some techniques used to manage alarms:
Alarm inhibit
Alarm inhibit can be used to control information overload by disabling irrelevant
alarms. It can also be used to eliminate erroneous alarms from consideration by the
fault management team.
Suppression of repetitive alarms
A repetitive alarm is one alarm issued multiple times for the same alarm condition.
It should be distinguished from a redundant alarm which is a separate, independent
alarm that provides redundant information. Suppression of annunciation of
repetitive alarms is another means of controlling information overload in alarm
situations.
Alarm acknowledge
Alarm acknowledge is a reminding technique for the operator. It distinguishes
alarms recognized by the operator from those not yet examined. The designer
should be cautious in using this feature. If repetitive alarms are not suppressed,
alarm acknowledge can become a severe load on the operator.
Fault message and discrete status lights are the most common ways to present alarm
information. Color and aural annunciation are frequently used to code criticality. See sections
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4.3and 5 for a discussion of issues related to presentation of information, including message
lists.
False Alarms
In the discussion of alarm interpretation in the previous section, the concept of alarm accuracy
was introduced. A false alarm is an alarm that inaccurately indicates the existence of an
anomaly. The management of false alarms is discussed in this section.
Noisy or failed sensors are common in aerospace control systems. The erroneous data from
such sensors can generate false alarms and misdirect the intelligent support system that
processes the erroneous data. Behavior of the system inconsistent with the annunciated alarm
may indicate a false alarm due to sensor error. Alternately, such false alarms may be detected
by disagreement between redundant alarms.
The operator should have the ability to manage errors in data from the monitored process.
Errors in data can be managed by allowing explicit control of the data sources used by the
intelligent system (see the discussion of redundant sources in section 4.3.1.1) and by
providing the capability to modify data prior to intelligent system processing (e.g., pre-process
information in some way). It may also be desirable to allow the operator to save an altered
alarm configuration for re-loading at another time (see section 4.1.3 for a discussion of
checlq_int).
Problem: Managing False Alarms due to Bad Data
Recommendation: The ability to manage false alarms resulting from noisy or erroneous
data should be provided to the fault management team. Such situations can be managed
by allowing the operator to exercise control of what data sources are seen by the
intelligent system and to operate on data prior to use in the intelligent system.
F,diaI!ll_: The example in figure 4-30 illustrates how bad data can cause false alarms
that misdirect the intelligent system. In figure 4-31, the operator excludes the bad data
and normal processing continues. This example is based on Scenario 4.
To effectively use such a capability to manage false alarms, the operatormust maintain
awareness of the modifications performed on the data and be able to reverse the effects of
performing such modifications. Incoming operators at a handover must also be made aware of
modifications made prior to their support period (section 4.1.1). The ability to reverse the
effect of a data modification could include the ability to restart the system from checkpoint
(section 4.1.3).
False alarms may also be caused by transient behavior in the system. Transient behavior is a
temporary, short duration aberration in normal system behavior. Transients often occur near
state changes in a system (e.g., steady state biases may become temporarily time-variant at a
state change, such as a momentary loss of system power). A common solution to false alarms
generated by transient behavior is to wait for a short time period before generating an alarm to
confirm the existence of anomalous behavior (e.g., Space Shuttle C&W noise filter value
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Problem: Managing False Alarms due to Bed Data
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, 2 temperature sensors are available for each joint of wrist. It is expected
that all would sense similar temperatures at a given time. An alarm has been issued based on
sensor 1 for roll joint indicating high temperature. Since all other measurements are similar,
the operator concludes that wrist roll sensor 1 Is bad. The intelligent system, however,
evaluates that there is a discrepancy between sensors and recommend further evaluation. The
operator has no way to disable use of data from the bed sensor by the intelligent system.
WRIST JOINT SENSOR 1
.................
_ pitch
yaw
TIME
ilJJJllliP_liIJ
Wrist roll joint high temp_
JJ__J_.
WRIST: ALL SENSORS
F.j,rjpppjj
j r Sensor l I
; Discrepancy i
 11-1/-i 11
pitch yaw roll
i Sensor 1 r--] Sensor 2
l lntelligent System Recommendations I
Y
l lntelligent System Conclusions I
Wrist roll temperaturaJhigh in sensor 1
I Recommend temperature I
malfunction procedures
for wrist roll.
I Discrepanc in wrist roll l I Temperature anomaly in II ,,wrisroll. ,'
sensors 1 a_d 2 "*"rli"r'rlllllllll"
001:08:45:38 001:08:45:40 001:08:45:42
STEP 1
Alarm indicating temperature
violation in wrist roll joint
is issued. Alarm was based
on temperature reading of
71 degrees when other joints
were reading 30 - 40 degrees.
STEP 2 STEP 3
Redundant temperature Operator has no way to disable
information indicates that use of faulty measurement in
71 degree reading is false, intelligent system and it
Intelligent system concludes erroneously concludes that
sensor discrepancy. Operator possible malfunction in
knows from other joint wrist roll.
temperatures that sensor 1
is bad.
Figure 4-30. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Adverse Affects of False Alarms due to Bad Data
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Problem: Managing False Alarms due to Bad Data
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
in this example, the operator disables use of data from the bad sensor by the intelligent system
and the sensor discrepancy is resolved.
WRIST JOINT SENSOR
.................. ,,'Oii
TIME
riJ_JJ_liliPPiPl_
//i Wrist roll joint high temp./.
WRIST: ALL SENSORS
PPilll.,Pf_
•.J / Sensor /
_I ; Discrepancy//i
J"f'f'J J'J'f S'A i
pitch yaw roll
i Sensor 1 _] Sensor 2
WRIST ROLL SENSOR 1
LIMITS:
.AXI looo I
.IN I 0 I
PARAMETER:
O ENABLE • DISABLE
[ Intelligent System Conclusions I
I v y y
iwrs,o,.m0.r.,or.'10.o.0.no,o reI [O 'r"orhigh in sensor 1 I sensors 1 and 2 roll sensor 1. Discrepancy
__1 [ r"°'v'°[
001:08:45:38 001:08:45:40 001:08:45:42
STEP 1
Alarm indicating temperature
violation in wrist roll joint
is issued. Alarm was based
on temperature reading of
71 degrees when other joints
were reading 30 - 40 degrees.
STEP 2 STEP 3
Redundant temperature Operator disables
information indicates that use of faulty measurement in
71 degree reading is false, intelligent system. Intelligent
Intelligent system concludes system no longer erroneously
sensor discrepancy. Operator recommends malfunction
knows from other joint procedures.
temperatures that sensor 1
is bad.
Figure 4-3 l. AFTER: Example Illustrating Recovery from False Alarm by Excluding Bad
Data from Intelligent System
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shownin table4-5). Thewait-to-confirm approach is not effective, however, when failure
effects can develop and change quickly (i.e., transient behavior is a leading indicator and
changes as the failure worsens) or when rapid response to alarms is required (i.e., insufficient
time to "wait and see"). An alternate approach is to identify indicators that transience is likely
to occur (e.g., recent state change) and rely on alarm information based upon the presence of
these indicators.
Intermittent behavior is a type of transient behavior, where normal behavior is periodically
interrupted by transient, anomalous behavior. Intermittent behavior often appears inconsistent,
due to changing influences that are not apparent. Assessment of intermittent alarms should
include consideration if similar behavior has been observed in the past (i.e., the alarm was
observed previously without resolution). See also the discussion of intermittency in Section
3.4.
Problem: Managing False Alarms due to Transient or Intermittent Behavior
Recommendation: Transient or intermittent system behavior should be considered when
detecting or interpreting alarms. Approaches to preventing false alarms due to transience
include waiting to confirm steady state behavior or considering the likelihood of
transience before acting on the alarm. When transient behavior is intermittent, it is
necessary to provide information about previous instances of that behavior.
_: The example in figure 4-32 illustrates false alarms caused by transient
behavior. In figure 4-33, the intelligent system avoids generating a false alarm by
waiting a few data cycles to determine if the effect is transient or permanent. This
example is based on Scenario 1.
System misconfiguration can result in false alarms. Misconfigured devices may appear to be
failed devices because they do not exhibit behavior consistent with the expected configuration
(e.g., default value at power-up may differ from desired default for a specific mission phase).
In the development of the IESP, it was observed that misconfigurations are especially common
after a transition to redundant capability. This was true because many devices power-up in a
configuration other than the nominal operational configuration. False alarms due to
misconfiguration can be minimized by having the intelligent system compare the config.uration
of a device exhibiting anomalous behavior with the expected device configuration consistent
with the current mission objectives before declaring a failure.
Problem: Differentiating Misconfiguration from Failure
Re¢ommendation: The intelligent system should be able to differentiate system mis-
configurations from system failures. Presentation of information about such system
anomalies should clearly distinguish these two situations.
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Problem: Managing False Alarms due to Transient or Intermittent Behavior
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the intelligent system makes erroneous recommendations based on a false
alarm. This alarm resulted from a transient signal at powerup of the RMS.
RMS SELECT
Q:F
PORT_TRBD
POWER TO JOINTS
I Intelligent System Recommendations I
T
[Intelligent System Conclusions I
|
I
J Recommend initiating J
malfunction procedures J!
j Power anomaly in pitch ;p
I and yaw wrist joints. _*
Iflllff,],lJ, ijj iij
000:00:15:08 000:00:15:10 000:00:15:12
STEP 1
RMS is powered up by setting
the RMS select switch to
PORT (i.e., RMS on left side
of vehicle).
STEP 2
False alarm is issued in both
pitch and yaw joints of wrist.
Alarm indicates no power
received in these joints and is
caused by a time delay in
receiving the power signal. Delay
results from low temperatures.
STEP 3
Intelligent system does not
know that this is a false alarm
and recommends malfunction
procedures to identify source
of power problem.
Figure 4--32. BEFORE: Example Illustrating False Alarms caused by Transient Behavior
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Problem: Managing False Alarms due to Transient or Intermittent Behavior
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the intelligen_ system recognizes that false alarms often occur at powerup
due to transients. No action is taken on the initial alarm and the intelligent system waits
for a few data cycles before assessing the situation. After a few cycles, the transient
disappears and the alarm goes away. The intelligent system correctly assesses a nominal
powerup.
RMS SELECT
CR:
POWER TO JOINTS POWER TO JOINTS
Shldr I Elbo_ Wrlet
I Pitchl pitch I pitchI
I Intelligent System
Ir
I RMS powered up.
I
000:00:15:08
Conclusions I
y
Alarm in power signal I I Nominal RMS Powerup
to wrist pitch and yaw I I SeQuence
is suspect. Waiting forI I -- ",
• confirmation. I I
000:00:15:10 000:00:15:16
STEP 1
RMS is powered up by setting
the RMS select switch to
PORT (i.e., RMS on left side
of vehicle).
STEP 2
False alarm is issued in both
pitch and yaw joints of wrist.
Alarm indicates no power in
these joints.Intelligent system
recognizes that transients occur
at powerup. It ignores initial
false alarm and waits to observe
alarm after a few seconds.
STEP3
Alarm is transient and intelli-
gent system concludes nominal
RMS powerup.
Figure 4-33. AFTER: Example Illustrating Design that Avoids False Alarms caused by
Transient Behavior
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Redundant Alarms
Redundancy is a common form of risk management within aerospace applications. Redundant
alarms are two or more independent alarms that provide notification of the same anomalous
condition. Redundancy may be provided as a backup in case of alarm failure. It may also
result indirectly, when a failure in one component causes an alarm state in a related component
(e.g., loss of power may disable a fan used for cooling, causing a rise in temperature in the
cooled item). Redundant alarms reduce the risk of a false alarm by providing multiple,
independent indicators of a failure. When redundant alarms provide inconsistent information,
however, the decision of which alarm to believe becomes an issue. Common methods for
resolving alarm inconsistency include accepting the consensus of the majority or a weighted
combination of alarms. For the second approach, alarms are weighted because some alarms
are considered more reliable than others. See section 4.3.1.1 for a discussion of redundant
information sources.
Redundant alarms can contribute to operator workload. The operator must combine multiple
information items into a single piece of diagnostic information. Synthesis of redundant alarm
information involves identifying related alarms, resolving alarm inconsistency, and associating
alarms with a failure. Sequence of alarm annunciation can also indicate the failure causing the
alarms.
Problem: Relieving Operator Overload due to Redundant Alarms
Recommendation: The intelligent system should assist the operator in managing
redundant alarms to emphasize the diagnostic content of the alarms and to avoid
overloading the operator with duplicate information. Techniques for managing
alarms include combining alarm information, using redundancy to establish confi-
dence, and using presentation of information to associate related alarms.
Possible techniques for management of redundant alarms include:
Combining redundant alarms into a single information item (i.e., a composite alarm)
A potential risk to this approach is the loss of additional information provided by
the redundant alarms, such as certainty of failure when all alarms are activated.
Associating a confidence measure of the accuracy of an alarm based on agreement within
the redundant set
A candidate for this measure is the percentage of the redundant set that is consistent
(e.g., 2 out of 3 indicate a failure, therefore a failure is likely).
Using presentation of alarm information to associate redundant or related alarms
For example, redundant alarms can be physically grouped on the display or
organized where distinctive, recognizable patterns are formed when they are active.
Figure 4-31 from the discussion of false alarms illustrates a graphical technique for presenting
information from redundant sources for easy comparison of value (e.g., use of a histogram for
comparing measurements from sensor 1 and sensor 2).
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J4.2.2 Critical Diagnostic Information
Once the presence of an anomaly has been alerted by system alarms, the fault management team
must initiate diagnosis to identify and rectify faults causing the anomalous behavior. The
information essential to diagnose faults in the monitored process is discussed in this section.
Recommendations address such issues as maintaining operator awareness of situation,
comparing predicted and actual state sequences, evaluating consequences and alternatives,
monitoring procedure execution, assessing the impacts of procedures, determining the impacts
of failures, assessing the functional capability remaining after a failure, and responding to
unanticipated situations.
Visibility into Monitored Process
Assessment of a situation using data from the monitored process was identified as a necessary
activity for fault management in section 3.3.1. The intelligent system should assist the operator
in achieving and maintaining an understanding of the current fault management situation,
especially in situations of change, risk, and uncertainty that often accompany system failures.
The types of information that provide visibility into the monitored process include changes to
expected system configuration, existing failure conditions (especially those with significant
impacts), relevant events affecting the monitored process and the environment, and summaries
of fault histories (Johns, 1990) and agent activities affecting the monitored process. Since
operator's awareness of the current situation is dependent on the availability of information
from the monitored process and its peripheral systems, such awareness can be compromised
during loss of data, either partial or complete (see section 4.3.1.1 on information availability).
The effectiveness of information in describing the current situation is also dependent on the
methods of information presentation. These methods should focus operator attention on
information that is diagnostically important and should quickly and clearly illustrate the
diagnostic content. Information should be presented within the context of the events and agent
activities leading up to the current situation. To illustrate dependencies between events and
activities, such information should be displayed chronologically. See also section 4.1.1 for a
discussion of situational assessment at operator handover and section 4.2.1 for alarm
management.
Problem: Maintaining Awareness of Monitored Process Situation
Recommendation: Information describing the current situation in the monitored
process should be presented within the context of events and agent activities
preceding the situation. Information that should be provided includes histories of
system configuration changes, relevant events affecting the system and the environ-
ment, and agent activities in response to those events. It may be important to represent
this information in chronological sequence, since the order of events affects their
interpretation.
The upgrade to a new or different technology often alters operations. This change in
operatmns can inadvertently remove access to information critical to the operator's situational
awareness. Information useful in clarifying the current situation can be acquired informally as
a by-product of current operations (Buck, 1989). Norman (1990) cited an example of
information loss due to a technology upgrade in commercial air traffic control. Airline voice
communications were replaced with electronic communications. The pilot's awareness of the
current situation was impacted by the loss of incidental information acquired by listening to
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other conversations on the voice loop. This is a potential problem for space flight control as
well.
An important capability for situational awareness is the ability to review information from the
past. It can be an orienting technique for in-coming operators at shift handovers. It is a means
of evaluating behavior trends. It can also be an important mechanism for reminding an
operator of important occurrences. See section 4.1.2 for a discussion of reviewing information
with an intelligent system.
Evaluation of Consequences
The consequences of an event are evaluated by predicting the effects of the event on the system
of interest and determining if these effects impact either safety or mission goals. The
consequences of an anomaly include the propagated effect of the anomaly (e.g., predicted
effect of a fault over time if not corrected) and the risks associated with a planned response to
the anomaly (e.g., effect of intervening into intelligent system processing). This evaluation
assists in selecting between alternative solutions (e.g., compare the effects of alternative
workaround procedures) and in setting activity priorities used when scheduling anomaly
response (e.g., schedule recovery procedures for high risk failures first).
Problem: Support for Evaluating Consequences of Events and Team Activities
Recommendation: The operator should be able to evaluate the expected consequences
of changes resulting from anomalies. Changes affecting the monitored process include
failure effects propagated over time and the impacts of executing procedures for fault
testing, workaround, and recovery. Changes affecting the intelligent system include
operator intervention into system processing.
WHAT-IF analysis is a common method of evaluating consequences that involves both the
human and the intelligent system. The name is derived from the question "What would happen
if ...". WHAT-IF analysis consists of postulating a change in the current situation (e.g, a
fault, execution of a procedure) and determining the resulting impact to system capability.
WHAT-IF analysis is not considered to be a real-time operation and any display regions
designated to present the results of this analysis should not be updated with data in real time.
Typically, upon initiating WHAT-IF analysis, the current configuration of the system in
question is frozen and no further updates from real-time data are reflected in the on-going
analysis. All further changes to the system are initiated by the collaborating agents as a part of
investigating the potential effects of hypothesized faults. An example of WHAT-IF analysis
was seen in the GNC Jet Control system (see Volume 2, Malin et at., 1991).
Display of the results of the evaluation of consequences is a variant of the display of
expectations and predicted results. See the discussions of predicted behavior, alternative states
and behavior, and impact assessment later in this section. See section 4.2.3 for evaluating the
consequences of workaround and section 4.1.3 for the consequences of operator intervention
into intelligent system processing.
Predicted Behavior
In section 3.2.3, simulation was one of the methods described for generating information. One
important use of simulation is prediction. The prediction of state values for the monitored
process provides information important in evaluating the consequences of an event or planned
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activity. Predictedbehaviorcanbecomparedto actual behavior to determine if planned
activities cause the desired effect when executed (e.g., procedures monitoring) or to detect
when the current situation does not agree with the expected situation based on on-going
operations (e.g., detect anomalous, actual behavior).
A prediction sequence is the state sequence describing expected behavior of the monitored
process (Johns, 1990). Johns discusses a number of issues associated with comparing
predicted behavior to actual behavior including identification of the important events (i.e.,
milestones) where a comparison should occur, definition of criteria for identifying when
behavior agrees and when it does not, and definition of divergence in terms of milestones not
satisfied.
A part of comparing predicted and actual behavior is guaranteeing that the assumptions used to
predict behavior match the current situation. When these assumptions are no longer applicable,
the comparison becomes invalid. Thus, a description of expected behavior should include
assumptions defining conditions when the predicted behavior is possible (e.g., the Space
Shuttle startracker sensor can only track a satellite when the sun is visible, since tracking is
based on light reflected from the satellite). These conditions can be expressed as time
constraints or event dependencies. The specification of milestone behavior should include
conditions required for the behavior to occur.
Since future conditions can alter the predicted behavior, there can be more than one possible
description of future behavior. The term used in qualitative simulation to describe this range of
possible future behavior is envisionment. Envisionments can rapidly become multi-path and
strongly interrelated in complex environments like aerospace. Effective display of
envisionments is an unresolved issue requiring further investigation (Forbus, 1991).
Issue: The display of expectations and predicted results is an area requiring further
investigation. Issues include:
• Simultaneous display of information resulting from different environmental and
configuration assumptions
• Definition of what constitutes agreement between information from multiple sources
(i.e., when do they match)
• Definition and display of divergence and criticality of divergence (i.e., Is this an
important mismatch?)
• Display and control of predictive simulation.
Display of multiple futures (i.e., envisionment) is also important. See also in this section the
discussion of alternative states and behavior, evaluation of consequences, and the display of
expectations based on procedures. See section 4.3.1 under quality of information for
discussion of inconsistency and significance of disagreement when comparing information
items.
Alternative States and Behavior
Consider managing a Space Station thermal control system (TCS). Suppose there is a small
coolant leak which will require Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) to fix. If a maintenance EVA is
already scheduled just after the next re-supply ship, one option is to simply wait until after the
next Space Shuttle arrives. If the leak is not serious, and it is possible to monitor the TCS more
closely to get early warning if the rate of coolant loss increases substantially, the waiting
strategy looks even more plausible. At this point the team might go over the current and
planned onboard operations, to see if thermally expensive activities could be terminated or
rescheduled to increase the safety margin. It could be the costs of doing so are too high --
termination of expensive experiments, for instance, or the thermal load simply being large
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enough that the safety margin is too small, making an extra EVA the preferred alternative. Or it
might be that changing a few activities around will keep the thermal load small enough that it
makes more sense to wait.
This scenario illustrates a key feature of many fault management problems: the need to mason
about alternative states and behaviors. Given that the coolant is periodically replenished, in fact
the amount of coolant may never get so low that heat transfer capacity is threatened. But in fact
it might, and detecting this possibility should cause attention to focus on resolving this
ambiguity. Once the relevant durations and likelihoods have been found, the team must
generate and examine alternate strategies for dealing with the situation. The intelligent system
must be able to "stand back" and view several distinct alternatives at once in order to fully
participate in the deliberations. We do not know of any applications-oriented efforts to date
which maintain and reason about branching time.
The lack of detail in qualitative representations is what gives rise to ambig, uities in predicted
behavior in qualitative simulations. Since traditional simulations yield umque .predictions of
behaviors, it is tempting to suspect that if we eschewed qualitative representataons we could
avoid thinking about branching time. This is not the case. Realistically, ambiguity typically
exists event with quantitative data. Sensors provide noise as well as information about a
physical system's state. System states can only be estimated with limited accuracy. Models
have limited accuracy, or may not even be available ff unusual and/or unanticipated failure
conditions arise. Ergo, the ambiguities of qualitative reasoning may be the only information
available.
It should be noted that the ability to maintain altemate interpretations of the past can be just as
important as maintaining alternate interpretations of the future. In monitoring, for instance,
sometimes a current state which is slightly off may only indicate a small excursion in external
conditions which is still being compensated for. But it could also indicate that a failure has
occurred in a system which is not directly sensed, and worse changes are yet to come. If such
changes occur, dealing with them could require going back to old sensor records and
examining alternate interpretations which could explain the current circumstances better.
It seems there are several orthogonal factors in communications about a physical system's
prospects. First, one must describe the classes of behavior which might occur. To a first
approximation the normal notion of qualitative state and transition may suffice. However, for
describing the gist of a problem concerning a complex system it will be important to work with
suitable abstractions of the raw dynamics. The second factor is the likelihood of each projected
path of behavior. A third factor is representing the evaluation of each .projection relative to the
performance goals of the system. A fourth factor is the temporal proxarmty of each projected
change. The fifth (and so far final) factor is describing any interconnectedness between
alternate projections (e.g., joins in the envisionment graph).
The size of this list may seem surprising at first, but hopefully it can impose some order on
many concepts in monitoring and reasoning about system operations. For example, "urgency"
is a slippery concept. Intuitively, judgments of urgency seem context-sensitive: The potential
for corrosion wearing out a pump before the next scheduled maintenance typically drops in
urgency when a coolant leak is detected. Perhaps by view_g urgency as a functional
combination of evaluation, likelihood, and temporal proxmalty information, we can provide a
better handle on such concepts.
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JIssue: Techniques for displaying alternate possible futures and pasts are needed for fault
management. Factors that should be considered when communicating about alternative
states and behaviors are:
• Classes of behavior which might occur
• Likelihood of each projected path of behavior
• Evaluation of each projection relative to the performance goals of the system
. Temporal proximity of each projected change
• Interconnectedness between alternate projections
Finding good ways to display alternate possible behaviors is a hard problem. The problem is
that behaviors are not simple sequences, or even trees -- currently distinct options can
eventually lead to the same behavior, and oscillation gives rise to cycles in qualitative states.
Thus one is faced with displaying general graphs, which is substantially harder than displaying
trees.
Displays used in qualitative physics research have used abstract icons (e.g., circles or squares)
for states and indicated transitions between them with arrows. One could certainly improve
this, by for example using state icons which indicated more information about that state (such
as what processes are occurring). Perhaps the biggest gain is in task-specific layout strategies.
Consider the display of possible futures a monitor might generate. It needs to get across the
likelihood, relevance, and temporal proximity of these alternate behaviors. Suppose
furthermore it has quantized each of these three factors. Then we could (1) sort states into
clusters based on equivalence relations in these factors, (2) lay out each cluster to make the
transitions as clear as possible, and (3) arrange the clusters to make important properties of the
envisionment visually apparent. For example, temporal proximity could be classified by sorting
states into whether their projected occurrence is minutes, hours, days, weeks, or even months
away from the hypothesized current state. Imagine now a grid whose vertical coordinate
consists of equivalence classes of estimated likelihood and whose horizontal coordinate
consists of equivalence classes of temporal proximity. States closest to the upper-left comer of
the display, for instance, would be the ones to attend to first, since they are both most likely
and soonest to arrive. Long-term prospects would appear on the right, with the least-likely
prospects appearing on the bottom. If some other visual property, say color, indicated
relevance (e.g.., nominal versus unsafe versus dangerous), then this display might
substantially simplify communicating priorities.
Mission Impacts and Procedures
Procedures are plan elements specifying sequences of agent activities to achieve mission goals
(section 3.3.1). The execution of a procedure can impact the monitored process or the
peripheral systems that influence the monitored process. Planned or intentional impacts are the
means of accomplishing mission goals. Unplanned and secondary impacts (i.e., side-effects)
are also possible, and introduce the prospect of negative effects and unanticipated situations.
The relationship between procedures and their impacts (planned and unplanned) is important in
managing the monitored process. The fault management team must be able to predict the
expected effects of a procedure, monitor the execution of the procedure by comparing those
expectations to actual behavior, alert unexpected or harmful impacts, and determine new
procedures in response to negative impacts (section 4.2.3). The intelligent system should
assist the operator in performing these activities. Issues affecting human-computer interaction
for procedures monitoring and execution include displaying expectations (see the previous
discussion of predicted behavior), illustrating the relationships between procedures and their
impacts, and alerting unplanned, incidental impacts of procedures.
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Problem: Support for Evaluating Impacts of Procedure Execution
Recommendation: To assist the operator in monitoring procedure execution, the
intelligent system should support such activities as predicting the expected effects of
a procedure, comparing expected behavior to actual behavior, alerting unexpected or
harmful impacts, and determining new procedures in response to negative impacts.
Information required for these activities includes procedures, scheduled activities,
potential impacts of procedures, and criticality of impacts.
The resolution of these human-computer interaction issues must address not only information
presentation but must identify the information requirements for procedures monitoring and
impact assessment. Mission goals must be related to scheduled procedures. Changes to
scheduled procedures must be evaluated for impact to mission goals and safety. These
potential impacts should be accompanied by warnings if those impacts are irreversible (e.g.,
preclude the ability to determine critical information) or fail to meet flight rules. The
significance of an impact to on-going (and possibly unrelated) activities should also be
evaluated. The fault management team must be able to determine when an impact is of minimal
consequence and when it is potentially harmful in a given situation. The fault management
team must recomn_nd modifications to crew activities only after evaluating the net impact of
these changes.
Issue: Information requirements and effective presentation techniques for monitoring the
execution of procedures and assessing their impact require further investigation. Areas
for study include:
• Displaying procedures and activity sequences
• Displaying expectations
• Distinguishing expectation from actuality
• Relating procedures to their impacts on the monitored process and on other
activities
• Alerting unexpected impacts of procedures
• Differentiating between a significant impact and an insignificant impact
A useful related capability is monitoring the execution of these procedures and displaying the
results of their execution with respect to the expected results and potential impacts. One
method of determining potential impacts is to perform a WHAT-IF evaluation (see the previous
discussion of evaluation of consequences).
The monitoring of procedures was performed by some of the applications in the case study,
including the KU Band Self Test Expert System, the OMA Prototypes, REX, and the GNC
Real-time Monitor. See Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) for a description of these systems.
A procedure normally consists of multiple activities in an ordered execution sequence. One
goal of procedures monitoring is to ensure that all activities are executed in the proper order. In
some cases, the procedure will include activities performed conditionally based on the
circumstances at the time of execution. Thus, the expected activity sequence must include
multiple possible sequences. The types of information useful for monitoring the sequence of
procedures should be identified.
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Issue: The information required to monitor procedure sequence should be defined.
These information requirements should support the following fault management activities:
• Illustrate when order is critical to the success of the procedure
• Alert out-of-order activities
• Assess the impact of out-of-order activities and suggest ways to correct this impact,
if possible
• Display procedures with conditional activities that result in multiple possible activity
sequences
A timeline of activities is one technique for illustrating activity sequence. An example of the
use of timelines to illustrate events and activities was seen in the PDRS HCI design concepts
(Volume 2, Malin et al., 1991).
Functional Capability Assessment
Procedures produce intentional impacts in the monitored process. Anomalies can introduce
unintended impacts in the monitored process by impairing functionality required for scheduled
operations. In addition to impacts manifested immediately, the potential for an anomaly to
impact the monitored process at some time in the future may also exist due to failure
propagation over time. When a failure occurs, the resulting loss of functionality in the
monitored system must be determined, the remaining functional capability assessed, and the
potential for the failure to propagate must be predicted.
To assess functional capability loss, failures in the monitored process must be identified.
Johns has defined the failure summary group as a list of all failures in the monitored process
organized by the associated problem (Johns, 1990). Associated with a failure group is an
explanation of the anomaly and supporting information, which can include graphic portrayals.
The failure summary group is a useful way of representing failure information for functional
capability assessment.
Before the impacts of an anomaly can be determined, the behavior that represents an anomaly
must be defined. Normal behavior for a system can vary from the design specification of
behavior (e.g., a component may operate normally at a temperature slightly outside design
specifications or a component's operating characteristics may change over time). Although
such variation represents no loss of capability, it can violate design criteria for expected
behavior. These design criteria represent an envelope of expected behavior that should be
explicitly defined with the system design. This envelope should be modifiable, to allow
changes to a more accurate representation as operational experience is gained. This is
particularly important for a newly designed monitored process (such as systems on the Space
Station) where the operating characteristics are not well known.
Examples of monitoring for behavior outside an envelope of expected behavior were observed
in the case study. Two systems, the KU Band Self Test Expert System and the GNC Real-
time Monitor, monitor pre-specified parameters for values outside normal operating limits
during check-out tests of specific subsystems. See section 4.2.1 for a related discussion on
managing false alarms when monitoring parameters.
Not only must the boundaries of nominal behavior be def'med, but the severity of anomalies
must be determined. This is related to the criticality of the functional impacts resulting from the
anomaly (i.e., When is a deviation out of bounds but of minimal impact and when is it out of
bounds with potentially harmful impact?). Also, once an anomaly has occurred, the definition
of expected behavior may change (what Johns (1990) terms expectable behavior). For
example, when a light bulb fails on the Display and Control Panel, expected behavior for the
associated panel indicators would be redefined to "always off" until the bulb can be replaced.
4-73
The Loss of Control application (Volume 2, Malin et al., 1991) for tbe GNC flight control
position defines regimes of behavior when monitoring for anomalies in tbe Space Shuttle
attitude indicating loss of vehicle control. Tbese regimes of behavior correspond to levels of
severity in anomalous behavior of the vehicle control system. See table 4-7 for an illustration
of thcse levels of severity.
Table 4-7. Levels of Severity for Space Shuttle Vehicle Control Anomalies
Regimes of Behavior for Space Shuttle Attitude
• Normal
Attitude angles are changing at a normal rate
• Going Out of Bounds
Attitude angles are changing at a rate greater than expected;
potential to lose control of vehicle
• Loss of Vehicle Control
Attitude angles indicate vehicle is spinning out of control
For Space Shurde, Critical Items Lists (CILs) identify the functional capabilities and hardware
systems critical to crew safety aud mission success (see appendix D.2). A critical item is a
system or capability with a single failure point (JSC, January 1989). Redundant elements can
be critical items in a life- or mission-essential application where redundancy cannot be checked
out, loss of redundancy is not apparent, or a single event can remove all redundancy (JSC,
January 1989). Critical items and the availability of tralundant cap.ability should be identified.
There is a need to identify how to effectively present this informauon
Prgblem: Support for Determining Remaining Functionality after Failure
Recommendation: To assist the operator in assessing the functional capability remaining
after a failure in the monitored process, the intelligent system should support such
activities as determining the loss of functionality in the monitored system, assessing the
remaining functional capability, and predicting the potential for the failure to propagate
into other systems.
Issue: Investigation of the information requirements and display techniques for
functional capabilities assessment is needed. This issue is related to the functional
impacts of a failure, criticality of functions, and failure propagation potential. The
relationship between the availability of redundant functionality and the associated
criticality rating of that functionality also affects functional capabilities assessment.
Failure propagation potential includes assessing the expected impacts of a failure and the ways
that the failure could propagate into other failures. Failure propagation can occur within a
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specific system or among different systems. Functional dependencies can exist between
systems (e.g., loss of a power bus can shutdown a fan cooling a system and result in
overheating). The existence of such dependencies associated with a failure can result in global
failure effects, including failure propagation across multiple systems.
Issue: Methods are needed for representing functional dependencies among different
systems and assessing the resulting global effects and functional impacts of such failures.
WHAT-IF evaluation can be used to determine failure propagation potential. If such a
formulation is used, see the previous discussions of the evaluation of consequences, predicted
behavior, alternative states and behaviors, and mission impacts and procedures for display of
functional impacts resulting from procedures execution.
4.2.3 Unanticipated Situations and Workaround
Procedures define the behavior expected from the monitored process and the activities of agents
participating in fault management during situations that are anticipated prior to a mission. In
actual operations, contingency situations arise where the behavior of the monitored process or
the intelligent system does not match these expectations. Such situations arise from a variety of
causes, including operator misentry, misinterpretation of situation, inherent variability of
devices, software errors, or the occurrence of multiple failures (Woods, Roth, and Bennett,
1990). Since a contingency situation has not been anticipated, no procedures exist to respond
to the situation. One of the difficulties in an unanticipated situation is that the problem is ill-
defined or unknown. The operator must first problem-solve to identify the problem, then
problem-solve to correct the problem (Lemke and Fischer, 1990). The operator should be able
to manipulate information to identify the source of the contingency and generate and test
workaround procedures in response to such contingencies. Workaround procedures are
procedures developed in real time in response to contingency situations. See also section 3.3.1
for a discussion of re-plan at contingency situations.
To respond to contingency situations and unexpected anomalies, the operator must have access
to miss!on, plans, such as mission procedures and scheduled activities. The intelligent system
can assist m an analysis of the resulting workaround procedures by providing such information
as the prerequisites for the execution of the procedure, the potential consequences of executing
the procedure in the given situation, violations of flight rules caused by the procedure, and
necessary post conditions for the altered procedure to succeed (Woods, 1986). Once these
procedures have been initiated, the operator should be able to monitor the effects of the
workaround procedures on the anomaly. See section 4.2.2 on monitoring procedure
execution.
Problem: Support for Developing Workaround Procedures
Recommendation: The intelligent system should be designed to assist the operator in
handling unanticipated situations. The operator should be able to generate and test
workaround procedures. Available information should include pre-defined procedures,
assessment of procedure impacts, scheduled activities, and flight rules.
For example, an analysis of procedure impacts is very useful during the construction of
workaround procedures. The execution of a procedure can impact crew and vehicle safety,
mission goals, and on-going operations. It can even affect the ability to perform fault
management by altering the diagnostic situation (e.g., change data from the value at system
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failure). The trade-offs between the importance of executing a procedure and the negative
impacts of that procedure are an important part of revising planned operations to respond to
anomalies. See section 4.2.2 for discussions of procedure impacts and evaluating the
consequences of events and activities, including execution of workaround procedures.
Issue: Study is needed to determine complete information requirements and effective
display techniques to assist the operator in handling unanticipated situations. Areas for
further study include:
• Detection of atypical situations
• Machine compensation for human stress reactions
• Display of ambiguous problem space
• Display of uncertainty (e.g., what do I know, what might be true; section 4.3.1.1)
• Display of response options with impacts
• Criticality of response options (e.g., potential impacts if NO response, failure
propagation; section 4.2.2)
• Operator orientation in presence of interruptions (section 4.1.1)
• Managing multiple failures (e.g., failure priority and criticality, failure
dependencies)
• Emphasizing what has changed from what remained the same
Workaround operations cannot be planned and tested as thoroughly as pre-defined procedures.
Such activities should be approached with caution due to the inherent risks of altering pre-
defined activity sequences. In such a case, the solution could create worse impacts to safety or
mission than the original anomaly. Any capability associated with workaround should include
the ability to evaluate the risks and potential impacts of that workaround.
Problem: Minimizing Risk Introduced by Workaround Procedures
Rccommendation: To minimize the risk inherent in real-time changes to procedures,
the ability to evaluate the potential impact of workaround procedures, including changes
in agent activities and reallocations of responsibilities, should be provided.
Thus, the ability to perform dynamic workaround must be balanced against the resulting risks
of such workaround and the requirements of configuration control. Since the time to
accomplish a workaround is frequently limited, performance constraints must also be
considered. These factors are a major constraint on what type of control and how much control
is provided to the operator in unanticipated situations. In the eventuality that the unanticipated
situation involves loss of capability in the intelligent system, the operator may need to intervene
in the machine reasoning process (section 4.1.3). In an extreme case, the operator may have to
takeover from the intelligent system.
The additional information required to support workaround can have a cost. More information
to manage can increase operator work load. The system should be designed to assist the
operator in managing the larger amounts of information required to support workaround.
Sections 4.3 and 5 provides recommendations for managing information overload.
For additional information related to unanticipated situations, see the previous discussions on
critical diagnostic information in section 4.2.2. See section 4.1.1 for recommendations
concerning agent task reallocation in response to unanticipated situations and interruption.
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4.3 Support for Information Management and Display
Information management is the manipulation of information to assist in interpretation and use
of information. Due to the potential for overloading the operator with large amounts of
dynamic information during real-time fault management, it is important to assist the operator in
managing information. One aspect of managing information is the ability to interpret
information. Section 4.3.1 provides recommendations for designing to assist interpretation of
information.
Woods has introduced the term workspace to describe the screen real estate provided by the
user interface and the set of all graphics and text displayed within that real estate (section
5.1.2). Design of the workspace affects the ability of the operator to access and manipulate
information effectively. Section 4.3.2 provides recommendations and issues addressing
design of the workspace for information management.
4.3.1 Interpretation of Information
Managing information overload requires designing the intelligent system and its user interface
to assist the operator in interpretation of information. Information context can be used to
present information in a more meaningful fashion. Qualitative representation of information
can be an effective way to identify information content. To effectively manage information
overload, information presentation should go beyond visualization (which still requires a
substantial operator effort to interpret) to support summarization of information and
suppression of irrelevant detail. These are areas requiring further investigation.
4.3.1.1 Information Context
In section 3.2.3, characteristics common to all information are identified as the source of
information, quality of information, and availability of information. These information
attributes represent a context useful in interpreting an information item. In this section,
recommendations and issues associated with communicating these attributes of information to
agents of the fault management team are discussed.
Source of Information
It becomes important to identify the source of an information item when information from
multiple sources is viewed from one workspace. Knowledge of the source of an information
item identifies how the information was generated and clarifies the authority of that item.
Understanding the method of generation assists in interpreting information. The source
identifier provides a reference for making related information requests (e.g., query an operator
about details of an input). It is useful for quickly identifying when backup or redundant
capability is being used (Johns, 1990). Knowledge of the source of information items also
assists in orienting an operator coming on shift about on-going events and the current
configuration of systems. See section 3.2.3 for more about the source of an information item.
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Problem: Demnnining the Authority and Credibility of Information
Recommendation: Agents should understand the source of information used in fault
management. The source of information identifies how the information was
determined and indicates the authority of the information. It is especially important
to identify the source of derived (i.e., computed and inferred) information, since the
operator must understand the algorithm or reasoning behind the information to be able
to interpret the information.
_: The example in figure 4-34 illustrates operator confusion arising he cannot
distinguish between information from the intelligent system and information from
another operator. In figure 4-35, the source of information is clearly indicated on the
display, allowing the operator to assess information reliability based on its source.
This example is not based on a scenario. The background required to understand the
example is provided in the figures.
There are a variety of techniques for indicating the source of information on the user interface.
Text identifiers can be placed near the information item (e.g., a field for source identifier in
message list, character identifier adjacent to data field). Graphic forms can also be used to
identify information source (e.g., icons can be uniquely associated with specific sources).
Coding techniques (e.g., color, highlighting) can also be used when displaying information.
Color should be used conservatively, since color overuse is a common problem. Although it
may not be necessary to always have source visible, the operator should be provided with
ready access to source information.
One of the characteristics related to the source of information is the availability of alternate or
redundant sources. The authority of a source is affected by the degree of confidence that the
operator has in the source. When alternate sources are operating nominally and providing
information, the agreement between these sources about the information item directly impacts
confidence. Since some sources may be considered more reliable by the operator, the identity
of the selected source also affects operator confidence. Thus, the availability and health of
alternate sources and the identity of the selected source when alternates exist affect the authority
of the information item. These attributes of an information item should be accessible by the
operator.
When displaying information from alternate sources on one screen, it is important to clearly
identify differences between the alternate sources. Often, the difference is the method used to
generate the information. The comparison of a predicted or simulated information item to the
corresponding real information sampled in the actual environment (e.g., comparing a predicted
measurement to an actual measurement) is a common situation where the method of generation
is the critical source information. See section 4.2.2 for a discussion of predicted behavior.
If alternate sources are simultaneously active, the potential for conflicting information exists
(e.g., hardware fault may be detected both by the Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) and by the
intelligent system diagnosis). See the discussion of inconsistent information under quality of
information later in this section for methods to evaluate and resolve inconsistency.
4-78
JjfJ
_f
Problem: Determining the Authority and Credibility of Information
BEFORE- Example Illustrating Problem:
Knowledge of the source of information often indicates the believability of the information.
In this example, source of Information cannot be distinguished from the display. The
operator has difficulty in determining how reliable a piece of Information is, because he
does not know how it was derived.
EVENT SUMMARY
103:09:13:00 The Port MRL has failed to release.
103:09:12:42 The Port MRL Release commanded.
103:09:11:36DAP in free drift,
103:09:10:20 The MPM has deployed successfully.
103:09:09:10 Expect Single Motor Drive Time.
103:09:09:08 MPM DEPLOY commanded.
103:09:08:50Limit check port aft MRL microswitch REL,
MSID V54X2345
DIAGRAM 1
The operator cannot determine which events were detected by the Intelligent system
and which events were detected by a previous operator using this message list.
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DIAGRAM 2
Similar to diagram 1, the operator has no means of Identifying the source of an event in
this timeline representation of events.
Figure 4-34. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Confusion about Source of Information
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Problem: Determining the Authority and Credibility of Information
AFTER Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, source identifiers are added to the entries in a message list and a timeline.
The current operator can now distinguish between conclusions of the intelligent system and
information provided by previous operators.
EVENT SUMMARY
103:09:13:00 RULES The Port MRL has failed to release.
103:09:12:42 RULES The Port MRL Release commanded.
103:09:11:36 COMPS DAP in free drift.
103:09:10:20 RULES The MPM has deployed successfully.
103:09:09:10 RULES Expect Single lvt)tor Drive Time.
103:09:09:08 RULES MPM DEPLOY commanded.
103:09:08:50 DCULP Limit check pod aft MRL microswitch REL,
MSID V54X2345
DIAGRAM 1
The second field of each message contains a source identifier (e.g., RULES, COMPS). Sources
in this illustration include the intelligent system (RULES), conventional algorithm (COMP),
and the operator responsible for entedng Information (e.g, DCULP for operator Don Culp).
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DIAGRAM 2
Graphic forms can also be used to identify information source. In the event timeline above,
the triangular mark indicates an event detected by the intelligent system and the circular
mark Indicates an event detected by the operator.
Figure 4-35. AFTER: Example Illustrating Clear Identification of Source of Information
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Problem: Resolving Disagreement between Redundant Sources of Information
Recommendation: Information useful in distinguishing between alternate information
sources includes availability of information from the source, the health of the source,
and the reliability of source (as indicated by previous behavior). Measures of
consistency of information from different sources should be provided and methods
for resolving inconsistency. When redundant sources are available, the currently
selected or enabled source should be identified.
Issue: Techniques are needed for effective display of information from multiple, alternate
sources, including redundant sources.
Figure 4-31 in section 4.2.1 includes an illustration of redundant sensor measurements when
they disagree. Figure 4-37 in the section below (quality of information) provides another
example of presenting information from alternate sources (e.g., quality assessments from BITE
and intelligent system). See also section 4.2.1 for information concerning redundant alarms.
The operator can also be a source of information. Interaction to acquire information from the
operator can be initiated by either the operator or the intelligent system. If initiated by the
intelligent system, the information can either be requested or the information can be inferred
and the operator requested to confirm it. The utility of these different mechanisms is dependent
upon the context in which the interaction occurs (Johns, 1990). For example, the ability to
infer information and merely request the operator to confirm the inference is more effective if
the human and computer have been collaborating about a given topic, which provides the
computer with a context for its inference.
Issue: Multiple mechanisms are possible for operator input into the intelligent system:
(1) requested by machine, (2) inferred by machine and confirmed by user, and (3)
volunteered by user. Research is needed to determine criteria for identifying
appropriate/effective mechanisms for operator input in different human-computer
collaboration scenarios.
The sources of information may vary over the lifetime of the system. The evolution to digital
electronic forms of information (e.g, from paper or analog electronic) is a common situation
where alternate or new sources of information are introduced. For example, the Space Shuttle
program is currently undergoing a change to digital voice communications, which will make
voice information available in an electronic format. Upgrading an existing system to include
intelligent system technology represents the addition of a new data source. In either of these
situations, the introduction of a new technology results in a new source of information for the
fault management team. It is planned that Space Station will use an electronic format for much
of the information that is in paper for Space Shuttle (e.g., procedures). This will provide more
potential sources of information for Space Station and the identification of source will be
especially important. See section 6.3 for additional guidance on the integration of intelligent
system technology into an existing support environment.
Quality of Information
An important capability in managing information from both the intelligent system and the
monitored process is the ability to identify and compensate for imperfections in information.
There are a number of types of imperfection, including imprecise information, inconsistent
information, and ambiguous information (section 3.2.3). The operator should be provided the
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capabilityto detect and compensate for imperfections in information. See Section 4.2.1 for a
discussion about managing false alarms arising from imperfect information.
There may be multiple assessments of the quality of an information item. Quality assessment
may be performed at different points during transmission or processing of the information to
satisfy specific objectives (e.g., a test using Built-In Test Equipment is conducted onorbit to
indicate health of measuring device while a bit-error check is performed to detect errors
introduced during transmission). When using an assessment of data quality, the objective of
the assessment and the sources of imperfection evaluated in the assessment should be clearly
identified. For example, bit-error checking indicates nothing about the accuracy of the data as
measured. Additionally, if no assessment has been performed, the data quality value should be
indeterminate. The use of nominal values for default values can also result in misinterpretation
of information.
Problem: Determining Quality of Information
Recommendation: Information quality assessments should be provided to the fault
management team when available. The objectives of the assessment and the sources of
imperfection evaluated in the assessment should be clearly identified.
_,2I_21_: The example in figure 4-36 illustrates poor presentation of information from
alternate sources of quality assessment (e.g., BITE and intelligent system), while
figure 4-37 illustrates an improved approach. This example is not based on a scenario.
The figure provides all background information required to understand the illustration.
Imprecise information is inexact or inaccurate information. Inaccuracy can result from
approximation or from error. Approximation arises from precision limitations in hardware or
software used to process the information as well as the fidelity of the source that generates the
information. There are a variety of sources of errors in information, including errors in
hardware devices (measuring and processing), errors during information transmission, and
errors in information processing (i.e., software errors).
Accuracy is an assessment of how well an information item agrees with the criteria defining its
expected precision. Information satisfying this criteria are rated as accurate (i.e., good) while
information exceeding this criteria are inaccurate (i.e., bad). An assessment of information
accuracy cannot always yield an absolute status (i.e., good or bad) for an information item.
Data quality indicators may provide conflicting assessments or the available indicators may be
insufficient to assess quality. An intermediate assessment, such as suspect data quality, can be
used to convey the possibility of an unconfirmed imperfection in the value of information. An
information item can be suspect due to its relationship with confmaaed bad information (e.g., if
B is derived from A and A is bad, then B becomes suspect), previous behavior trends (e.g.,
item has exhibited bad data quality before), inconsistency with other indicators (e.g., a sensor
whose measurements disagree with redundant sensors is suspect), and ambiguities preventing
quality determination (e.g., A or B is bad, but unable to determine which is bad).
Some types of knowledge representations provide an assessment of information certainty (e.g.,
membership in a fuzzy set, statistical representation). These assessments may be useful in
assessing confidence in the accuracy of the information. See also section 4.1.2 (visibility into
intelligent system activities and reasoning) for guidance on distinguishing information with
different levels of uncertainty (i.e., hypotheses from facts).
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JProblem: Determining Quality of Information
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the status of three sensors is displayed. The value of this status can be
altered by either the Built-In Test Equipment (BITE, quality check built into the sensor) or
by the intelligent system. With 1his presentation format, it is not clear which of these
quality tests has determined the value. It is also not clear how a conflict between these
two would be resolved.
_o.t I _ I Suspect_i_
SENSOR2 _i_il ......................_!i!J Suspe=l e_ I
SENSOR3 _i_._ii_ll Suspect I Bad J
Figure 4-36. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Poor Presentation of Alternate Sources of
Quality Assessment
Problem: Determining Quality of Information
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, status values from from the BITE and the intelligent system are displayed
in close proximity to each other. This allows the operator to distinguish between quality
tests (since they check different symptoms to determine quality) and to detect conflicts
between them (here, BITE has detected Bad status on sensor 1 not detected by intelligent
system).
BITE _ Suspect _.l_._._'i_SENSOR 1
Sys ...: ¥..Int !.!.!_.._....._I.iii. Suspect Bad
SENSOR2
 u.0ooI II ,ntsyslii/_._;llsus,ec, Bad
SENSORaI IntSysl!iI_-_'_I_ii Suspect
Figure 4-37. AFTER: Example Illustrating Improved Presentation of Alternate Sources of
Quality Assessment
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Issue: Techniques are needed to assist the fault management team in managing imprecise
information. These techniques should indicate the certainty associated with the quality
assessment (e.g., confirmed bad versus suspected bad), the cause of the inaccuracy, and
possible ways to compensate for the inaccuracy.
Inconsistency occurs when multiple information items provide conflicting interpretations about
a single event or aspect of behavior. These information items can come from alternate sources
at a given time or from a single item sampled over time (see section 4.2.1 on intermittent
behavior). Redundant capability for failure backup is one way of achieving alternate sources of
information. Dependencies between systems can also give rise to alternate sources of
information (e.g., loss of system power can be indicated by temperature increases in cooled
systems and loss of data from measuring devices attached to the power system as well as by
low voltage readings).
Comparing information for consistency requires that criteria for agreement and disagreement be
established (see related discussion on criteria for comparing predicted and actual behavior in
section 4.2.2). It is also important to identify when the disagreement is significant (i.e., has an
important impact to safety or operations).
Once inconsistency has been detected, it must be resolved by determining a single interpretation
of the conflicting information. Methods for resolving inconsistency between redundant alarms
were discussed in section 4.2.1. These methods include accepting the majority opinion or
creating a composite opinion by a weighted combination of information, where the weights
correspond to the reliability of each information source. Statistical evaluation of information
can also be useful in detecting transients or behavior trends that lead to imperfections (both
inconsistency and inaccuracy) as well as selecting between alternate sources. The resolution
should also be consistent with other system behavior (e.g., don't postulate a power loss if
there is evidence that the device is still operating).
Issue:Techniques are needed to assist the fault management team in managing
inconsistent information. These techniques should indicate the source of the information
items being compared, the intent/objective of the comparison, the criteria for agreement,
and the significance of a disagreement. Methods for resolving inconsistency should be
provided also.
Ambiguous information is information supporting multiple interpretations. Ambiguity should
be clearly indicated to the operator. The information needed to evaluate ambiguous information
includes the set of possible interpretations of the information, the activities required to reduce
ambiguity, and an assessment of the impacts of performing these activities. This impact
assessment should indicate any violation of the mandatory operational conditions and
constraints (e.g., the flight rules for Space Shuttle). Since the set of possible interpretations
may change as activities are performed to reduce ambiguity, a display of ambiguous
information should dynamically change to reflect the altered situation. See also section 4.2.2
for recommendations relating to procedures monitoring and impact assessment.
Issue: Techniques are needed to assist the fault management team in managing
ambiguous information. These techniques should indicate the set of possible
interpretations of the information, the activities required to reduce ambiguity, and an
assessment of the impacts of performing these activities. Display of this information
should dynamically change during the process of reducing ambiguity.
Fault ambiguity occurs when two or more faults are indistinguishable using the available
evidence. Fault ambiguity is a common form of ambiguity in flight operations, resulting from
insufficient evidence to distinguish between faults. Insufficient evidence can result from
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inadequate sensors on-orbit (due to vehicle weight constraints), from limitations in the
bandwidth of the downlisted telemetry stream, or when unanticipated situations occur (see also
section 4.2.3).
Availability of Information
As discussed in section 3.2.3, dynamic information may be either available (i.e., the most
current value is accessible) or static (i.e., not updated to current value due to inaccessible data
source). Information can become static at Loss of Signal (LOS) due to the geometric
configuration of the elements of the transmission system or due to a failure in the
communications system. Since dynamic information that updates at a slow rate or that is
currently not changing value can appear to be static, the availability of information should be
indicated to agents of the fault management team. Additionally, the intelligent system should
be designed to allow continued operations during periods of static information.
Problem: Managing Information Loss due to Static Data
]_ecommendation: The intelligent system should be designed to handle periods of
static information. The user interface should display the availability of dynamic
information. Since it is often important to know the last value of a parameter prior
to going static, the technique for displaying static availability should not preclude
displaying the last parameter value.
Example: In figure 4-38, both the intelligent system and the operator are unaware that
Loss of Signal (LOS) has occurred during the MPM Deploy. They mis-interpret the
lack of change in MPM state as a failure of the Deploy when it is actually due to LOS.
In figure 4-39, LOS is clearly indicated on the display and data are no longer mis-
interpreted. This example is based on Scenario 2, with the addition of a Loss of Signal
midway through the MPM Deploy.
Techniques to indicate static data on the user interface were observed in the case study. An
ascii character "s" was positioned to the right of an information item when static. Color was
also used to indicate availability (e.g., use of orange to indicate static information for some of
the RTDS intelligent systems).
A partial loss of information may occur instead of a total loss of dynamic information. A
partial data frame may result from either reducing the number of parameters transmitted from
the number in a normal data frame or by transmitting a complete set of parameters at a lower
rate than usual. For example, the Space Shuttle downlists a reduced number of parameters
when the high frequency transponder fails. The backup capability is a low frequency
transponder, which has a significantly reduced transmission bandwidth. Procedurally, the
subset of parameters that are most critical to safety and mission are downlisted. In this
situation, an intelligent system would be required to function using partial information or
shutdown until a full data set was acquired. One means of operating with partial data is to
partition the knowledge base such that portions operating on the unavailable information can be
disabled (section 4.1.3 on overriding the intelligent system). Another approach is to load a
separate knowledge base designed for operation with the reduced data set. Alternately, the
unavailable data could be simulated, inferred, input by the operator or ignored, depending on
the desired fidelity of operation.
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Problem: Managing Information Loss Due to Static Data
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, Loss of Signal (LOS) occurs during the MPM Deploy. Since there is no
indication of LOS on the display or in the data set, both the operator and the intelligent
system fail to notice the LOS and erroneously conclude Deploy failed based on fact that
data does not change after 68 seconds.
I MPM COMMAND
)
MPM COMMAND MPM COMMAND
MPM STATUS
Nominal Deploy ] I] MPM STATUSNominal Deploy ]
tl MPMSTA_S ]
JJiJiiJiiJiJJ,=
Single Motor Deploy Fa_]
JJJlJlllPlllJ I
[Intelligent System Conclusions]
I
I
000:01:03:00 000:01:03:54
y I
I MPM Deploy failed.Initiating recoveryprocedures.
I
000:01:04:10
STEP 1
MPM Deploy is initiated.
STEP 2
Failure in communications
system causes Loss of
Signal (LOS). All telemetry
from vehicle goes static.
Only indication of static
on screen is that information
value does not changes
STEP 3
Operator and intelligent system
are not aware of LOS. After 68
seconds with no change in MPM
state, assume failed Deploy.
Actually, Deploy was completed
during LOS period.
Figure 4-38. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Data Mis-interpretation when Fault Management
Team is Unaware that Data are Static
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Problem: Managing Information Loss Due to Static Data
AFTER Example Illustrating Solulion:
In this example, Loss of Signal (LOS) is indicated to both the operator and the intelligent
system. Now both respond correctly and do not mistakenly conclude failed MPM Deploy.
The presentation technique used to indicate LOS (in this example, a distinctive background)
should not overwrite the last value of information items. These values remind the operator
of state of system prior to LOS.
MPM COMMAND
Nominal Deploy
MPM COMMAND MPM COMMAND
IMPMSTATE
I MPM STATUS
Ilntelllgent System Conclusions J
I T initiated] IIIIiCi,;,'i;iii Z;lllllJ MPM Deploy
1 I
000:01:03:00 000:01:03:54 000:01:04:10
STEP 1
MPM Deploy is initiated.
STEP 2
Failure in communications
system causes LOS. All
telemetry goes static.
Indication of static is shown
by distinctive background
behind static information.
Intelligent system Is also
provided Indication of static.
STEP 3
Operator and intelligent system
do not mistakenly conclude that
MPM deploy has failed. Notice
that distinctive background does
not overwrite the last value
prior to LOS.
Figure 4-39. AFTER: Example Illustrating Proper Interpretation of Static Data when LOS is
Clearly Indicated on Display
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Problem: OperatingwithPartialData Set
Bccommendation: Ifa partialossofdataispossible,theintelligentsystem should
Ix: designed to recognize and operate with a reduced set of dynamic information. The
desired functionality with partial data should bc specified and can range from low
activity, maintenance operations (e.g., record information) to active compensation for
information loss (e.g., use of simulation or inference to "fill in" for unavailable
information).
There arc alsouserinterfaceissuesassociatedwith use of a partialdataset.The focusof these
issuesismaintainingoperatorawarenessof importantbehaviorinthepresenceof partial
information(seealsosection4.2.2fora discussionof criticaldiagnosticinformation).
Problem: Operator SituationalAwareness withPartialData
Recommendation: Thc userinterfaceshouldclearlyindicatewhen operatingwith
partialinformation.Alterationof intelligentsystem capabilityor lossof functionality
duringperiodsofpartialinformationshould be broughtto theoperator'sattention.
Any means of compensating forthelossof informationshouldbc clearlyidentified.
The displayformats providedforsupportduringperiodsof partialdatashould
emphasize maintainingawareness of criticaleventsand anomalous behaviorwhere
possible.
Since operationwith partialinformationcan bc viewed as a distinctmode of operation,the
rccomn_cndationsin section4.I.Iconcerningmode of operationcan be usefulwhen designing
thisportionof the intelligentsystem. Ifsimulationor inferenceistobe used toestimatethe
unavailableinformation,therecommendations aboutdisplayof predictioninsection4.2.2
shouldbe considered.Note thata requestforunavailableinformationby theintelligentsystem
can alsobc a mechanism foralertingtheoperatorabout a lossof data. Scc thediscussionof
differentmechanisms foruserinputof unavailableinformationearlierinthissection.
4.3.1.2 Qualitative Representation
The representationsof qualitativephysicsprovidea communications medium thatseems to
match wellwith what isexpected by human members of an engineeringteam. The abilityto
recognizewhat changes arcimportantrelicson a symbolic,qualitativeunderstandingof the
artifacLFor example, an engineerwho declaredthata power plantwas ina completely
differentstatebecause thefcedwatcrdropped from 70.0OF to69.00 OF would be viewed with
some skepticismby hisor her colleagues.Furthermore,abstractingaway unimportantdetails
iscrucialforefficientcommunication. Qualitativerepresentationiseffectiveatexpressing:
Relevance
Qualitativecriteriarccommonly used todescribewhen models arcvalidand actionsarc
applicable.Thus qualitativephysicsprovidesa crucialsubstratcforengineering
knowledge.
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Naturalness
Experts use and expect qualitative language in consultations regarding monitored
processes. Human engineers assume a shared background of commonsense knowledge
in communications concerning artifacts.
Abstraction
Qualitative representations provide a concise summary of classes of situations and
behavior, making communication about complex events and states easier.
Minimality
Qualitative reasoning allows conclusions to be drawn with very little information. While
often weak,these conclusions are often sufficient for the task at hand, and otherwise form
the basis for guiding the application of more detailed knowledge.
Problem: Information Representation for Human Communication
Recommendation: Qualitative representation can be used to organize and manage
information. Since human engineers often seem to use qualitative language in
discourse, many default presentations of information should be cast in qualitative
terms. Such displays could be made very compact, with details presented as needed.
Qualitative representations have been developed for:
Numbers and equations
The qualitative, symbolic representation of the artifact's state and behavior provides
a central, integrating representation, a framework which provides the context in
which the quantitative information makes sense. Typically, symbolic representation
of numeric entities are organized around inequalities. For example,
Limit point: comparisons made with other parameters of the model that
signify when important behavioral changes occur (Forbus, 1984)
Landmark value: comparisons between particular values taken by a parameter
during a behavior (Kuipers, 1986)
Order of magnitude: notation of which effects dominate others (Rairnan,
1986; Mavrovouniotis and Stephanopolous, 1987)
Ontologies
Qualitative physics has contributed formal languages for organizing models of
engineering domains. For example,
Device-centered ontology: concept of idealized devices of system dynamics
(de Kleer and Brown, 1984; Williams, 1984)
- Process-centered ontology: concept of physical process (Forbus, 1984)
Behavior
Examples of qualitative representation of behavior are:
- Representation of control strategy (LeClair et al., 1989)
- Summarization of system status (Abbott, 1991)
Behavioral representation must be supplemented by fundamental description, which
is required to derive or explain the behavior. It must include changes introduced by
agent actions (e.g., procedures) as well as system dynamics. Productive areas of
investigation include linking behavior and function and classifying patterns of
behavior, independent of role within the system.
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Someexamplesillustratingtechniquesfor usingqualitativerepresentationare:
Signsof derivatives are often key indicators of system state. This information could be
compactly described in a table using symbols to indicate decreasing, constant, or
increasing, or perhaps using a different color or highlight pattern.
When annotating a schematic with numerical values, it could be useful to display a
parameter in terms of its quantity space. That is, set up a small scale with a discrete
number of ticks and represent the value via the position of an indicator on this scale.
Such displays have been very useful in (Kuipers, 1986).
It is common to summarize unusual events in system logs. Such excursions should be
noted in qualitative terms in addition to any more detailed data, to facilitate their being
noticed by human team members.
Study is needed to evaluate how well qualitative representations fit with human mental models.
Few such studies have been done to date (c.f. Kuipers and Kassirer, 1984).
4.3.1.3 Summarization
Visualization has been rightly hailed as a powerful advance for interacting with computers.
Part of the power of visualization is summarization: We can exploit our visual perception
abilities to quickly comprehend a mass of data. However, we believe visualization isn't
enough. It is certainly progress to move from spending hours poring over reams of line-printer
listings to watching a videotape or interactive animauon. But we should be aware of the costs
of visualization. It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. But let us assume the
picture is 512 X 512 pixels, with 24 bits of color, and that we can assume an average of 6
characters per word, using one byte per character. Then a picture costs 768 KB, or about
131,000 words! And while computers are getting cheaper, human beings aren't, and trained
people must still watch the movies and try to understand what they mean. We suggest it would
be even better for our machines to understand what we are trying to do and let them sift
through the mountains of data for us. Let them report back when they. have found something
interesting, perhaps presenting it in video form, rather than us continuing manual labor, albeit
in a slightly more pleasant form.
Issue: Information management techniques are needed that go beyond visualization,
which can be costly in processing time and which still require humans to interpret the
visualization. Task-dependent algorithms for summarization and suppression of
irrelevant detail seem a promising extension.
This insight is based on our experience with research interfaces for qualitative model
development. Correctly managing the amount of detail presented is a key issue, but we don't
have very good solutions for it yet. And maybe there aren't any. No graphical interface is
going to make a 10,000 state envisionment instantly comprehensible. If, on the other hand, all
you care about are steady-state situations and there are only a handful of them, a good interface
can make it easy to analyze that handful of states to select the one you are interested in. Task-
dependent algorithms for summarization and suppression of irrelevant detail seem a promising
alternative.
4.3.2 Workspace Design
Design of the workspace includes specification of the visual appearance of the user interface
and the style of interacting with it. This specification should be derived from the information
requirements and agent activity description for the task and should be evaluated for utility using
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operational scenarios. Designing the workspace to assist the operator when navigating through
the workspace is discussed. The trade-off between complexity in the workspace design and
intelligent system performance is identified and methods to compensate for these performance
impacts are described. The effect of the user's level of expertise on both the visual appearance
and the style of interaction with the user interface is discussed. Finally, alternatives to the most
common visual form used in designing the intelligent system workspace, the message list, are
investigated.
Recommendations and issues affecting both the visual appearance of the user interface and the
style of interacting with it are summarized in this section. An in-depth discussion of designing
for visualization of the monitored process and intelligent system activity is provided in section
5.
Navigation through Workspace
Navigation is the means of traversing the workspace to access and manipulate information.
There are a number of design considerations that affect workspace navigation. The grouping
of information into multiple windows that can be selectively closed to reduce screen clutter can
introduce complicated and confusing interaction sequences. The operator can become lost
when navigating through such a complex workspace to access required information. The
operator can also become disoriented when navigating through a process view (i.e., a coherent
unit of representation of a portions of the underlying process or systems which the observer
could select for display, such as a schematic; see section 5.1.2) that is larger than the available
real estate for displaying them (i.e., where only part of a view can be displayed at one time).
Thus, an important HCI design trade-off affecting workspace navigation is information density
versus interaction complexity. Increasing the availability of information often complicates
interaction with the workspace. A good design represents a balance between these two
approaches. Approaches for achieving this balance include assisting the operator in navigating
through a complex workspace or providing mechanisms for reducing information density. For
complex interaction, a "map" can be provided to identify where the operator is currently located
within the interaction sequence or display unit. Information density can be reduced locally by
grouping non-critical information into "overlays" that can be de-selected by the operator (Chu,
1990). See also section 4.1.1 for a discussion of interaction options that vary by mode of
operation.
The operator should be able to easily identify the available interaction options, both for access
to and control of the monitored process and the intelligent system as well as control of the
format and content of the user interface (Johns, 1990).
Problem: Maintaining Orientation in Complex Workspace
Recommendation: The workspace design should include aids for navigating through
the workspace and should provide the capability to control information density on the
user interface.
_xample: Figures 4-40 through 4-45 illustrate techniques that assist the operator in
maintaining orientation within a complex workspace. These examples are described
below in more detail.
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Althoughtherearenodefinitiveguidelinesonhowto make this trade-off, some suggestions
for achieving balance between information density and interaction complexity are made below:
• NavigatingthroughAvailableWindows
A graphical representation of available screen formats can be used as a map for orienting
the operator and as a mechanism for moving through the workspace. See figures 4-40
and 4-41 for an illustration of presentation of information about what windows arc
available for display and how to improve navigation through them.
• Navigating throughSchematics and Graphics LargerthanDisplay Region
When navigating through a graphic larger than the display area, a representation of the
entire graphic (e.g., schematic) with the visible portion highlighted within that
representation is a useful orienting mechanism (Shaw, 1988). See figures 4-42 and 4-43
for an illustration of how this overview graphic assists the operator in avoiding getting
"lost" in a large schematic. Also, see Johns (1990) for additional information on the
navigation of schematics.
• Selectively Hiding Unnecessary Detail
Organizing task-specific information into operator-selectable overlays can be effective in
reducing visual complexity when the information is not required for the current task
(Chu, 1990). See figures 4-44 and 4-45 for an illustration of the use of overlays to
reduce information density on the screen.
* Using Fixed Regions for Quick Scanning
A combination of fixed and dynamic regions on the workspace can assist in balancing
information density and interaction complexity. A quick scan of the fixed regions can
direct the operator toward a system requiring detailed investigation (i.e., what to call up
in the dynamic region of a workspace).
The examples referred above are not based on one of the scenarios provided at the beginning of
section 4. Adequate background to understand the example is provided in each figure.
Issue: Research is needed into methods assisting the designer in making the trade-off
between information density and interaction complexity of the HCI.
A variety of techniques for workspace navigation were observed in the case study. Many
systems had a workspace designed around pre-defined screens. Navigation through the
workspace consisted of displaying the desired screen. Within a screen, there were often
combinations of fixed display regions and regions with operator-selectable displays.
Hypermedia connections between information displays were demonstrated in the GNC Air
Data System.
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Problem: Maintaining Orientation about Available Windows
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, it is not clear what windows are available for display or how to access
available windows. The operator can become "lost" in a compJex interaction sequence
just trying to view another window.
|1 I II ill ill Ill il! Ill II::ii
_:_]_::_]i_::iiii_iiiiiii!_...........................................................................................................................::ii::it R.S i EPS iiiili
TCS Statua Screen ilii
::;:::::::::::
Figure 4-40. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Difficulty in Navigating Among Multiple
Windows
Problem: Maintaining Orientation about Available Windows
AFTER - Example Illuetrating Solution:
in this example, an overview of all available windows is always displayed at the top
of the screen. The selected window is highlighted using grey tone. The operator can
now easily identify what windows can be viewed and how to access them.
,v..,.. ._'_._._.._._._'_._`_._._`'_.._.`_._`_._ _`._._`._'._.._'_v' ` _._.`_._._`_`_._._.._ _,_
C_T EPS R_ _£S
TCS Diagram
i::-'7'r-'t'-,",-. . . ','-'-".'_........................._'r_7"'-,',' ','-'.'t'r,......................"-' ....r,,"_I
Schematic
Figure 4-41. AFTER: Example Illustrating Presentation of Information about What Windows
are Available and How to Navigate through Them
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Problem: Maintaining Orientation In a Large Schematic
BEFORE - Example Ulustrsting Problem:
in this example, it is not clear if the entire schematic is visible or if only a portion
of the schematic is visible. Additionally, if only a portion is visible, it is not clear
which portion is visible. With such a display, the operator can easily become "lost"
in the schematic.
MPM System 1
Figure 4-42. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Operator Getting "Lost" in a Schematic
Problem: Maintaining Orientation In a Large Schematic
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
in this example, an overview of the entire schematic is reproduced in the upper
right hand corner. The visible portion of the schematic is displayed in black
and the hidden portion of the schematic is displayed in grey tone. The operator
can now easily identify what portion of the schematic is visible
MPM System 1 OVERVEW
Figure 4-43. AFTER: Example Ulustrating Navigation Aid for Moving Through a Schematic
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Problem: Maintaining Orientation by Hiding Unnecessary Detail
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the operator Is monitoring three systems simultaneously: the Electrical Power
System (EPS), the Thermal Control System (TCS), and the Communications and Track System
(COMM & TRK). The diagram has become very complex visually, which can complicate
the operator's task of identifying Important state transitions.
EPS
4_
TCS I _, TRACKING
Figure 4-44. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Visual Complexity of a Display
Problem: Maintaining Orientation by Hiding Unnecessary Detail
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
In this example, the detailed diagrams for each system are implemented as overlays on the
larger block diagram. Each overlay can be independently hidden, to allow the operator to
reduce visual complexity when trying to focus on a specific system. In the illustration below,
only the TCS is being viewed in detail.
EPS
TCS COMM & TRACKING
Figure 4-45. AFTER: Example Illustrating Reduction of Visual Complexity using Overlays to
Hide Unnecessary Detail
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Theability to balanceinformationdensityandinteractioncomplexityiscomplicatedby the
presenceof morethanonephysicalscreen.Theamountof visible informationis usually
increasedby increasingtherealestate.Andinteractiongainsanotherdimension-- viewingand
navigatingthroughmultiplescreens.Issuesassociatedwith usingmorethanonephysical
screenincludetheability tocoordinatetheaccessof informationonmultipleviewsandto
effectivelymoveamongtheseviews.Easeof accessisrelatedto how well informationis
visuallyorganizedandintegratedwith theexpectedtypesof interaction.It is importantto
specifytheactivitiesto beperformedsothatinformationcanbepartitionedeffectivelybetween
screens.With moreinformationvisible,it becomesespeciallyimportantto clearlyidentifythe
importantbehavioralchangesastheyoccur(e.g.,violationof critical boundaries,major
•events).Theability to quicklyscanfor anomaliesisnecessaryin this typeof support
environment(section4.2.2).
Issue: Investigation is needed into display and navigation issues when more than one
screen is visible at a time. This investigation should include issues associated with
integrating intelligent system technology into an existing operational environment.
Ground operations for both the Space Shuttle and the Space Station are likely to include user
interfaces that span more than one physical screen. For Space Shutde, the recent upgrade to
workstations for flight support has not precluded the use of the displays on the existing flight
support consoles. In this situation, HCI with the workstation should be integrated with use of
the original displays. See section 6.3 for more information on integration of new technology
into an existing operational environment.
Design for Performance
Design is a process of performing trade-offs between conflicting alternatives (Norman, 1983).
In the previous section, the trade-off between information density and interaction complexity
was discussed. Another important trade-off for HCI design is the availability of informatton
versus the performance of the intelligent system. During the case study, intelligent system
performance problems were observed in some systems with complex HCI capability
implemented using advanced software (e.g., G2 ® , The X Window System TM ). The
workspace should be designed to balance the availability of information (i.e., complexity of
interface) with the intelligent system performance impacts of making that information available.
This trade-off could include evaluation of a prototype for performance impacts. As a part of
such an evaluation, the ability of the prototyped design to scale up to a full capability HCI
should be assessed.
Issue: Research is needed into methods assisting the designer in making the trade-off
between availability of information and the performance of the intelligent system.
In a real-time support environment, performance is an important measure of the utility of
support software. If the software cannot provide timely results, it is of limited use. A flexible
HCI design should include provision to accommodate potential performance problems.
Essential capability for mission support should be distinguished from desired capability. The
system should be designed to allow the operator some control over system performance (e.g,
disabling non-essential capability as needed to improve performance). Techniques for
improving performance include off-loading segments of the knowledge base, reducing rate of
information input to the intelligent system, or disabling portions (elements) of system
® G2 is a registered trademark of Gensym Corporation.
rMThe X Window System is a trademark of MIT.
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functionality. Figure 4-29 in section 4.1.3 illustrates the technique of disabling portions of the
knowledge base.
User Expertise
Methods of interacting with the user interface that are obvious to the novice user may be
cumbersome or disruptive to the expert user (Norman, 1983). For example, the use of a long
series of informative menus to access an information item may provide necessary training for
the novice about available display options. Once the novice is trained, however, these menus
lose their utility for that user and can become an obstacle in performing operational tasks.
Means of bypassing these orienting mechanisms should be provided. The content and
presentation of the user interface should be tailored to the expertise level of the operator (Wick,
1989).
Problem: Supporting Both Novice and Experienced Users
Recommendation: If the operational user interface is to be used for training as well as
operational support, the use of redundant types of interaction and alternate forms of
presentation can accommodate the conflicting needs of the novice and the expert while
retaining the same functionality (Norman, 1983). Display formats and interaction
methods can be varied to tailor the content and presentation of the HCI to the expertise
level of the operator (Wick, 1989).
Example: Figure 4-46 illustrates a complex interaction sequence arising from nested
menus. Figure 4-47 shows a redundant, alternative method for interacting that reduces
complexity. This example is derived from the RTDS applications in the case study.
See the discussion below for additional information about this case.
An example of this concept was observed in some of the RTDS applications (Volume 2, Matin
et al., 1991). The user interface provided mouse-selectable, pull-down menus for interaction
with the system. These menus provide a good orienting mechanism for the novice operator by
displaying available options at each menu level and by leaving a visual trail of the inputs
required to perform an action. In some cases, however, these menus were nested deeply and
interaction became cumbersome to experienced operators. An alternate, redundant method of
interaction was provided in the form of function keys on the keyboard. This allowed
experienced operators to quickly access desired functionality without proceeding through the
menu hierarchy (Gnabasik, 1990). Figures 4-46 and 4-47 illustrate this example.
It is important for the system to use the same terminology as used by experienced operators.
When an intelligent system is to be used by inexperienced operators, this reinforces other
forms of training through use of a common language. It is imperative that the intelligent
system use the "operational" language with experienced operators as well. An "operational"
language typically exists to prevent ambiguous statements in critical situations. The intelligent
system must use that language to be clearly understood and to be accepted by experienced
operators.
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Problem: Supporting Both Novice and Experienced Users
BEFORE - Example Illustrating Problem:
In this example, the operator must use the menus to interact with the intelligent system.
For complex systems, there can many, nested menus. Multiple mouse-cllcks may be
requlred for one operator input. Although the menu system Is very useful when leamlng
how to use the user interface, It can be frustmtlng to an experienced user.
START EXPERT SYSTEM
STOP EXPERT SYSTEM
PAUSE EXPERT SYSTEM
RESET EXPERT SYSTEM
LOAD RULE BASE
ENABLE/DISABLE RULE.SETS
ENABLE RULE SETS
MPM
MRL
MCIU
ABE
R::
D&C
r ENABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
Figure 4-46. BEFORE: Example Illustrating Complex Interaction Sequence using Menus
Problem: Supporting Both Novice and Experienced Users
AFTER - Example Illustrating Solution:
in this example, simple keystrokes (e.g., control E) can be used to bypass the menus and go
directly to a window. Here, the operator enters " ^ E " and the window "ENABLE RULE
SETS" is immediately displayed.
[z]m ENABLE RULE SETSMPM
MCIU DISABLE
ABE DISABLE
R= DISABLE
D&C DISABLE
Figure 4-47. AFTER: Example Illustrating Alternate Method of Interaction using Control
Keys
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Problem: Avoiding Unfamiliar Terminology
Recommendation: Use the terminology of the operators in the user interface. When
well-accepted terminology does not exist for a concept, clearly define all new
terminology and consult experienced operators in the selection of that terminology.
Types of User Interfaces
All intelligent systems are operated by at least two types of users: personnel who make
operational use of the intelligent system and personnel who develop and maintain the intelligent
system. Not all systems distinguish between these types, however. Often, the user interface
built for system development becomes the user interface for operational support without any
recognition of the unique needs of these different users. In many of the cases surveyed,
however, the concept of a user interface that differentiated between development and operations
use had been considered. Typically, the development user interface was a super-set of the
operational user interface, providing access to extra information or additional types of control
that are not needed during operational use.
Problem: Providing an Operational User Interface Distinct from the System Developer
Interface
Recommendation: Operational users have information needs that differ from those of
system developers and maintainers. The operational user interface should be distinct
from the system development user interface and based on operational information
requirements.
For model-based intelligent systems, there are three distinct classes of interface users, each
with somewhat different, although overlapping, requirements. Domain Model Developers are
involved in creating generic domain models that can be applied to a wide variety of specific
physical systems. These generic domain models constitute "off the shelf" knowledge bases
that can be used for developing models of a wide variety of monitored processes. In particular,
the next class of interface users, System Model Developers, use these domain models to
construct models of specific physical systems for particular tasks. Model Users interact with
the finished intelligent system. As qualitative modeling technology becomes more widely
used, it is less likely that the same people will be involved in all three roles.
All three classes of users need better interfaces than are available today. Domain Model
Developers need the ability to visualize large, complex envisionments, to more quickly
ascertain the consequences of changes in a model. Sophisticated model analysis tools, which
could for example compare envisionments produced by different domain models across a suite
of test cases, could substantially speed up the development of "off the shelf" knowledge bases.
System Model Developers need the ability to interactively select the appropriate domain
constructs and levels of detail for their particular task. An intelligent system that collaboratively
helped the System Model Developer identify implicit modeling assumptions and navigate
through a space of models varying both in grain size and technology could speed the
development of qualitative models for specific applications.
"v
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ModelUsers at minimum need the ability to extract enough information from the results
generated using the qualitative model to have faith in its conclusions. Model Users engaged in
sophisticated problem-solving will also need many of the tools ncexied by System Model
Developers, since they will be reasoning about fault hypotheses, many of which can be
represented as al_mate modeling assumptions. Model Users will also need interfaces which
aid the "tracking of what is happen!ng in the system with model predictions. For example,
consider a fault-management scenario. Suppose the user, in collaboration with the intelligent
assistant, has narrowed a problem down to one of two failures. The interface must make clear
(a) what consequences the competing hypotheses have in common and (b) what consequences
of them differ. The interface should simplify the identification of predictions which can
distinguish between the hypotheses. Alternately, consider a monitoring scenario. The user,
knowing of a future thermal demand that could overload the thermal control system, might
desire a "watch routine" that would look for signs that the system is overloading or confirm
that an overload will not occur. By assuming a particular future state, the assistant could
generate predictions concerning measurable parameters, including criteria for invalidating the
hypothesis of overload (such as coolant temperature leveling off at a higher value after the load,
but still cool enough to allow significant heat transfer). The interface must make clear (a) what
the nature of the watch's conditions are, (b) be able to explain why those are appropriate, and
(c) accurately inform the user when the set conditions either come to pass or fail to do so.
Lists and Schematics
The message list and the schematic are the two most common display forms used in the
development of intelligent systems. The designer should be cautious about using such display
forms simply because they are commonly used and focus instead on using a representation that
is most effective at communicating the desired information.
Most systems surveyed in the case study used a message list to display messages from the
intelligent system (Volume 2, Malin et al., 1991). The message list consists of time-sorted
message fields defining important events, anomalous behavior, or intelligent system
assessments and recommendations. Often, a scroll bar provides access to messages describing
behavior in the past. Figure 4-48 shows an example of a message list.
[] Event Summary
000:01:01:46 The MPM deploy did not complete within the expected time.
000:01:01:10 Expect single motor drive time,
000:01:00:36 MPM deploy commanded,
000:00:59:20 RMS Powerup complete.
000:00:55:04 RMS Powerup initiated.
Figure 4-48. Example of Message List
The message list has some drawbacks as a representational form, however. It does not reveal
causal or structural relationships between messages (e.g., associate messages from a given
hardware system). If specific timetags are not included, it often does not reveal temporal
relationships either. It can be difficult to emphasize important information from less important
information. Alternatives to the message list include a timeline representation (see PDRS
Decision Support System in Volume 2, Malin et al., 1991), plots of numeric information, or
animated graphics, such as schematics.
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Issue: Effective alternatives to the message list as a format for display of events and
recommendations are needed.
The most common use for schematics was to represent the physical topology of the monitored
process. Often these representations are based on existing paper-based diagrams. There is a
tendency to reproduce such schematics because they provide a compact domain representation.
Such forms are only useful, however, if they assist in interpreting the information to be
presented. For example, if the location of components is important in interpreting information,
then a physical topology diagram is appropriate. If the information concerns state, however, a
functional representation would be nmre effective. See section 5 for detailed discussion and
recommendations about both message lists and schematics.
i
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Section 5
Design for Visualization of the Monitored Process
and Intelligent System Activity
5.1 Introduction
Some of the trends that we will discuss relate to the representational windows available to help
the human operator visualize the state of the monitored process in relation to the intelligent
system's assessment and actions. What kinds of windows did the intelligent system designer
make available to the human operator? Do they help the operator see through the interaction
barriers shown in figures 1-2 through 1-4?
Ironically, the net result of the application computer interface technology (e.g., windows and
graphics) in some of the applications is to increase the demands on slow, deliberative, capacity-
limited user cognitive processes rather than engage parallel, automatic, perceptual recognition
based cognitive processes. Examples of this include:
Navigation and interface control mechanisms that place high demands on user memory
rather than use the interface as an external memory
Navigation demands that shift the user's focus of attention away from the monitored
process and towards the interface itself
Display forms that force a serial process of finding, collecting and integrating individual
data elements (e.g., message lists) rather than organizing related data to make critical
states and events "pop out."
The irony is heightened by the fact that, in contrast to the above, there were several cases that
supported better visualization of the monitored process (e.g., ILDSS), better information
handling capabilities that reduced data overload problems (e.g., Selective Monitoring System,
SELMON), and new conceptualization aids that helped the user search for and discover
patterns in the data (e.g., some features in SHARP).
In the following sections, we examine several trends observed in the case study -- workspace,
schematics, and message lists -- to point out problems and possible new directions. Again,
this is work in progress so that these sections are samples of issues about how to support
effective human-intelligent system cooperation. To provide some structure about the
multidimensional nature of the interface capabilities that support human interaction, we first
provide an overview of the design for information transfer criterion and different levels of
description for computer based display systems.
5.1.1 Design for Information Transfer Philosophy
After Gibson (1979, p. 42), one can define a display as, a surface shaped or processed so as to
exhibit information about more than just the surface itself. Given this definition 1, the design of
displays/interfaces/aids is shaping or processing display surfaces (the medium, e.g., video
display units (VDUs), and the elemental domain data) so as to exhibit information for a domain
practitioner (the problem solver who is also the problem holder). One can term this approach
design for information extraction (Woods, 1991). This criterion emphasizes that effective
1 And given a specific view of information where information is not a thing-in-itself, but rather a relation
between the data, the world the data refers to, and the observer's expectations, intentions, and interests.
Informativeness is not a property of the data field alone, but is a relation between the observer and the data field
(cf., Woods, 1986).
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interfaces/displays must do more than provide access to domain data; they must assist the
practitioner extracting the information needed to perform better. The displays/interface should
support the operator in seeing, assessing and acting on the underlying process through the
computer medium. Thus, the computer displays/interface form a representation of the
underlying process, i.e., the monitored process, the intelligent system, and their interaction
(figure 1-4).
Representational form is defined in terms of how data on the state and semantics of the domain
is MAPPED into the syntax and dynamics of visual forms in order to produce information
transfer to the agent using the representation. It is indifferent to the visual form per se. Bar
charts, trends and other visual forms can be used to create the same representational form (or
variants on a representational theme). Conversely, the visual appearance alone does not define
the representational form so that a single visual format such as a bar chart can be used in many
representational forms.
The design challenge for creating effective representations is to set up this mapping so that the
observer can extract information about task-meaningful semantics. Becker and Cleveland
(1984) call this the decoding problem, that is, domain data may be cleverly encoded into the
attributes of a visual form, but, unless observers can effectively decode the representation to
extract relevant information, the representation will fail to support the practitioner. This
mapping challenge is central to the discussion of problematic trends and possible new
directions in the following sections.
5.1.2 Levels of Description of a Computer-Based Display System
To describe the trends and problems, we fh-st need to introduce the concept that there are
several levels of analysis at which a designer can think about a computer based display system
(Woods and Eastman, 1989; Woods, in preparation). We use these different levels of analysis
as a structuring heuristic for organizing design techniques and practices lor creating
visualizations of dynamic processes (figure 5-1). Many of the terms that we will introduce
here will be used to describe trends that we observed in interface capabilities designed to
support human interaction with intelligent systems.
The graphic form level is the fundamental hinge in the series of levels. Design activities below
that level are concerned with crafting graphic forms out of elements (for example, reference
values, numeric scales, unitizers, labels) and atoms (e.g., lines, characters). Above the level
of forms, design activities are concerned with grouping, organizing and coordinating forms to
create process views and a workspace.
At the highest level design focuses on WORKSPACE COORDINATION: coordinatin.g the set
of viewports and classes of process views that can be seen together in parallel or in series.
Viewport: Any screen real estate that serves as a unit where process views can appear. A
viewport can be a region within a single VDU -- a window or a whole VDU screen. A set of
viewports, i.e., a workspace, can consist of multiple window viewports, multiple VDU
viewports and any combination of the two.
Process View: A coherent unit of representation of a portion of the underlying process or
systems which the observer could select for display in a viewport.
5-2
JWorkspace
/
--:\_ I __:1 ¸
J
Process Views J i
Formals
Elements
Atom
/ / J
,P
1
@
Figure 5-1. Levels of Analysis in Computer-Based Display Systems
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Workspace:Setof viewportsandclassesof processviews(content)thatcanbeseenin parallel
andin sequenceasafunctionof context.In theextremeonlyoneviewportis availableand
eachprocessview takesup theentireviewport(thehistoricaldefaultof a "displaypage".The
workspacecanincludemultiplewindowsand/ormultipleVDUsasviewports.
Theworkspaceincludestheclassesof processviewsthatareavailable and their inter-
relationships. Design of the workspace requires specification of how the classes of process
views are mapped into the available viewports, i.e., a set of coordinated viewports/display
classes. Total flexibility, i.e., any process view can appear in any viewport as the observer
chooses, represents a failure to design the workspace (e.g., Moray, 1986; Henderson and
Card, 1987; Cook et al., 1990).
One of the critical forcing functions in the design of data displays for the computer medium is
that the set of potentially observable display units or chunks is very much larger than the
available viewports (physical display area or real estate). This characteristic of computer based
display systems creates the danger of the keyhole effect where the user is unable to maintain a
broad overview, becomes disoriented, fixated, or "lost" in the display structure (Woods, 1984;
Elm and Woods, 1985).
At the workspace level, there are several issues of concern. These are:
How is the information coordinated
How does the user know where to look next?
Can the person fred the right data at the right time?
Some of the trends in the case study at this level of analysis are:
• Proliferation of windows, typically each specialized for just one type of data
Navigation issues on where to find related data, especially complicated by hidden
windows and complex menus
Excessive flexibility in user tailored environments (e.g., user controllable window
configuration) that creates data management burdens
At the level of process views, the designer is concerned with orchestrating a set of .graphic
forms to form a larger representational tapestry with respect to a new level of domain issues. A
process view could consist of one graphic form or a group of graphic forms (e.g., schematics,
timeline displays). The historical default case is where each process view takes up the entire
viewport (and a viewport consists of a whole VDU screen) -- a "display page". Note that with
"automatic" display creation via intelligent processing process views may not necessarily be
pre-designed but rather created or assembled or modified adaptively or "on-the-fly."
The critical design challenge here is to break the process into a set of coherent views or kinds
of views -- defining the boundaries for collecting together sets of domain data. The boundaries
may be drawn based on process system lines, process functions, control systems, operator
tasks, or some combination.
The major trend in the case study at this level of analysis is:
Inscrutable systems where the dominant process views available, physical topology
schematics of the monitored process and message lists as output from the intelligent
system, do not help the operator see patterns of events
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The graphic forms level deals with issues in designing representations of some part or function
of the target world. The basic design focus at this level is -- what data sets and data
relationships need to be represented to transfer information to the observer (i.e, the mapping
question)? The main design activity is crafting integrated representational forms from elements
and other forms. There are two design goals for the design of representational form: (1) how
does the form highlight and support recognition of anomalies? (2) how does the form reveal
the dynamics of the process and highlight changes (e.g., behavior over time, events,
movement towards or away from landmark states, what has happened, what will happen next).
The major trend in the case study at this level of analysis is"
Over-reliance on digital/linguistic forms of representation resulting in the dissociation of
related data, failure to highlight anomalies, failure to highlight state changes and dynamic
behaviors
Elements are the building blocks manipulated to craft graphic forms and consist of items such
as reference values, numeric scales, unitizers, labels, indicators, digital values, linguistic
strings, icons.
Elements are in turn made up of what we call the "atoms" of display design. The atoms
generally are concerned with limiting factors -- pixel resolution, character sizes, fonts, aspect
ratios, line widths, color/intensity palette.
If the collection of display frames in a system could be conceived of as one huge layout, the
levels may be thought of as a series of nested spaces, from the overall workspace design, to the
forms that occur within process views and viewports, to the elements and atoms used to craft
the forms. The designer zooms back and forth between these nested spaces during the design
process (cf., figure 5-1).
5.2 Workspace - Proliferation of Windows
The use of workstations with high-resolution monitors and window-oriented development
shells creates a computer workspace where the user can call up different kinds of process
views into the different available viewports (windows) on one or more VDUs. Design of the
workspace requires specification of how the classes of process views are mapped into the
available viewports, i.e., a set of coordinated viewports/display classes. A critical forcing
function on the design of the workspace is the fact that the set of potentially observable
displays is very much larger than the viewport space available in parallel (physical display real
estate).
Figure 5-2 shows a common theme observed in the case study. There is a base set of
viewports visible on each VDU with a default set of displays and interface control mechanisms
(soft function keys, pull down menus) presented in these windows. There may be other
process views which can be called into the base viewports displacing the default displays. In
addition, the user can open additional windows on top of the base viewports, partially or totally
obscuring the view displayed within the base viewport. In the example in figure 5-2, a
physical topology schematic is the default process view displayed within a base viewport. The
user has opened two additional viewports which contain diagnostic and status message lists on
top of this base.
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There is a base set of viewports visible on each VDU with a default set of displays and
interface control mechanisms presented in these windows. In addition, the user can open
additional windows on top of the base viewports, partially or totally obscuring the view
displayed within the base viewport. In this example from the case study a physical topology
schematic is the default process view displayed within a base viewport. The user has opened
two additional viewports which contain diagnostic and status message lists on top of this base.
Figure 5-2. Common Theme in Workspace Design: Default Workspace Augmented with User
Configurability
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This approach provides the user with a default workspace plus user configurability. The user
has great flexibility in reconfiguring the placement and size of windows. The user can call up
and configure many additional viewports/process views. The user can configure the viewports
so as to be able to see the contents of two viewports in parallel.
However, too great a reliance on user configurability represents a failure to design the
workspace -- the burden of determining what sets of process views should be seen together
and the data management activity to configure this collection of views should not fall
exclusively on the operator of dynamic systems during real-time operations. This is one way
to produce clumsy automation where the user's data management burden is high during high
tempo, high workload operating conditions such as fault management (cf., Woods, 1984;
Woods and Elm, 1985; Henderson and Card, 1987; Woods et al., 1990; Cook et al., 1990 for
research on the effects of workspace design and on design techniques and principles to create
more effective computer workspaces).
Excessive user configurability creates extra data management tasks that shift operator attention
to the interface (where is the desired data located in the display space?) and to interface control
(how to I navigate to that location in the display space?) at times where his or her attention
needs to be devoted to assessing/managing the monitored process.
In general in the case study, the interface control mechanisms used to navigate within the
display space tend to divert operator attention from the monitored process to the interface itself.
Interface control mechanisms frequently imposed extra information processing steps and user
memory burdens due to hidden windows, hidden menus, and unnecessary dialog steps (the
interface was underutilized as an external memory).
This lack of transparency is particularly problematic because of another trend. There was a
tendency for windows to proliferate, each specialized for just one type of data. This
fragmentation or dissociation of data across different windows forces the operator into a slow
serial search to collect and then integrate related data. The proliferation of windows degrades
rather than supports the cognitive component of interface navigation -- knowing where to look
next and finding the right data at the right time (Woods, 1984; Elm and Woods, 1985).
Figure 5-3 illustrates another common feature of the workspaces surveyed in which several
different views can be selected for display in a given viewport. In this approach (commonly
referred to as tiled windows), there are no overlapping process views so that the operator is not
moving windows out of the way to see what's happening on the schematic display. However,
this approach involves other important issues that relate to serial versus parallel display of data,
how does the operator know when he should examine a different view, how is an event on a
non-displayed view signaled to the operator.
An important issue in workspace design is how to coordinate different views so that the
operator can easily find relevant information. The proliferation of windows can create a
situation where many viewports are opened on the VDU at one time. Figure 5-4 illustrates
how the VDU can be cluttered with windows causing problems in determining where to focus
attention and making it easy for the operator to miss new events. In addition, note how this
creates a new operator data management task -- de-cluttering the workspace, where the user
must remember to remove stale views/viewports. If the user does not de-clutter early, he or
she may miss significant changes or find that they need to do the de-cluttering task at the same
time that they should be assessing the effects of a changed process state or evaluating how to
respond to the change. Forcing the operator to work with only relatively few tiled windows
does not solve the overall problem (although it can reduce de-cluttering demands) since the
operator may miss significant events on non-displayed views or need to go through a serial
process to find and compare related data that appears on different views.
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In this example, there are seven different views which can be examined serially in the main
window (upper fight).
Figure 5-3. Second Approach to Workspace Design: Tiled Windows With User Selecting
Which View is Presented
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Figure 5-4. Example of Proliferation of Windows and Resulting Clutter Which Impairs
Locating Important Information
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Oneof the key questions to be addressed at the workspace level is what information needs to
be viewed at the same time and what can be presented serially. The answer to this question
comes from a cognitive task analysis -- what information should the observer be able to
extract from observing this display (in isolation and in concert with other displays)? This
question addresses the issue of what role a particular display (window) plays in conjunction
with other information available. Figure 5-5 presents one approach to this problem by
including a "scratchpad" window onto which information from other windows can be copied.
In this manner, the user can select what information to view in parallel.
Reminding can take the form of informing the user about planned actions, past activity, state of
the system (e.g., mode), etc. The key aspect of this principle is to relieve excessive memory
burdens on the user. According to Norman (1988), the ideal reminder must contain two
components, the signal (that something is to be remembered) and the message (what is to be
remembered). With overlapping windows, the potential for obscuring reminders exists. As
figure 5-6 indicates, overlapping windows violates this principle. In this example, the window
which was called up covers relevant data which needs to be compared to the information in the
new window. In general, this is a problem of having background, hidden windows. Another
example violating this principle was presented in figure 5-2.
In one system we saw, after the intelligent system made some diagnosis, a message informing
the operator of this fact would appear. However, if the operator wanted to see the diagnosis,
he would have to select the menu and menu item that brought up this window. This example
shows how there is often a failure to use the computer power ready at hand to assist the
operator's in handling the large amounts of available data -- the data overload problem. If the
intelligent system has reached some conclusion about the source of the observed disturbances,
then this information and related information (e.g., explanation) is contextually relevant.
Rather than than force the operator to assemble step by step the relevant views and viewports,
the system functioning as a cognitive tool would provide immediate access to a coordinated set
of views and data needed to inspect, evaluate and follow up the intelligent system's
assessment.
The proliferation of windows can be taken as a symptom of a design failure in the organization
of different types of information according to different task contexts. Figure 5-6 shows a case
where the operator must compare the control actions taken by the IS (based on a model of the
MP) to the current state of the process and to the current goal (setpoint). When system
parameters are out of tolerance, for example, the IS changes other parameters to maintain the
goal. However, to track system behavior and distinguish normal process tuning from more
severe faults, the operator may need to open three window to find and integrate the necessary
data.
5.3 Message Lists and Timeline Displays
As figure 1-3 illustrates, one aspect of human-intelligent system cooperation is the set of
mechanisms that help the human track the intelligent.system's assessment, recommendations or
actions with regard to the monitored process. The primary representational window used for
this purpose in many of the NASA cases, as well as in other similar applications (Gradient
project; Hollnagel, 1990), is a message list. Figure 5-7 shows one example abstracted from
the case study. (Note that the following examples are abstractions from the observed cases,
and do not use the actual text used in any particular system.)
5-10
fJ
f
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF_ POOR QUALITY
The window in the bottom right of this workspace is a "scratchpad" window, and functions
like the "clipboard" on the Apple Macintosh. High-level information from other windows can
be copied into this space and thus presented in parallel with any other window.
Figure 5-5. Scratchpad Window the Functions Like Clipboard on Apple Macintosh ®
® Macintosh is a registered trademark of Apple Computer, Inc.
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This example illustrates how overlaying the default window can obscure information. Clicking
on a component opens a new window which is placed on top of the component and the digital
value indicating flow rate.
This example also illustrates how a proliferation of windows indicates a design failure. When
system parameters are out of tolerance, for example, the IS changes other parameters to
maintain the goal. However, to track system behavior and distinguish normal process tuning
from more severe faults, the operator may need to open three separate windows to find and
integrate the necessary data.
Figure 5-6. Example Illustrating (1) How Information can be Obscured when a Window
Overlays the Default View and (2) How Proliferation of Windows Indicates Design Failure
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Running Operational Sequence A (13:34:23)
Control Switch 1 tripped (13:36:42)
Beginning automatic diagnostic (13:36:43)
Fin|shing automatic diagnostic (13:36:44)
Results of diagnostic: 03:38:29)
Failure to uplink to lower circuit
Attempting to correct (13:38:33)
Correction sequence failed (13:40:03)
Switch 2 tripped (13:40:19)
Beginning automatic diagnostic (13:40:20)
Recommended actions for Anomaly 1: (13:40:23)
Menualty reroute to lower circuit
Failure to respond may cause loss of main power flow
Finishing automatic diagnostic (13:4622)
Results of diagnostic: (13:41:37)
Oa.l?eratormust reroute to continue Operational Sequence A
0lure to respond could cause syslr,,m shut down
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Figure 5-7. Example of a Message List Window with Timestamps, Messages and Format
Abstracted from Case Study
5-13
Messagelists are windows that list events in a textual, alphanumeric string format. Typically
each entry is one or two lines long. A timestamp is usually associated with each entry, but we
observed cases where no timestamp was used. Message lists occurred in several different
forms in the case study and included information about the monitored process (e.g., alarms)
and automatic actions, as well as the intelligent system's assessment of the monitored process
(see figure 1-4). While message lists were relied on heavily in the current versions of systems,
most of the projects recognized weaknesses in this type of display and planned to develop
improvements in future work.
5.3.1 Weaknesses of Message Lists
The exclusive use of textual encoding of system/intelligent system status means that the
language of these messages is crucial to operator comprehension. It is important that it not be
cryptic or redundant. Messages that are products of program execution traces may be
particularly susceptible to this malaise. In addition, we saw several cases where the messages
tended to "run together" making it hard to segment the list into individual messages.
Message lists usually operate on the principal that the last message is the most recent one. But
there are no quickly apprehensible cues to indicate when the last message occurred -- messages
that differ considerably in time of occurrence all look the same. The observer must focus his or
her attention, read the timestamp and compare it to current time. The critical landmark of now,
the current time, frequently is not included in the message list. "Time-less" message lists
exacerbate the difficulty.
A message list organizes events chronologically. However, because each entry is a line of text,
it is a "packed" representation that obscures the temporal distances between events. One cannot
see at a glance whether events occurred contiguously or farther apart. Again it is only available
through a deliberative cognitive process based on reading and comparing timestamps.
Compare the two hypothetical message lists illustrated in panels A and B of figure 5-8. The
same events occur in the same order in the two panels. What is different? Panels C and D of
this figure immediately reveal the pattern of temporal relationships hidden in the packed list
representation.
Because each entry is a line or lines of text, when a series of events occurs, the list of messages
can exceed the space available in the viewport. This forces the operator to read and scroll
through several screens of messages to see the inter-related messages and to "piece together" a
global view of what is happening with the process, the pattern of automatic actions and the
intelligent system's assessment or recommended actions (although the survey revealed cases
where there was no scrolling capability, at least at that stage of development of the prototype
system). Timestamps do not help the operator quickly apprehend this information; each
message and timestamp must be read and compared to other messages. Furthermore, as one
scrolls around in a long message list it is easy to get lost as the packed textual field contains no
readily apparent temporal landmarks (e.g., current time was rarely indicated on the message
lists surveyed).
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10:31:07 Switch 4 tripped
10:32:23 Load Shed
10:23:43 Switch 3 tripped
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10:32:23 Load Shed
Co
I II
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
all
II I
i i I , i I I I I I I I I I
© 1991 Woods, Potter, Johmnesen, HoUoway
The same events occur in the same order in panels A and B, but the timestamps are not enough
to make the pattern of temporal relationships stand out. By indicating events against an analog
tirneline, panels C and D immediately reveal the temporal pattern.
Figure 5-8. Example of Sequence of Events That Points Out How Message Lists Obscure
Information About Temporal Distance Between Events
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Figure5-9providesanexample(abstractedfrom thecasestudy) of how relationships between
messages can be very difficult to extract. The right panel shows the full message list. The left
panel contains a smaller viewport with a portion of the list out of view. Messages concerning
Switch 1 ("Switch 1 tripped" is referred to as "Event 1") have scrolled out of view in the left
panel. The message that Switch 2 has tripped is displayed followed by the diagnostic message,
"Recommended actions for Event 1: manually re-route to lower circuit". Because a portion of
the list is hidden and because of the poor wording of the messages, this and the other
diagnostic messages seem to be referring to the Switch 2 event when they are actually referring
to the Switch 1 event. The message list makes it difficult to establish the context for each
message 'at a glance'.
The above examples start to reveal how temporal patterns in event sequences are not readily
apparent from a message list. The top panel of figure 5-10 shows a sequence of events against
an analog timeline. The bottom panel shows some of the types of temporal patterns that the
operator should be able to see. First, note that some of the events are unrelated to the later
sequence -- independent subsets of events need to be discriminated. The sequence illustrates
three types of temporal relationships important to diagnostic reasoning. An earlier event might
be a premonitory sign of later major trouble. A single underlying fault may trigger several
contiguous effects or have multiple contiguous manifestations (the event set labeled major
event). The underlying fault will produce a cascade of disturbances and their associated
manifestations which will be seen as a temporally evolving series of events that follow the
original burst of activity (cf., figure B-1 and the related discussion in appendix B). In this case
the diagnostician needs to see the cascade, distinguishing between manifestations that indicate
the source of the trouble (the subset of events labeled major event) and those that result from
disturbance propagation. In addition, the intelligent system may produce commentary about
the events in the monitored process that are linked to different subsets of the event sequence.
One should note from the above that a message list is made up of different kinds of messages.
The message lists surveyed generally did not distinguish between message categories. Figure
5-11 shows the uncategorized message list from the example mentioned earlier (figure 5-9).
Figures 5-12 and 5-13 show two different ways to organize the same sequence of events.
Figure 5-12 spatially segregates messages about two different anomalies. Within this
categorization, the sequence of events should distinguish the anomaly, intelligent system (IS)
diagnostic assessments, and automatic and recommend_ actions. The analog timeline and
categorization of messages greatly enhances an observer s ability to track monitored process
behavior and intelligent system assessment/actions. Figure 5-13 illustrates a different top level
categorization by spatially segregating messages into categories of anomalies/automatic actions,
IS diagnostics, and recommended responses. Again, combining the analog timeline and
categorization reveals the pattern of relationships in the sequence of events and fulfills the
design goal illustrated in figure 1-4.
An extension of these ideas that supports message comparison is two side-by-side message
displays, each containing one highlighted message. A horizontally-oriented timeline is above
them, highlighting them amongst the other events and giving an analog perspective on the
temporal distance between them. Under both of them is (1) the duration between the message
and the current time and (2) the duration between one message and the other.
Some of the systems surveyed did try to categorize messages by placing different types into
different message list windows. However, the lack of indication of temporal interval and the
packing of messages removes any anchor for comparison across windows (see figure 5-14).
Furthermore, the workspace design provided the user with window placement flexibility
creating the opportunity for nonalignment of the related windows. (Actually, in this case it
may be even more misleading to align the windows since the there is no necessary temporal
ordering relation maintained across the windows.)
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Switch 2 tripped
Beginning automatic diagnostic
Recommended actions.for Anomaly 1:
Manually reroute to lower circuit
Failure to respond may cause loss of main
power flow
Beginning automatic diagnostic
Finishing automatic diagnostic
Results of diagnostic:
Operator must reroute to continue Operational
Sequence A
Failure to respond could cause system
shut down
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Running Operational Sequence A
Control Switch 1 tripped
Beginning automatic diagnostic
Finishing automatic diagnostic
Results of diagnostic:
Failure to uplink to lower circuit
Attempting to correct
Correction sequence failed
Switch 2 tripped
Beginning automatic diagnostic
Recommended actions for Anomaly 1:
Manually reroute to lower circuit
Failure to respond may cause loss of main
power flow
Finishing automatic diagnostic
Results of diagnostic:
Operator must reroute to continue Operational
Sequence A
Failure to respond could cause system
shut down
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Figure 5-9. Complete Message List and Partial Message List Containing Same Messages,
Some of Which Have "Scrolled Away"
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Unorganizled Sequence of Events in Time Line Format
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Above: Sequence of events spatially displayed on a tirneline conveys temporal relationships.
Below: In addition to spatio-temporal information, event-type categorization information allows
one to see the pattern of events.
Figure 5-10. Relationships Revealed by Displaying Events on a Timeline
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Panel A
Control Switch 1 tripped
Beginning automatic diagnostic
Finishing automatic diagnostic
Results of diagnostic:
Failure to uplink to lower circuit
Attempting to correct
Correction sequence failed
Switch 2 tripped
Beginning automatic diagnostic
Recommended actions for Anomaly 1:
Manually reroute to lower circuit
Failure to respond may cause loss of main power flow
Finishing automatic diagnostic
Results of diagnostic:
Switch tripped on fast trip
Attempting to correct
Reflipped with no trip
Failure to respond to Anomaly 1 could cause system
shut down
i _
_i _: .
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Figure 5-11. Typical Message List
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i !!1 0" - Attempting to correct
- Correction sequence failed
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-_l- - Recommended actiom for Anomaly 1:
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Failure to respond may cause loss
of main power flow
CAUTION
Failure to respond may cause loss
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Ill iiiIi_
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Figure 5-12. Messages Shown Categorized by Anomaly Type
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Figure 5-13. Messages Shown Categorized by Type of Message: Automatic Action,
Diagnostic Message, or Recommended Action
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Note that them is no temporal scale relating the two windows.
Figure 5-14. Messages Categorized by Type into Two Separate Windows: Status and
Diagnostic
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Figure 5-15 depicts another attempt to categorize messages into different message list
windows, in this case, into two windows one with messages in an abbreviated textual format
and the other as an "explanation" of the events coded in the first list. If the operator is
confused by the abbreviated format he or she must switch back and forth between the two
windows. The operator must figure out which explanation goes with which message. The
timestamps provide the only means of calibration between the two messag.e lists. Note that not
all messages in the status window have an explanation. Relative position is a misleading cue
since there are no time markers between the lists; for example, the last explanation does not
necessarily correspond to the last (most recent) message in the status list.
The above two examples illustrate a theme referred to previously as the dissociation of related
data. The separation of related messages imposes extra cognitive tasks on the operator to find,
collect and integrate the information on his own.
Overall, the problem with message lists is that it imposes cognitively effortful deliberative
process of finding, collecting and integrating individual messages in order to construct the
meaningful relationships and patterns between events.
The question that remains is: what alternative representations can be crafted to overcome the
deficiencies of message lists? The first step is to recognize that message lists are just one
instance of temporally organized displays of information. Another type of temporally
organized display is a timeline where an analog representation of time is used as the organizing
anchor to represent sequences of events. In fact, some of the cases did reveal timeline
representations, most notably in the Intelligent Launch Decision Support System. What is
interesting is that in these cases timeline representations were developed based on the existence
of a planned sequence of events -- what could be called Plan Based Timelines (see figure 5-
16). Message lists can be replaced by what could be called -- Event Driven Timelines (see
figure 5-16; figures 5-11, 5-12 and 5-13 are also examples).
5.4 Physical Topology Schematics
One aspect of human interaction with an intelligent system in dynamic fault management
situations is the representation of the monitored process (refer to figure 1-2). One of the kinds
of process views that occurred frequently in the case study was a schematic diagram of the
monitored process. This type of display can be called a physical topology schematic because
the organization of the graphic is based on the physical topography of the process -- the
subsystems, components and their physical interconnecttons. Active data about the state of the
monitored process -- parameter values or component states -- are annotated to the schematic.
Physical topology schematic diagrams or simply 'physical schematics' are relied upon by many
systems to display an overview of the monitored process. These physical schematics tend to
be reproductions of paper-based schematic diagrams, with certain modifications. It is
important to be aware of the implications that the following modifications have on operator
information extraction.
One important modification is that the VDU-based physical schematic incorporates dynamic
data; parameter values are placed physically next to, or on top of, the representations of the
components or sensors, etc, associated with them. The schematic is effectively given a dual
task: rather than simply provide a view of the physical ins and outs of the system, it is
intended also to provide a living picture of the state of the process.
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Seeing what status message relates with what explanation is not easy in this example.
Figure 5-15. Messages in Status Message List "Explained" by Messages in Explanation
Window
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Above: Event-Driven format to show past events spatio-tcmporally organized. Below: Plan-
Based format to show both past and planned events in a spatio-tcmporal organization.
Figure 5-16. Comparing Event-Driven Format to a Plan-Based Format
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The other important modification is imposed by the nature of the host medium; real estate on a
VDU is precious and so the schematic may undergo a simplification of detail. Furthermore, the
VDU schematic must be viewed in a different way from the way its paper counterpart can be
viewed. For example, techniques such as zoom and pan can be used to move a viewport over
a large schematic.
In order to design an effective view of the monitored process it is imperative to define the
information that operator needs in order to perform his tasks, i.e., what are the information
extraction goals for this display? A physical schematic of the monitored process is useful only
if the operator needs to know about the different physical parts of the system and their
interconnections. For example, knowing where a sensor is located relative to other
sensors/components may be important in extracting the significance of its current reading or
recent behavior. But physical schematics are often used when the information transfer goal is
to show the state of the monitored process - is it working correctly? is it achieving its goal?
State assessment cognitive tasks may be much better supported by functional or model based
displays (Mitchell and Saisi, 1987).
Some of the problems observed in the physical schematics surveyed include: (1) poor
perceptual segmentation, (2) an overreliance of digital _presentations to indicate state
information, (3) the lack of a functional model to organize and integrate data, and (4) the lack
of any integration of measured data on the state of the process with the intelligent system's
assessment.
It seems a truism to say that what is important should stand out; the operator should not have to
expend effort in finding out needed information. Change can be generally said to be important
and should be conspicuous. Yet we have observed schematics and other display forms where
the most perceptually salient feature was a static, even unnecessary, element, such as the name
of the system or of the organization. In general, the physical topology schematics failed to help
the operator see the patterns of events and quickly size up the dynamical state of the monitored
process. When coupled with the problems produced by the proliferation of windows and
message lists as the primary form of output from the intelligent system, the result is inscrutable
systems -- the wall illustrated in figure 1-2.
The over-reliance on digital/linguistic forms of representation resulted in the dissociation of
related data, failure to highlight anomalies, and failure to highlight state changes and dynamic
behaviors in the monitored process. In one system a physical schematic served as the main
window on the screen (figure 5-17). The schematic shows digital parameter values which are
dynamically updated. Because operators had trouble seeing changes in the monitored process
when inspecting the schematic, another smaller, scrollable window was created in the corner of
the screen to show the most recent parameter value or component state changes as a message
list.
The second window attempts to deal with the problem of calling the operator's attention to
changes in values that occur, but which are not readily perceived in the schematic. While it is
easier to detect new values in the smaller window there are several reasons this is a poor
strategy for presenting dynamic information. First of all, data is being repeated. It should only
appear once, effectively displayed. Also, it takes up screen real estate. More importantly,
though, having the data in two windows forces the operator to switch back and forth among
views in order to integrate them. This "dissociation of data" is inefficient and effortful. Also,
note that rate of change information for the component values is not available even in the small
window. Finally, we can point out that the small window is problematic in and of itself, being
an instance of a message list format (the problems with this format are discussed in another
section).
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In an attempt to present a "clean" schematic display some detail may be sacrificed, to the
detriment of the operator's information needs. In some cases the detail is shifted to another
window, but the movement among displays may be distracting and effortful, particularly when
it is not natural or obvious where to f'md information. In some cases the needed detail may be
left out of the workspace altogether, i.e., the schematic may contain inaccuracies (unfortunate,
and perhaps rash sacrifices to the real estate god, as it were). For example, in one system
surveyed, the intelligent system performed certain controlling functions, but these were not
displayed to the operator, only a simplified, incomplete schematic version of the process was
displayed. The information that was missing was necessary for forming an accurate picture of
the process. It is crucial to make the intelligent system's actions on the process visible in order
to give the operator the most accurate model of the process and to allow the operator to detect
any problems or limits of the intelligent system.
An example of a display that attempts to show an overview of the state of the monitored
process but fails to do so because it does not represent the process functionally is shown in
figure 5-18 ("Status at a Glance"). This display provides dynamically-updated, raw sensor
values in a digital format annotated to a abstracted representation of the physical topology of the
system. Below it in the figure is shown the paper-based physical topology schematic from
which the display was derived.
Note that the values of the different components are not set within the context of expected
values or limiting values. This means means that the operator must remember this information
in order to interpret the significance of the displayed parameter values. Also, the data displayed
is not integrated in an informative way. For example, the relationship between temperature and
pressure is not made explicit; this relationship is needed to monitor subcooling margins, for
example. The display forces the operator to search through the data and makes him perform
the extra task of information integration. Information extraction in order to evaluate the process
state is made effortful and inefficient because relationships, and patterns of data are not
available. A study was recently done that indicated the ineffectiveness of this particular non-
model based display (see Czerwinski, 1991.) A model-based view of the monitored process
given by a functional schematic would allow the operator to see the functional relationships in
the process and thus extract the critical data effectively.
5.5 Wading through the Interface Layer
5.5.1 Dissociation of Related Data
The following example serves to illustrate the extra workload that can be imposed on the
operator when one piece of information is parceled out throughout the interface layer.
In one system we observed, parameter values are displayed digitally on the screen and color
coding is used to indicate the state of these parameters: white means normal, red means the
component is being tested, and purple means a diagnosis has been performed and the
component is in some sort of abnormal condition. However, the precise meaning of the
abnormality is available on a different display. Figures 5-19 and 5-20 illustrate the stages
involved in becoming informed about an anomaly in a generalized version of this system.
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Figure 5-19. Stages 1-3 in Becoming Informed about an Anomaly
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Whenthe system diagnoses an anomaly, a number on the screen will change to purple. The
operator's ability to detect the color change depends on the backdrop that is present. Questions
relevant to the change's detectability are: how much color noise is there? how many other
items on the screen are of the same color? how much data is present? Also, if the operator was
not looking at the screen at the moment the change occurred, will he be able to tell a change has
occurred? Because no time information on the changes is immediately available on the screen,
it is possible for the operator to slip and think he knows about recent changes when he does
not.
Assuming that the operator detects the change to purple of some parameter value, the operator
would then mentally map the color to its generalized meaning, i.e., that purple means an
abnormality. (If there were several alternative color changes possible, each with a generalized
meaning, this would affect recall of the meanings of colors.) In this particular case, however,
there are only three.
Then the operator must make a decision about whether this change is important in the particular
situation, i.e., whether it is worth retrieving the specific information on the kind of abnormal
condition being referred to by the color change. At this stage the operator's mental model of
the monitored process and intelligent system comes in to play. Did some action prior to the
color change allow him to expect that the component would be faulty, so that he wouldn't think
it necessary to seek out the actual diagnosis?
If the operator decides he needs to find out more about what the specific abnormality is, he then
needs to try to get to the appropriate display. The relevant issues here are whether 'getting to
the appropriate display' is visible on the interface, or, if it is not immediately visible, whether
the sequence of events is natural and memorable. If it is complicated, perhaps involving a
couple of menus with vague menu items, a memory load will be imposed. If the operator
cannot remember the sequence, a workload burden will be imposed in trying to find out the
sequence.
Once the operator executes the commands to call up the appropriate display or window, the
operator must "orient" to it, i.e., he must search for the relevant data. The workload associated
with this task depends on the other data in this view and the organization of the display. When
the operator has retrieved the target data, he may need to clear the viewport which he had
opened or de-clutter the workspace in order to return to the previous, 'overall status' display.
Again, the naturalness and the sequence of commands required to do this affect the workload.
Once the operator returns to the previous display he must reorient to it. For example, he must
compare his mental model of the current events in light of the diagnosis with what is on the
display and to establish whether any other changes have occurred.
This parceling out of the diagnostic information is inefficient; it burdens the operator with extra
tasks in order to acquire related data. Figure 5-21 illustrates the points concerning the potential
lack of transparency of the interface layer and the effortful task it can be to travel through it.
5.5.2 Hidden Functionality
Some of the systems had hidden interface functionality i.e., the system may have powerful
capabilities but what these are they axe how to use them is not apparent from the screen.
In most of the schematic interfaces we observed, it was not obvious what the available choices
were at any point. This lack of visibility concerning what to do to get what you want is what
Norman terms the 'gulf of execution.' The functionality of the interface (i.e., what it is
possible for a user to do) should be natural and should not impose a memory requirement.
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Figure 5-21. Wading through the Interface
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Many interfaces have mouse sensitive icons that when clicked provide more information on the
item. For example, in one system, the sensors and switches are mousablc. The problem here
is that it may not be clear what is selcctable and what is not. Also, it can be confusing, if the
same functionality (e.g., mouse-click) can produce an operation on the user-interface in one
mode of operation, say, and an action on the monitored process in some other mode.
5.5.3 The Problem of Fleeting Data
A classic example of the problematic effects of fleeting data is illustrated by what occurred at
the Electrical, Environmental, Consumables, and Mechanical Systems (EECOM) console
during the Apollo 13 mission. Just a few seconds before the oxygen tank ruptured, the oxygen
pressure value on the screen increased very quickly until it soared to 1008 p.s.i. Three
seconds later it plummeted to 19 p.s.i. The EECOM's attention, however, was directed
towards to the Hydrogen tank pressure, the measurement of which had been giving them
problems since the beginning of the mission (Cox and Murray, 1989). Consequently the
EECOM did not notice the rising and then falling oxygen tank pressure. If he had seen the the
behavior of the values, he would have been able to deduce the tank had ruptured. However,
this information was lost as soon as the values changed. A timetail plot of this data would have
captured the behavior of the oxygen tank pressure and would have been very useful in this
case.
This problem of fleeting data is not limited to parameters changing on a display. In one of the
cases observed, the scheduling component of the system scheduling system generates a new
schedule of activities if, for example, a power source is lost. However, the user is not
informed of how the updated schedule differs from the previous schedule. Too much reliance
is placed on memory in being being able to detect changes.
In one system we observed, icons are used to represent switches. When the switches are being
tested by the expert system, the icons flash red and then either turn black, if the switch is
faulty, or remain uncolored if it is normal. The problem is that the information communicated
by the flashing icon is lost if the operator does not happen to see it as it occurs. When
information is fleeting as in this case there is potential that the operator will not know if or
when it occurs. This is another factor that contributes to an inscrutable system, reinforcing
rather than breaking down the barriers shown in figure 1-2.
5.5.4 Overuse of Digital Representations and Underuse of Analog Forms
Analog representations can be used to provide the contextual data that gives significance to a
given datum (cf., Woods and Elias, 1988). Parameter values often need to be presented within
the context of their limiting values and of their expected values. Even digital representations
can be enhanced to show contextual data to some degree. In one system surveyed, a display
consisted of a table of telemetry channel v',dues in digital form. Alongside each current value of
the channel was the expected value and the range of possible values.
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Section 6
The Development Process
The development process was initially investigated to identify how to effectively deliver the
design guidance discussed in sections 4 and 5. Case study observations of the development
process, however, identified a more fundamental design problem than delivery of guidance. It
was observed during the case study that perceived user interface design problems are often
actually intelligent system design problems (e.g., unavailable information, mis-representation
of information). These problems result from failing to identify the information exchanged
between human and computer when performing domain tasks (i.e., information requirements).
These information requirements are defined as a part of HCI analysis and design.
Although HCI design can affect the entire support system, including conventional software
systems, intelligent systems, and the user interfaces to both, it is usually not considered during
system design. At best, the user interface design is influenced by HCI considerations. The
user interface primarily addresses presentation media (i.e., presentation of information),
however, and is not concerned with the information message (i.e., information content) that is
also a part of HCI design. Since user interface design is frequently done after system design,
the potential for HCI design to influence system design does not exist. It is necessary to
modify the design process to include definition of the information requirements for both the
support system (both conventional and intelligent software agents) and the user interface.
This process view of system design is often absent during intelligent system design. Designers
tend to focus on specific technology aspects of the design (e.g., what software tools will be
used) and fail to consider the overall system view of the design (e.g., how will the intelligent
system be integrated into the existing support environment). Most types of design guidance
address technology issues instead of process issues (Shafto and Remington, 1990). A
development methodology is needed that addresses design process issues.
Development methodology seems to be the most effective means of integrating HCI design into
system design. The methodology should support mapping from a specification of the task into
information requirements for both the intelligent system and the user interface. This task
description should include both domain tasks and tasks required to coordinate human and
computer agents. The methodology should incorporate both information-level and display-
level design guidance as an integral part of design. It should provide mechanisms for
communication and coordination between members of a multi-disciplinary design team. It
should support development of the intelligent system as an integral part of the overall support
system, which may include both intelligent and conventional software. Each of these topics are
discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections.
6.1 Development Methodology
Many of our insights into the steps for developing information requirements result from a new
perspective of the user -- the user as another type of agent in a heterogeneous, cooperating,
distributed system. System design then becomes the design of an architecture for
accomplishing domain tasks with the available human (i.e., users) and computer (i.e.,
applications) agents. HCI considerations are an important part of such system design, even
before user interface design is addressed.
A significant result of this project is the identification of how HCI design and analysis affects
design of both the intelligent system and its user interface. To understand these effects, one
must understand how information requirements are derived from a specification of the task.
These information requirements impact all elements of the system (i.e., application, user
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interface, user). A design methodology for developing information requirements should
include the following steps:
Description of domain tasks
The fault management task is described in terms of goals and the actions required to
achieve them goals. This task description should include actions required to coordinate
agents during joint tasking.
Identification of resources provided to perform tasks and the constraints that affect task
performance
Resources include the capabilities of the operational environment and of the agents, and
the availability of information. Constraints result from complexity, dynamics, and
deficiencies in these resources.
Specification of agent activities and valid agent behaviors in an architecture for multi-
tasking and dynamic task allocation
Actions defined in the task description are assigned as specific agent activities consistent
with the available resources and the inherent constraints of the fault management team and
the operational environment. These agent activities support both fault management of the
monitored process and agent coordination.
Evaluation of the activity specification using complex activity sequences and modes of
agent interaction
The specification of agent activities is evaluated using operational scenarios to derive the
information and functionality requirements. These scenarios should include both nominal
and anomalous activity sequences and modes of agent interaction.
Analysis of requirements for system information
Requirements for information are explicitly identified for both the applications and the
user interface. 1
• Design application and user interface using information requirements
Information requirements are applied in the design of the intelligent system, its user
interface, and any conventional software used in the support system.
Figure 6-1 illustrates these steps in the development process that map from a task description
into information requirements for both the intelligent system and the user interface
1. Functional requirements for the intelligent system may also be identified by these analysis tasks.
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Figure 6-1. Mapping from Task Description to Information Requirements
This characterization of the design process outlines the steps of a development methodology.
The methods and software tools that could assist designers in performing these steps have not
been fully defined. Additional investigation is required to identify appropriate methods and
tools and to integrate these techniques into a development methodology.
Issue: Methods and tools are needed to assist in mapping from the task description to
information requirements. These techniques should be integrated into a system
development methodology consistent with the development steps that have been defined
in this section.
These steps define what needs to be done to develop information requirements. The designer
must also understand when these steps are executed. Most applications in the case study were
developed using iterative prototyping. The complete design methodology will consist of these
steps integrated into an iterative development life cycle. In such a methodology, development
would generally proceed from the task description (at the left of figure 6-1) to the information
requirements (at the right of figure 6-1). It should be possible, however, to go back to
previous steps as additional information is obtained (e.g., continuing knowledge acquisition
may update and refine original task description).
In the remainder of this discussion of development methodology, the steps outlined above are
elaborated and recommendations and issues associated with these steps are provided.
6.1.1 Task Description
Task description is defined as a specification of the task in terms of the goals and the actions
required to achieve these goals. This task description differs from the traditional task analysis
performed when designing the user interface. Evaluation of the development process has
identified deficiencies in traditional task analysis for systems that have complex agent
interaction and multi-tasking.
For complex, multi-agent systems, a significant number of activities can be classified as
coordination activities, which are activities independent of the domain task that are required for
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thehumanandcomputerto work togethereffectively(seesection 3.3.2). Coordination
activities act upon the agents responsible for domain tasks, while activities derived from
domain tasks act upon the process being managed. The activities and information required to
coordinate multiple, interacting agents are not identified by task analysis techniques yet are
critical to the success of the system in operation. A design approach that specifies architectures
for cooperation between human and computer agents is a promising way to incorporate
coordination activities into system design (see also the discussion of dynamic task assignment
in section 4.1.1). Task analysis techniques for use early in design should be modified and
simplified to facilitate identification of these coordination activities, and to exclude details of
user interface design by focusing on information requirements.
Most task analysis techniques represent tasks as sequences of low-level activities (e.g,
individual keystrokes). For systems with complex agent interaction and multiple, simultaneous
tasks, such an approach quickly becomes unmanageable. It is necessary to represent tasks at a
higher level of abstraction. The task description should specify task goals and procedures and
identify the information required to perform tasks.
Modified techniques for task analysis should assist designers in using the task description
throughout the software development process. Typically, knowledge acquisition for intelligent
systems is performed iteratively. A means should be provided for updating and maintaining
the original task description as additional knowledge about the task is uncovered (Jones,
1991). Methods for evaluating the accuracy of the task description should also be supported
(Bloom, 1991).
Issue: Modified techniques for task analysis are needed that result in a task description
representing task goals, procedures, and information flow. These techniques should be
usable early in the development process and should facilitate identification of coordination
activities as well as fault management/domain activities. Support for modifying and
maintaining the task description should also be provided.
If such techniques for managing and modifying the task description are provided, it can serve
as a common repository for task information useful to the entire design team. As such, it can
assist in organizing design team activities and serve as a means of communication between
design team members about the task (see the discussion of design team later in this section). It
may even be possible to reuse portions of the task description for new support systems with
similar agent activities or derivative monitored processes (Jones, 1991). See appendix D for an
example of a partial task description of aerospace fault management that has potential for reuse.
The representation of goals and procedures is useful not only in describing the task for use in
system design, but can also be used explicitly in the design. The goal structure can be
reproduced on the user interface as a useful means of communicating with the operator about
the task (Mitchell, 1991). The goals and procedures currently being pursued also indicate the
intent of operator actions. They represent a context for the interpretation of information and
can improve collaboration between agents about the task.
6.1.2 Techniques
In this section, two techniques for developing requirements are described. The In'st technique,
prototyping, is almost universally applied in the development of intelligent systems. The
second technique, storyboards, are less commonly used, but proved very useful when tested in
the development of the PDRS Decision Support System (DESSY).
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Prototyping
Most of the applications in the case study were developed as iterative prototypes. Often, the
prototype represented the final requirements. When the delivery system will be developed by a
separate organization, the prototype must be translated to requirements that are amenable to
explicit verification. Demonstration of capability corresponding to specific requirements is
typically the mechanism used by a development organization to verify a software product.
Issue: Prototyping is frequently used to define requirements for a deliverable system. In
addition to def'ming system capability, requirements also represent a means for the
developing organization to certify that a software product provides the specified capability
and to prove that contractual commitments have been met. Techniques are needed to
translate a prototype into verifiable requirements.
There is a difficulty in using an iterative design process within NASA. The waterfall life cycle
has been baselined for major programs such as Space Shuttle and Space Station. The waterfall
life cycle, however, is not well-suited to the iterative design of software. Investigation of the
design methodology should be include integration of iterative design into the waterfall life
cycle.
The frequent design changes resulting from iterative prototyping can be difficult to implement if
the prototype is not designed properly. A small design change may translate to a large
implementation change. It is especially important to separate the user interface from the
intelligent system, so that changes in one will not impact the other. Many tools that support
iterative design do not enforce such a separation. For example, many of the prototypes
developed in G2 TM freely mixed display rules with intelligent system rules. The prototype
toolkit User-Intelligent System Interface Toolkit (UISIT) supports an architecture with
separation of the user interface and intelligent system. UISIT is being evaluated as part of the
effort to define requirements for the design methodology.
Issue: Iterative prototyping involves frequent design changes. These changes can be in
either the user interface or the intelligent system. Design tools are needed that enforce
separation of the intelligent system and its user interface to minimize the impact of
changes in one design on the other design.
Preliminary designs in the form of rapidly-developed prototypes can be evaluated to elicit
additional information requirements. A common method of evaluating a prototype is testing
using operational scenarios. Exercising the system under realistic conditions allows the
designer to identify missing or misrepresented information and cumbersome interaction
sequences. Evaluation of designs using operational scenarios also represents a way to
incorporate HCI design early into the development process.
Problem: Testing the HCI Design
Recommendation: The HCI design can be evaluated by testing a user interface
prototype using expected operational scenarios. This evaluation should occur early
in the design process and should assess such issues as availability of information
and ease of interaction.
ru G2 is a trademark of Gensym Corporation.
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One goal of operational testing is to determine if system behavior meets acceptance criteria.
For such testing to provide realistic results, the data used for these tests should closely
resemble the data actually used for flight support.
Problem: Testing the Design under Realistic Conditions
Recommendation: The prototype should be tested using high fidelity, simulated data
or real data. If the prototype represents an upgrade to existing technology, such testing
is most effective when both the existing system and the new system are used side-by-
side (i.e., the term parallel operations is used by the RTDS developers).
The RTDS project provides an example of testing using real data. Workstations in both the
Mission Control Center and the RTDS development lab have connectivity to real-time data from
the integrated simulations used to train Space Shuttle flight controllers and crew. This data can
be used for testing from the lab either in real time or by playing back recorded data. The
ONAV system also uses recorded, real data for testing.
Notice that connectivity to real-time data can introduce risk when using unconfigured software.
The RTDS project resolved this difficulty by providing an independent data source which
isolated prototypes from the operational data source. See also the discussion of technology
integration into the support environment in section 6.3.
Storyboards
The storyboard technique employed for the PDRS HCI design concepts (Schreckenghost,
1990) proved useful as a means of identifying information requirements. Specifying these
design concepts required early consideration of the operational use of the intelligent system.
The storyboard served as a vehicle for discussing information requirements with operators that
clarified misconceptions and improved domain understanding. It forced design of the
workspace and provided examples of desired capability. A storyboard illustrating exemplary
HCI designs in operational use represents a useful technique for integrating HCI into the
design process of the intelligent system.
Problem: Providing Techniques to Identify Information Requirements
R¢¢ommendation: A storyboard of proposed HCI design concepts can be a useful
tool for identifying information requirements. The storyboard can be used to illustrate
simple operational scenarios, to refine the design concepts, and to elicit additional
requirements.
It is recommended that each storyboard picture be supplemented by a text description stating
the purpose and information content of the illustration to assist in identifying requirements. An
index by topic is also recommended to allow easy access for review. Further investigation of
methods for deriving requirements from storyboards is needed.
Issue: Techniques and tools are needed to assist designers in identifying information
requirements from a storyboard of design concepts.
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See figure 6-2 for a example of a requirement derived from one of the screens developed for
the PDRS design concepts. This screen design was used as an illustration of the information
required to perform domain tasks and does not represent a final user interface design. The
designers task is to extract the information requirement's "message" embedded in the
storyboard "medium".
ARM-BASED ELEC
END EFFECTOR
MCIU
D&C
REQUIREMENT:
The intelligent system should detect events affecting the major
hardware subsystems (i.e., MPM, MRL, Arm-based Electronics, End
Effector, MCIU, and D&C) and related external systems. Informa-
tion about the event should include event description, timetag,
and subsystem identifier.
Figure 6-2. Example of Requirement Derived from Storyboard (PDRS HCI Design Concepts)
When demonstrating the PDRS HCI design concepts, it became obvious that the storyboard
technique does not capture the reasoning behind design decisions. Frequent questions included
"why did you do that?" or "what about doing something else?". A design methodology should
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includespecificationof theconstraintsimposed on thedesignand thereasoningbehinddesign
decisionsmade tomeet thoseconstraints.
Problem: Documenting the Design Constraints
Recommendation: Constraintson thedesignshouldbe clearlydocumented with the
associateddesigndecisionsand justification.This includesconstraintsdue tothe
operationalenvironment,compromises due tothe prototypingenvironment,and
limitationsimposed by theusercommunity.
A number of importantdesignconstraintswere observed in thecasestudy.For example, an
operationalconstraintforsystems used intheSpace ShuttleMission ControlCenteristhatno
audio coding can be used. When usinga HCI prototypingtooltoimplement the PDRS design
concepts,a number of compromises from theoriginaldesignwere mandated by limitedtool
capability(e.g.,difficulttouse color,no blackbackground). A limitationtypicallyimposed by
theSpace Shuttleusercommunity availabilityofthecurrentuserinterfacewhile transitioningto
thenew userinterfaceprovided by theintelligentsystem. For theONAV system,thisresulted
intherequirementtoemulate theexistingdisplayon thenew displayfortesting.
6.1.3 Design Description
During iterativedevelopment, modificationscan occur inboth therequirements(e.g.,a new
informationitem isneeded from theinteUigcntsystem)and thedesignspecification(e.g.,a
displayitem should be moved on thescreen).Fischerdescribedthisitcrativedevelopment
approach as "thecocvolutionof specificationsand implementations"(Fischer,1989). The
Icvclsof analysisfora computer-based displaypresentedinSection5.1.2could providea
framework forspecifyingthedesigndescription,where theinformationrequirementsand the
displayspecificationaredeveloped inparallel.Inthismodel, designmoves between levelsas
designconstraintsare identifiedand designdecisionsmade. These levelsof analysiswillbc
investigatedaspartof the specificationofrequirementsfora designmethodology.
6.2 Design Team
The design methodology should support development by multi-member design teams. Such
teams are typical of complex system development. Multi-member design teams can fragracnt
into multiple, small design teams working on portions of the system. The design methodology
should facilitate communication between developers that arc working on different portions of
the system. It should foster the concept of a single team with experts from multiple disciplines,
including HCI expertise. An important aspect of integrating HCI design into system design is
the participation of HCI experts on the system design team. The development methodology
should also encourage user participation throughout the development process.
Recommendations and issues affecting the design team are discussed in the following section.
6.2.1 Communication within Design Team
A prevalent problem in current approaches to system development is the lack of communication
between designers responsible for the intelligent system and those responsible for the user
interface. Often these design efforts are conducted in relative isolation with a minimum of
information exchange about how the designs will work together. This isolation is frequently
exacerbated by the delay of the user interface development until the end of the development
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process. Such an approach prevents any consideration in the intelligent system design of
information requirements resulting from the evaluation of HCI, since HCI is not investigated
until it is too late to influence the intelligent system design.
An effective way to improve communication between designers and to integrate HCI into
system design is to form a single, multi-disciplinary design team from the early stages of
development. The concept of a "user interface design team" is replaced by HCI and user
interface expertise in the system design team. A design effort involves multiple activities (e.g.,
software engineering, analysis of requirements, or visual design) often conducted in parallel.
The design team should reflect the composite, multi-perspective nature of system design. It
should include such skills as intelligent system development, software engineering, HCI
expertise, user interface expertise, and domain expertise/user experience. HCI expertise would
address such issues as effective agent (human and computer) architectures and information
requirements for domain tasks and coordination of agents. User interface expertise would
address such issues as identification and management of information overload, as well as
graphic design, style of presentation, and application of user interface guidelines.
Problem: Selecting Members of the Design Team
Recommendation: The design team should be multi-disciplinary from the early stages
of development, including expertise in such areas as intelligent system development,
software engineering, human-computer interaction, user interfaces, the domain, and
operations (i.e, users). HCI expertise should be distinguished from user interface
expertise. HCI expertise addresses such issues as information requirements and
coordination of agents. User interface expertise addresses issues of graphic design
and style of presentation.
Mechanisms for communication between members of design team are being investigated by
evaluation of the prototype tooLkit User-Intelligent System Interface Toolkit (UISIT). This
toolkit supports a design methodology which explicitly defines the information passing
between the intelligent system and the operator (via the user interface) (Kessel, 1990). This
information is captured as objects in a distinct layer of the system architecture called the
communication layer. The communication layer also represents a common/global repository
for information requirements useful to both intelligent system designers and user interface
designers. The concept of a communication layer can be used to coordinate and couple
intelligent system design with user interface design and provide a mechanism for designers to
communicate their information needs. Information requirements in the form of an information
object layer are being investigated as a means of communication and coordination.
Problem: Ensuring Communication between Design Team Members
Recommcndation: The design methodology should provide mechanisms for
communication and coordination between members of the multi-disciplinary design
team. Information requirements seem a good candidate for such coordination.
The communication mechanism can assist in design of a more integrated application as well.
Close coordination between team members is required to minimize redundancy and to ensure
consistency,, ease of navigation, .and utilitv.-.°f dis p lay gr ou p in g.s Desi g n of the work saceD
should include a group effort to ldenufy acuvities that span the designs of multiple individuals.
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To achieve this level of integration, designers must make explicit much of the information
usually implicit for a single designer. For example, tables describing designated colors or lists
of available schematics can improve system consistency and minimize redundant effort.
Issue: When the user interface is designed by a multi-member design team, problems of
consistency and usability can occur. Methods are needed to achieve an integrated
workspace design with multi-member design teams.
6.2.2 User Participation in Design
Iterative development with incremental knowledge acquisition has resulted in active user
involvement in portions of the development process. Such involvement has contributed to the
success of these intelligent systems by easing technology transfer into the user community.
The roles of the user during system development are varied.
The Space Station program plans to provide the capability for users to design their own
displays (Wilford, 1990). A tool set called the User Support Environment (USE) will be
provided for user definition of displays. An example of user-generated displays was observed
in the case study. The RAVES application allows users to develop new display formats using
a specific HCI tool, DataViews ® . The completed display is specified as a visual screen design
and a list of parameters presented in the display. This description is provided to system
implementers for integration with the operational application (see Volume 2, Malin et al.,
1991).
Typically, there are multiple users for a fault management application. For most of the cases
surveyed, a subset of this user group was closely involved in design of the intelligent system.
In some cases, such as the RTDS applications, the designers and implementers have included
users. The remainder of the group serve as reviewers of the design.
A variety of user review techniques were observed. For the RTDS applications, prototypes
were inserted into the operational environment for side-by-side test and review. Demonstration
and review was another approach observed in the case study. An alternative technique is to
build small, stand-alone prototypes for evaluating portions of the design. These prototypes
allow users to perform hand-on testing of designs early in the development process. They are
quickly modified based on user feedback, which facilitates rapid knowledge acquisition and
refinement. The prototype can he used to evaluate the portions of the knowledge base, the
HCI, or the user interface. The PDRS HCI design concepts were implemented using a
prototyping tool for evaluation of the HCI.
Problem: Involving the Users in Design
Recommendation: Active user involvement in the design and development of the
intelligent system and its user interface contributes significantly to the potential for
success of the system. Frequent user review of the requirements and prototypes,
including both demonstration and hands-on use, is recommended to improve both the
accuracy of the design and user acceptance of the system. Feedback from these
reviews should be incorporated into the system design.
® Data Views is a registered trademark of VI Corp.
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An emphasis on user-generated software was observed during the case study as well as at
advanced automation conferences (e.g., Space Station Evolution Symposium, February,
1990). Many of the users developing intelligent systems have minimal software development
experience and no intelligent system development experience. For the RTDS applications, the
need to assist users in developing intelligent systems influenced the selection of the tool G2,
which provides a natural language syntax in its interface. Performance of complex systems
and scalability of prototypes are other areas where users need assistance. Tools and methods
to support software generation by users are needed.
Issue: Often, users are not trained in the development of intelligent systems or even in
software engineering. This can result in problems such as software performance and
scalability of prototypes. Tools and methods are needed to assist users in designing and
implementing intelligent systems and their user interfaces.
6.3 Integration into the Support Environment
Typically, the intelligent system is one software element of a larger support system. Many
elements of that system may be conventional, non-automated elements. Often, the support
system contains software and hardware elements from a previous support system. The
automated technologies must be united with the conventional technologies to form an integrated
support system. The intelligent system designer should avoid designing the system as a stand-
alone replacement for an existing approach to the task. The intelligent system design (including
HCI and user interface design) should be embedded into design of the entire support system,
including the design of operations.
Problem: Integrating Intelligent System Design into Design of Support System
Recommendation: Not only should HCI and user interface design be embedded in
intelligent system design, but intelligent system design should be integrated into the
design of the entire support system, including the design of operations.
Upgrades in an existing system can result in the inadvertent removal of easy-to-use tools and
methods. For example, the Real-Time Interactive Monitoring System (Volume 2, Malin et al.,
1991) failed to provide a hardcopy capability with its strip chart emulation. A typical procedure
during post flight analysis was the review of these hardcopies, so this loss of capability was an
impact to users. Norman (1990) discussed methods for manipulating physical checklists that
can be lost with electronic checklists (e.g., operator can hold the checklist such that his thumb
points to current location within checklist).
Changes in human-computer interaction resulting from such upgrades can also impact the
operator's ability to gain or maintain expertise. The operator can be incidentally informed
about specific processes and systems while using the user interface to perform nominal tasks
(Bloom, 1991). For example, monitoring raw data for anomalies also informs the operator of
a model of the data (e.g, characteristics such as range of values, rate of update, behavior
trends, frequency and duration of transients). This training can be inadvertently lost when
using a symbolic interpretation of the data. The new design should provide equivalent
opportunities to learn on the job and should reinforce such acquisition of expertise. See also
section 4.1.1 for a discussion of task allocation that includes on-the-job training with real-time
support.
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Problem: Avoiding Negative Impacts Caused by System Upgrade
ge_commendation: Upgrades to an existing system can incidentally complicate the
operator's job or negatively impact his ability to maintain job expertise. The designer
should carefully evaluate current procedures (documented and undocumented) before
removing or altering existing methods and tools. He should also identify opportunities
for the operator to learn on the job and incorporate these in the new design.
A cautious approach should be taken when integrating a new or different technology into an
existing environment. The availability of new information from that technology can represent
increased risk in operations. If the system implementing the technology is not designed
properly and integrated with existing tools, the workload of the operator can be increased by
providing yet more information to interpret. Incidental loss of information can also occur,
impacting the operator's ability to maintain situational awareness (see the discussion in section
4.2.2 on visibility into the monitored process). Total reliance on a new software application
should be avoided. For example, Leveson (1991) discussed a situation where a software
failure in new medical radiation equipment resulted in lethal dosages of radiation during
treatment. The accident was possible because the hardware interlocks that would have
prevented administering lethal amounts of radiation had been removed when the new software
capability was added. Instead of precipitously removing old capability, there should be a
gradual integration of the new with the old. Adequate information to diagnose and compensate
for failures should also be provided. Recommendations for managing software failures in the
intelligent system are discussed in section 4.1.3.
The constraint to retain portions of an existing system in parallel with the upgraded application
represents the gradual integration of the new technology into an existing environment. A
gradual approach to technology insertion was evident throughout the case study applications.
By far, the most common development approach was multiple, iterative cycles of testing,
evaluation, and modification (Volume 2, Malin et al., 1991). Each cycle consisted of small
upgrades that were quickly implemented and tested (often in an environment similar to the
operational environment). When an upgrade represented to large a technical leap, the user
would often resist the design and the designer would be required to redesign with less
capability (e.g., the original INCO display was considered too advanced). This incremental
approach improved operator trust of the new technology by providing the user fi'equent
opportunities for feedback and allowing gradual accommodation to change (Gnabasik, 1990).
Problem: Integrating a New or Different Technology into an Existing Environment
Recommendation: The integration of a new technology into an existing operational
environment should be approached gradually. An iterative development process with
frequent small upgrades from the current system is an effective way to introduce the
technology. Each upgrade should be followed by a period of operator review and use
in an environment similar to the operational environment.
An example of the gradual integration of new technology with old has occurred in the Space
Shuttle Mission Control Center (MCC). As a part of the upgrade to the MCC, workstations
have recently became available for flight control support. The Real Time Data System (RTDS)
was created to provide access to telemetry data from these workstations via an independent data
source. This approach has allowed the operators to prototype new technologies, such as
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advanced user interfaces and intelligent systems, and test them in an operational environment
without introducing risk due to unreliable, unconfigured software. See section 6.1.2 for a
discussion of evaluation of prototypes and Volume 2 (Malin et al., 1991) for a description of
RTDS.
There is also the risk of building an inflexible capability when integrating a new technology
with an older, existing technology. The existing technology may not be able to fully support
the new technology at the time of integration. For example, information currently in paper
documents (e.g., Space Shuttle procedures, mission timelines), software source code (e.g.,
rules) and on the voice loops will become available in an electronic format eventually. The new
system should include hooks for such expected evolution, including planned improvements to
the existing environment.
Problem: Considering System Evolution during Design
Recommendation: The intelligent system and its user interface should be designed to
ease evolution to planned improvements to the existing environment. Hooks should
include designing for transition to alternate sources of information or automation of
currently manual functions.
For example, in the PDRS HCI design concepts, a pop-up window is provided for access to
information about existing fault ambiguities. Included in this information are references to the
location in a manual of the procedures that could reduce ambiguity and a reference to related
flight rules. If properly implemented, the pointer to a list of references could be easily replaced
with a pointer to the electronic version of the listing of the procedure or flight rule at a later
time.
Tools and methods used to perform current operations can be a source of useful design
information when integrating new HCI technology into an existing environment.
Consideration of current operations promotes consistency and familiarity and improves
operator acceptance. There is a trade-off, however, between designing a system for integration
with an existing system and avoiding retention of bad designs by rigidly following the old way
of doing business, which may be an artifact of out-dated technology (e.g., unavailable graphics
results in use of paper schematics only) (Brooks, 1991). This trade-off should be focused on
identifying the user's goals and supporting the user's decision-making process (e.g.,
information should be represented consistently with the planned used of the information). For
example, if the task requires that two values be compared, the intelligent system should be
designed to make certain that both values are available when needed and the user interface
should be designed to allow easy comparison.
Problem: Matching the System Design to the User's Task
Recommenglation: When adding new technology to an existing operational environ-
ment, it can be very useful to look at manual techniques and off-line devices for ideas
to incorporate into the design. Existing techniques and methods of information
presentation should only be adopted, however, when they are consistent with the
planned use of information in support of the user's decision-making process.
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For example,the user interface to the GNC Jet Control application (Volume 2, Malin et al.,
1991) directly incorporated a diagram of the jet locations and thrust directions from the paper
documentation. This paper diagram was used to predict the impact of the loss of specific jets.
The intelligent system incorporated this diagram and provided interaction capability to emulate
the manual technique that had always been used by the flight controllers.
Another example of bringing off-line capabilities on-line was seen in the applications built for
PDRS flight support. The Position Monitor is a graphical display of the three dimensional
projection of the Space Shuttle, the arm, and the payload. This display was originally
developed for" use with an off-line simulation. The Position Monitor adopted the same display
format, but connected it to downlisted telemetry, so it reflects actual position instead of
simulated position.
6.4 Delivery of Design Guidance
In sections 4 and 5, recommendations to assist designers in developing intelligent systems with
effective HCI were provided. These recommendations focused on the identification of
information requirements for the intelligent system and its user interface. Merely identifying
design guidance is not sufficient, however. Use of HCI design guidance must become a part
of the intelligent system development process if it is to be effective. One of the purposes for
evaluating the design process was to provide insight on mechanisms for integrating design
guidance within this process. HCI design guidance should assist the designer at all stages of
the development process (see section 6.1 for a description of these stages). Methods and tools
are needed that integrate the use of HCI guidance into the system design process. The
development methodology should not only permit the use of design guidance, but should make
guidance easier to use and incorporate use of guidance as an essential element in design. The
integration of design guidance into development methodology includes both traditional forms
of user interface guidance as well as the information-level guidance presented in this report.
Issue: The development methodology should make guidance easier to use and should
incorporate use of design guidance as an essential element in design. Methods and tools
are needed that integrate the use of HCI guidance into the system design process.
A likely approach to facilitating use of design guidance is computer-based delivery as part of an
integrated design methodology. Computer-based delivery is an useful alternative to paper-
based delivery. Although documents are easily disseminated into multiple environments, use
of documents can be frustrating and time-consuming. A well-recognized problem with paper
delivery of guidance is difficulty in accessing relevant guidance. The categorization of
guidance for easier access can hide relationships that are not represented by the selected
categories. Also, information access in a paper-based format is mandatorily sequential in
nature. Methods are needed to provide multiple access points to design guidance and to assist
the designer in identifying useful relationships between recommendations and examples. A
prime candidate for investigation is hypermedia access.
A preliminary format for the delivery of design guidance has been proposed. See figures 6-3
and 6-4 for an illustration of HCI design guidance. For each design recommendation, the
following information would be provided:
Topic
Keywords that describe the issue area.
Problem
A statement of the design issue or difficulty.
6-14
_J
Recommendation
A brief statement of the recommended design guidance.
Supporting Information
The foundation or evaluation supporting the recommendation. This can include
alternatives to and impacts of the guidance.
Example Illustrating Problem
An example illustrating the difficulty BEFORE use of the recommendation.
Example Illustrating Recommendation
An example illustrating the improved design AFTER use of the recommendation.
Techniques
Suggested methods for implementing the recommendation. These may address
information presentation as well as information content.
Cross References
Identification of other sections containing related design guidance.
Research Issues
Related issues requiting further investigation.
EXAMPLE OF HCl DESIGN GUIDANCE
Topic: Intervention Into Intelligent System Reasoning Process
Problem:
An Intelligent system can become'disoriented" and require the operator 1o redirect It onto • more productive
path of Investigation (e.g., the system Investigating an unproductive hypothesis or fedllng to investigate • likely hypothesis).
Recommendation:
operator Intervention into the reasoning process of the Intelligent system can be used to menage errors in the Intelligent system.
Methods of Intervention Include modiflcatio_ of the reasoning process or selection of an alternate reasoning mechanism.
Supporting Information:
Intervention Into Intelligent syslBm processing is one approach for redirecting e'dlsorlented" Intelligent system onto • more productive
path of investigation. The intellgent system must be designed, however, to permit such intervention. To effectively intervene In
processing, the operator must flrsl have e good understanding of the reasoning strategy used by the Intelligent system.
Example Illustrating Problem:
see the following page for an example that illustrates the problem.
Example Illustrating Recommendation:
See the following page for an example that Illustrates the recommendation.
Techniques:
Methods of intervening in the method of processing information include modlncatloa of the ro_',ontng process or selection of an alternate
reasoning mechanism. Examples of modification of the reasoning process are (1) setting processing prbdtles (e.g., what hypothesis
to investigate first), (2) alteration of hypotheses, and (3) specification of alternate solutions.
Cross References:
The user Interface used to intervene should reinforce the opermor's understanding of the reasoning process to assist in Identifying
appropriate action. See section 4.1.2 for 8 discussion of presenting Information about Intelligent system reasoning. See the discussion
of dak in intervening In the intelligent system later In this section.
Research Issues:
Making intelligent systems easily intorruptebio end rodirectable, developing vocabularies for communicating advice about control
decisions which reduce the amount of knowledge required by human team members about intelligent system Internals.
Figure 6-3. Example of HCI Design Guidance, Page 1
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EXAMPLE OF HCI DESIGN GUIDANCE
Topic: Intervention into Intelligent System Reasoning
AGENT INTERACTION ILLUSTRATING PROBLEM
In this case, the operator is unable to communicale
information about a likely fault and its corTeotion
procedure to the Inte_genl system. Unaware el this
Inlormatlon, the inlelllgent system would ¢onlinue Io
pursue fauH isolation on an incow_l set of suspected
faults, even when the actual fault was corrected. The
operator would have to do a reslarl to reset the knowledge
base and "fix" the inlelligent system. Figure iltustrates
the agent inters(lion. Illustration: Operator Reatartlng Intelligent System
AGENT INTERACTION ILLUSTRATING RECOMMENDATION
In this case, the ability to aflecl reasoning by altering
hypotheses used by the intelligent syszem has been provided
to the operator, The operator "informs" the Imeillgem
system about the fault, pedonns a corrective procedure,
and normal 10¢ocesslng to contlnues. Figure illustrales the
agent interaction.
IIluetrmtlon: Op_rmtor Inlonnlng Inlelllgent System of • Fmult
Figure 6-4. Example of HCI Design Guidance, Page 2
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Section 7
Summary
A variety of difficulties can be encountered when introducing an intelligent system into fault
management operations. Adverse changes in the availability of information and the assignment
of tasks can result. Intelligent systems represent a new source of information that can
contribute to the existing problem of information overload in real-time flight support.
Inappropriate task assignments can complicate task performance or distract the operator during
critical operations, inadvertently resulting in performance degraded from that of the operator
alone. Additionally, changes in information and tasking can result in lost opportunities for on-
the-job training and development of expertise.
A second difficulty arises because the intelligent system represents another source of error.
Without control of the intelligent system, the operator can lose the ability to make task
decisions. Control of the intelligent system requires the capability to intervene in intelligent
system processing to inform and redirect the system. Additionally, the levels of automation
provided by the intelligent system are often misunderstood or ignored, which affects operator
control of the intelligent system, leaving the operator uncertain of task responsibilities or even
unaware of available modes of operation.
These difficulties arise from failing to consider HCI in the design of the intelligent system and
its user interfaces. Traditional forms of user interface design guidance emphasize the medium
(i.e., how information is presented) and not the message (i.e., information content). Often
what is perceived as a user interface design problem is actually an intelligent system design
problem (e.g., unavailable information). There is a need for assistance in defining the
information exchanged between human and computer (i.e., information requirements).
Design Guidance
Many of the insights into design guidance result from considering the user and intelligent
system as members of a fault management team. A new perspective of the user results -- the
user as another type of agent in a heterogeneous, cooperating, distributed system. System
design then becomes the design of an architecture for accomplishing domain tasks with the
available human (i.e., users) and computer (i.e., intelligent system) agents. This architecture
must support multi-tasking, dynamic task assignment, and shared agent tasking.
The close agent interaction that results from the team concept requires that human and
intelligent system collaborate to accomp.lish tasks. Common forms of explanation,
retrospective in nature and based on stauc rationale or simple rule traces, are inadequate.
Collaboration requires that the user have visibility into the reasoning behind intelligent system
conclusions and recommendations. In effect, the user must be able to share the world view of
the intelligent system. The intelligent system must be designed to support this type of
collaboration.
To be an effective team member, the intelligent system must be directable. This includes
possessing the flexibility to allow real-time reallocation of tasks as well as providing capability
for the operator to inform and redirect the intelligent system. Tasks may be reallocated when
anomalies occur or mission goals are altered or to compensate for an overworked agent. The
ability to inform the intelligent system of new or revised information can be used when data are
not available in electronic form (e.g, information on voice loop) or when the intelligent system
has been misinformed (e.g., noisy or erroneous data). Redirection can be used to compensate
for intelligent system errors, improve system performance, and set the intelligent system on a
more productive path of investigation.
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Thereareanumberof information requirements for supporting fault management of the
monitored process. The intelligent system should assist the operator in interpreting alarms and
minimizing false or redundant alarms. Critical diagnostic information should be accessible,
improving visibility into the monitored process and supporting the operator in evaluating the
conse_l.uences of events and planned activities, monitoring and executing procedures, and
assessing functional capability after a failure. In the event of an unanticipated situations, the
team should be able to generate and execute workaround procedures.
One of the common problems encountered in real-time support systems is overloading the
operator with information, especially when an anomaly occurs. Anomalous conditions are
often accompanied by warnings, alarms, new events, and activity changes. Managing such
information overload requires identifying the important message contained in this flood of
facts, i.e., interpreting the information. Methods that improve the operator's ability to interpret
information include use of information context in presentation, qualitative representation of
information consistent with the operator's mental models, and techniques for summarizing
information and reducing irrelevant detail.
Several trends in user interface design were found based on the cases studied. One issue that
occurred in several systems is a proliferation of windows which can lead to navigation issues
concerned with where to find related data. This is complicated by hidden windows and
complex menus. This trend points to a lack of workspace design (coordinating the set of views
into the monitored process as well as the intelligent system that can be seen together in parallel
or in series) and lack of specification of information requirements (what information should the
observer be able to extract from observing a particular display -- in isolation and in concert with
other displays). With respect to the interface between the human operator and intelligent
system, diagnostic reasoning was typically displayed as chronologically ordered message lists.
However, this approach fails to capture the temporal nature of events or distinguish between
kinds of messages (e.g., events and actions). The predominant view into the monitored
process was physical topology schematics annotated with active data about the state of the
monitored process (i.e., color coded digital parameter values or component states). However,
there were cases in which this approach did not provide appropriate information for the
operator (e.g., did not highlight events or system change).
The net result of these user interface trends is black-box, inscrutable systems where the user
interface capabilities inadvertently reinforce barriers between the human operator and the
intelligent system as well as between the operator and the monitored process. The lack of
transparency in inscrutable systems, caused by lack of needed information or confusing
presentation of excessive information, makes it difficult for the operator to visualize the
intelligent system's situation assessment and recommendations in relation to the flow of events
in the monitored process.
Design Methodology
The availability of HCI design guidance alone is not sufficient. Design guidance must be used
to be effective. Thus, it is also important to identify how to integrate HCI design into design of
the support system (both conventional and intelligent portions). A design methodology is
needed that makes guidance easier to use and integral to the development process. The
evaluation of system design processes observed in the case study has yielded the following
goals for an integrated design methodology:
Supporting the development of a task definition at the level of actions for domain tasks
and agent coordination, not user interface actions
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JAssisting designers in extracting requirements and design specifications from prototypes
and storyboards, for both the intelligent system and the user interface
Supporting the use of operational scenarios for developing and evaluating design
concepts that consider HCI issues
Defining HCI guidelines (both for identifying information requirements and specifying
the user interface design) and making use of HCI guidance an integral part of intelligent
system development
Providing mechanisms for coordination and communication within the diverse
membership of development teams typical for complex systems
The development methodology should map the task definition into requirements for
information essential to effective HCI. These information-level requirements impact all
elements of the system (i.e., application, user interface, user). A design methodology for
developing information requirements should include the following steps: (1) description of
domain tasks in terms of goals and actions required to achieve goals, (2) identification of
resources provided to perform tasks and the constraints that affect task performance, (3)
specification of agent activities and valid agent behaviors in an architecture for multi-tasking
and dynamic task allocation, (4) evaluation of the activity specification using complex activity
sequences and modes of agent interaction, (5) analysis of requirements for system
information, (6) design of application and user interface using information requirements.
Consistent with the goal of integrating HCI design into design of the support system, it is
necessary to form a single system development team. This team should be multi-disciplinary
from the early stages of development. It should include such diverse personnel as software
designers, users, HCI experts, and user interface experts. Notice the distinction between HCI
expertise and user interface expertise. HCI experts assist with issues of agent coordination and
in the definition of information requirements. User interface experts assist with issues of
graphic design and style of presentation. User participation throughout system development is
essential. The design team should adopt a development methodology that supports
communication between members of the design team. Information requirements, represented
as objects in a distinct layer of the system architecture, are currently under investigation as a
possible communication mechanism.
Design Issues
Much work remains to be done to realize the goal of providing effective HCI design guidance
for intelligent systems. Team architectures must be defined that specify how fault management
tasks are performed, including agent interaction, mode shifts, and dynamic task assignment.
This investigation includes identifying what coordination activities are required for shared
tasking and information requirements for a controllable, directable intelligent system.
A second issue area concerns identifying information requirements that support agent
communication and collaboration. These requirements must provide visibility into intelligent
system reasoning and permit the operator to understand how and why the intelligent system
reached a conclusion. Methods to support collaboration that go beyond retrospective
explanation are required. These methods should be based on creating a shared view of the
world between agents, including shared goals. This shared view is essential for both agent
collaboration and effective intervention into and control of the intelligent system.
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A third issue area concerns design of user interfaces to accommodate the new types of
information and graphic forms from intelligent systems for real-time fault management. New
display designs are needed to handle these new types, to handle the new mix of tasks and
information, and to support management of the intelligent system.
Finally, an intelligent system development methodology is needed to facilitate use of HCI
design guidance in developing information requirements and in designing intelligent systems
and their user interfaces. Areas of investigation for development methodology include (1)
modified techniques for task analysis to support definition of agent coordination activities, (2)
methods for using operational scenarios to evaluate prototypes and storyboards, (3) methods
for extracting and representing information requirements from prototypes and storyboards (4)
use of information requirements as the basis for communication between members of design
team.
Meanwhile, we hope that this document provides significant assistance to designers of
intelligent systems for real-time fault management. We also hope that it can be used by the
research communities of artificial intelligence, human factors, and software engineering to
identify issues to investigate so that even better assistance can be provided to intelligent system
designers in the future.
7-4
f_J
J
J
.f
Appendix A
Points of Contact for the Case Study
Space Shuttle Real-Time Data System
Johnson Space Center
Troy Heindel/NASA
Space Shuttle Guidance, Navigation & Control (GNC) Intelligent Systems
Johnson Space Center
Dave Miller/RSOC
Ron Montgomery/RSOC
Space Shuttle Instrumentation and Communications Officer (INC'O) Expert System Project
Johnson Space Center
Art Rasmussen/MITRE
Space Shuttle KU Band Self Test Expert System
Johnson Space Center
George Pohle/RSOC
Space Shuttle DATA COMM Expert System
Johnson Space Center
George Pohle/RSOC
Space Shuttle Payload Deployment and Retrieval System Decision Support System (DESSY)
Johnson Space Center
Don Culp/RSOC
Dave Mayer/RSOC
Joe Watters/formerly RSOC
Kristen Farry/formerly RSOC
Gordon Johns/MITRE
Mark Gnabasik/MITRE
Mary Czerwinski/formerly LESC
Benjamin Bebemess/LESC
X-29 Remotely Augmented Vehicle Expert Systems (RAVES)
Ames Research Center Dryden Flight Research Facility
Dale Mackall
Dorothea Cohen
Military Aircraft Real-time Interactive Monitoring Systems (RTIMES)
Edwards Air Force Base
Robin Madison
Space Shuttle Onboard Navigation (ONAV) expert system
Johnson Space Center
Lui Wang/NASA
Malise Haynes/NASA
Space Shuttle Rendezvous Expert System
Johnson Space Center
Hal Hiers/NASA
Oscar Olszewski/LESC
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Space Station Procedures Onboard Management System (OMS) Prototypes
Johnson Space Center
Christine Kelly/MITRE
C.Jayne Guyse/M1TRE
Dave Hammen/MI'IRE
Chris Marsh_rI'RE
Space Station Module/Power Management and Distribution (SSM/PMAD)
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
Dave Weeks/NASA
Bryan Wails/NASA
Space Shuttle Knowledge-Based Autonomous Test Engineer (KATE)
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
Jack Galliher/NASA
Carrie Belton/NASA
Barbara Brown/NASA
Steve Beltz/Boeing
Space Shuttle Intelligent Launch Decision Support System (ILDSS)
John F. Kennedy Space Center
Arthur Belier/NASA
H. Greg HadaUer/Boeing
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Appendix B
Disturbance Management
The main target application for this work is fault management where there is some monitored
process (an engineered system) whose state changes over time. Faults disturb the process and
diagnosis goes on in parallel with manual and automatic responses to maintain process
integrity. In fault management the action is swift, the consequences high, and the situation
saturated with uncertain data.
The operator may need to satisfy multiple competitive goals in the face of incomplete and often
contradictory information. There is high pressure to perform efficiently (the need to get
through a certain number of operations each day, or to land a certain number of aircraft per
hour), and omnipresent in the background is the fact that the mission may fail or the plane may
crash. The expert in these worlds is often confronted with resource saturation, especially at
high criticality time periods. The strategies that experts use to cope with these demands is
particularly relevant to those who would design information systems to support their activities.
Expert performance is more than simply following a plan or collection of guidelines. Rather
the expert is one who can adapt plans, bring new plans into being and cancel others as new
events warrant, and maintain several threads of action in different stages of completion. The
critical contribution of people to the person-machine ensemble is adaptability in the face of the
variability and surprise of real, complex situations (Rasmussen, 1986; Woods, 1988). This
adaptability means that experts can handle special cases and exceptions as well as routine cases;
to use efficient reasoning shortcuts but then to switch to more thorough reasoning strategies
when cues indicate that the present case is atypical.
The human operator must track evolving situations loaded with unanticipated and potentially
threatening events. As a result, operators must build and maintain a coherent situation
assessment in a changing environment where multiple factors are at work including one or
more faults, operator interventions and automatic system responses. How do people evaluate
large amounts of potentially relevant and changing data in order to size up a situation in the face
of time pressure? Researchers who examine expertise in situ have noted that practitioners
themselves coin various phrases that describe the ability to maintain this coherent view of
changing situation: in commercial aviation it is referred to as being "ahead of the plane", in
carrier flight operations the expression "having the bubble" is used (Roberts and Rousseau,
1989), in military operations von Clauswitz called it "coup d'oeil" -- the ability to discern
where and when a decisive action can be taken.
Attentional control in the face of multiple interleaved activities and the possibility of
asynchronous and unplanned events is a fundamental part of fault management. Experts need
to be able to manage several threads of activity in parallel, devoting enough attentional resource
at the appropriate time in order to keep each on track. Also at issue here is interrupt handling --
as data changes and new events are noted, how do they or should they modify the current task
or cognitive resource priorities. Understanding action in the face of diverse, changing and
highly uncertain situations depends critically on understanding attentional processes and the
dynamic prioritization of tasks. A critical criterion for the design of the fault management
systems is how they support operator attention focusing, attention switching and dynamic
prioritization.
B.I Cascade of Disturbances and Disturbance Management Cognitive Task
Fault management in dynamic applications has a different character than the stereotype about
diagnostic situations which is based on the exemplar of troubleshooting a broken device which
has been removed from service. In dynamic process applications, fault management incidents
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extend, develop and change over time. A fault disturbs the monitored process and triggers
influences that produce a time dependent set of disturbances (i.e., abnormal conditions where
actual process state deviates from the desired function for the relevant operating context). This
cascade of disturbances unfolds over time due to the development of the fault itself (a leak
growing into a break) and due to functional and physical interconnections within the monitored
process (Woods, 1988; Abbott, 1988).
Figure B- 1 provides an aviation illustration of the cascade of disturbances that can follow from
a fault (adapted from Abbott, 1988). The initiating fault is a failure in the fan subsystem of an
aircraft engine. This fault directly produces an anomaly in one engine parameter, but the fault
also disturbs compressor function which is reflected symptomatically in an anomaly in another
engine parameter. The effect of the fault continues to propagate from the compressor to the
combuster producing anomalies in two more engine parameters. Diagnosis involves
understanding the temporal dynamics of the cascade of disturbances. For example in this case,
the temporal progression is an important clue to understand that the fault is in the fan
subsystem and not in the compressor or the combuster. Note that, because of disturbance
propagation, the same or a similar set of anomalies may eventually result from a fault in a
different subsystem. A critical discriminating difference is the propagation path as the cascade
of disturbances develops over time.
In dynamic fault management, the monitored process is not and usually cannot be removed
from service. This means that the fault manager needs to try to continue to meet the goals of
the monitored process (Woods, 1988). The relative importance of different process goals may
change as the incident evolves and some goals may need to be abandoned if they compete with
more critical goals (mission control activities following the oxygen tank explosion during
Apollo 13 are a good example of this).
Thus, in dynamic, uncertain, and dangerous domains, fault diagnosis occurs as part of a larger
context where the expert practitioner must maintain system integrity by coping with the
consequences of faults (i.e., disturbances) through sating responses in parallel with untangling
the causal chain that underlies these disturbances in order to take corrective responses. The
interaction between these two lines of reasoning and activity defines a major cognitive activity
of human experts in dynamic problem solving situations, what Woods (1988) has cal/ed the
disturbance management cognitive task (figure B-2).
Information processing in fault management is anomaly driven. There are a large number of
data channels and the indications on these channels may be changing (the left side of figure B-
2). The first task of a fault management system (either human alone, machine alone or the
ensemble) is to recognize, out of all the signal states and changes, which represent anomalies --
significant findings about the current and future state of the monitored process. Obviously,
this can be relatively easy when all data channels are quiescent except for one. But faults in the
monitored process produce multiple effects that change over time creating the potential for an
avalanche of changing indications. The task for a fault management system is to recognize, out
of all of the changing indications, which represent anomalies. Note that this is an example of a
potential data overload situation where the critical cognitive activity is filtering the relevant
indications from the irrelevant variations in the disturbed process (Woods, 1991).
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Figure B- 1. Aviation Example of Cascade of Disturbances that can Follow from a Fault
(adapted from Abbott, 1988)
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Figure B-2. Model of Anomaly-driven Information Processing in Disturbance Management
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fThis means that a critical characteristic of a fault management system from a cognitive point of
view, is how it helps segregate the relevant variations from the irrelevant ones. And the critical
constraint on carrying out this cognitive function is the context sensitivity problem -- which
variations are important depends on the state of the process itself and on the state of the
problem solving process. We can term this the alarm handling function of a fault management
system.
There are classic paths that have been used to cope with the alarm handling demands of fault
management. One is to develop a fixed, static priority assignment to individual alarm signals.
Usually, two or three classes of priority are defined and then individual alarm signals are
assigned to one these categories. Presumably, there are only a few high priority alarms that
occur in the same time period and alarms in the lower priority classes do not need to be
processed in order to evaluate the significance of the high priority ones. In other words, the
static priority technique tries to cope with alarm handling demands through a scale reduction
process.
Another classic technique is to develop automated fault diagnosis. The need to handle alarm
information is avoided by simply developing a machine to do the diagnosis via heuristic or
algorithmic computer processing. The automated diagnostic system processes the alarm
information and determines what fault or perhaps what faults are present in the monitored
process. When the system has determined a fault, the human operator is notified of the result.
Now, the fault determination is often softened (in part because of reliability concerns) and
output with an attached "degree of belief" marker, as a ranked list of hypotheses, or as a
recommendation. Nevertheless, all of these approaches attempt to cope with the alarm
handling demands of fault management through a finesse of allocating the task to a machine
rather than supporting the human operator.
We mentioned that fault management information processing is anomaly-driven. In everyday
usage, an anomaly is some kind of deviation from the common order or an exceptional
condition. In other words, an anomaly represents a mismatch between actual state and some
standard. To characterize a fault management system cognitively, one must specify the
different kinds of anomalies that the system can recognize and information processing that is
needed to recognize these classes of events.
One kind of anomaly has to do with departures from desired system function for a given
context, i.e., the monitored process is not performing the way it was designed to perform. It
could be that pressure is supposed to be within a certain range but that it is currently too low.
Let us call this class of anomalies "abnormalities," that is, observed monitored process
behavior is abnormal with respect to the desired system function for a particular context (e.g.,
shutdown versus full power operations).
Another kind of anomaly has to do with process behavior that deviates from the operator's
model of the situation. In this case process behavior deviates from someone (the operator's) or
something's (the intelligent system's) expectations about how the process will behave. The
agent's expectations are derived from some model of the state of the monitored process.
Because we are focusing on dynamic processes, this model refers to the influences acting on
the process -- influences resulting from manual actions, influences resulting from automatic
system activities, or influences resulting from the effects of faults. Anomalous process
behavior that falls into this class we can call "unexpected," that is, observed monitored process
behavior is unexpected with respect to model derived expectations for the particular context.
For example, if you trip a power generation system and there is some kind of cooling reservoir
in the system, then level in that cooling reservoir is going to drop. It always drops when you
shut off the power generation system. Thus, a low level alarm indicates an abnormality with
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respect to the desired system function; however, the alarm is expected given the circumstances.
The operator knows "why" the alarm indication is present (it is an expected consequence of the
influence of the rapid shutdown) and therefore this alarm does not interrupt or change his or
her information processing activities, for example, the operator will not try to "diagnose" the
fault. What would be unexpected would be the absence of this alarm or if the low level
condition persisted longer than is expected given the influence of the trip event. Note that there
can be other kinds of anomalies as well, for example, departures from plans.
Figure B-2 illustrates anomaly driven information processing. Recognition of "abnormal"
process behavior should lead to information processing about how to cope with the indicated
disturbance, for example, sating responses. This, in turn, leads to monitoring lines of
reasoning -- checking to see if coping responses have occurred as expected and whether they
are having the desired effect. Thus, in the above example, the low level alarm should trigger a
line of reasoning to evaluate what coping responses should be initiated to deal with the
abnormality, for example, an automatic makeup system should start up to resupply the
reservoir and a line of reasoning to monitor that the automatic system came on properly and is
restoring level to the desired range. Recognition of "unexpected" process behavior should lead
to diagnostic information processing -- a line of reasoning to generate possible explanations or
"diagnoses" for the observed anomaly and knowledge-driven search to evaluate the adequacy
of those possible explanations. When a diagnosis is reached (a best explanation), it can trigger
a line of reasoning to identify or develop corrective responses.
This model of the cognitive activities in fault management has several implications for the
design of intelligent systems to support fault management. One is that the fault management
support system should help the operator see anomalies in the monitored process. Since
anomalies are defined as mismatches, the fault management support system should help the
operator see what specific mismatch is present. Since there are different kinds of standards for
process behavior, e.g., target values, limit values, automatic system response thresholds,
intelligent system "expectations" (in the case of model based AI systems), indications of an
anomaly should include the standard violated.
Cognitive activities in fault management involve tracking the set of anomalies present in the
process and their temporal inter-relationships. Fault management support systems can help
operators see the dynamics of anomalies and the underlying disturbances in process functions,
especially to see how disturbances grow and subside in the face of sating/corrective responses
(Woods et al., 1986). This information may be very important in the diagnostic process and in
the strategic allocation of cognitive resources either to diagnostic search to identify the source
of the cascade of disturbances or to focus on coping/saf'mg actions to protect important goals.
A fundamental feature of the disturbance management cognitive task is that diagnostic activities
and information are intermingled with manual and automatic responses to cope with the
consequences of faults. How the monitored process responds to these coping/sating actions
provides information for the diagnostic process. In fact, people will often take actions whose
primary purpose is to check out or confirm a hypothesis about the source of the trouble --
diagnostic interventions. It is important for a fault management support system to assist the
human operator untangle the interaction between the influences of fault(s) and the influences of
coping/safmg actions taken by automatic systems or by some of the people involved.
B. 1.1 Alarm Handling Trends in the Case Study
With respect to fault management and with the very notable exception of the Selective
Monitoring system (SELMON), most of the systems surveyed relied on the automated
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diagnosis technique. 1 In other words, the systems used some form of intelligent processing to
automatically determine the fault(s) present in the monitored process and directly presented the
machine's diagnosis to the human operator.
There is a kind of ambivalence in the systems surveyed, however. All of the systems
attempted to provide the human operator with various sources of information about the
monitored process or the intelligent system's processing to help the operator develop their own
assessment. However, the systems generally did not include mechanisms explicitly designed
to assist the operator deal with the data overload problems that can occur during fault
management. Some of the human interface features in some of these systems may even
increase the human operator's data overload problem.
The Selective Monitoring system (SELMON) under development directly addresses the
information handling requirements of fault management and the danger of data overload
(Doyle, Sellers and Atkinson, 1989; Doyle et al., 1990; Fayyad et al., 1990). This work uses
machine intelligence in the cognitive tool style of interaction described in appendix C (figure C-
3). The goal is to intelligently handle data coming from the monitored process to help the
human operator focus on the subset that is significant for the current context (of., also Woods
and Elias, 1988; Woods, 1991).
1 The systems examined in the case study usually contained many functions, only some of which were targeted
at fault management.
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Appendix C
Styles of Collaborative Interaction
What are the different ways that intelligent agents can interact in solving fault management
problems? Figures C-1 through C-3 illustrate three basic styles of interaction between the
human operator and an intelligent fault management system.
Figure C-1 illustrates the intelligent system as advisor architecture. As mentioned earlier, the
first AI consultant systems needed the human to collect data. In aerospace fault management
situations, of course, what happens is that the data on the state of the monitored process is
available automatically to the intelligent system as well as to the human partner. While the
intelligent system can monitor the engineered process directly, note that it cannot take any
action independent of the human in the loop. In this paradigm, the human is the problem
holder in that a person is always the one who has responsibility in these systems (cf., Woods,
1986 for a discussion of authority/responsibility relationships in human-intelligent computer
interaction).
C.I Advisory functions
What makes for a good advisor? There have been a variety, of studies of human-human
advisory interactions which can provide insight into the answer to that question (e.g., Coombs
and Alty, 1981; cf., Woods and Roth, 1988 for a review). Advisory interactions where the
advisor exclusively controls the interaction and then offers a solution for the problem holder are
generally seen as unsatisfactory either in terms of performance (brittleness) or on some other
dimensions (learning). Whereas in successful advisory interactions, there tends to be shared
interaction, aid in identifying important facts, and greater focus on problem definition. This
allows the problem holder to gain some expertise through the advisory process. The results
suggest that good advice is more than recommended solutions. The following are different
types of advisory interactions.
• Substitution or advisor as cognitive prosthesis
The kind of advisory interaction that we normally think of in the context of the typical AI
consultant system we call the substitution or prosthesis approach. In this approach the
human operator is seen as incompetent and the machine advisor substitutes as problem
solver in order to improve performance (Woods et al., 1990). Note that the problem
holder and advisor function as essentially independent problem solvers. However, in
aerospace fault management, as in many other domains, the people in the system are
highly trained, knowledgeable and often possess high levels of expertise themselves.
Note how the substitution style represents a shift in locus of control from the problem
holder to the advisor;, see Woods (1986), Muir (1987), Billings (1990) for discussions of
locus of control, responsibility/authority relationships and trust in human-intelligent
system interaction.
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Figure C-1. Styles of Human-Intelligent System Interaction: Intelligent System as Advisor
and Human as Problem Holder
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Reminding or broadening
In this style the advisor acts to remind the human problem holder of relevant possibilities.
The goal is not to output a possible answer, but rather to aid the human in developing
their solution by ensuring a broad consideration of all possibly relevant factors or
hypotheses or consequences. Performance is aided by (a) including more of the possibly
relevant data in the problem solving process, (b) generating a larger, more thorough, set
of candidate hypotheses that might account for the situation, (c) broadening consideration
of the consequences that might follow from a chosen course of action. This approach
targets several psychological classes of human errors, for example, errors of missing side
effects.
Critiquing
These systems analyze a user's decision, solution or plan of action in order to detect
errors, verify the adequacy of the human's decision, or suggest improvements.
Prototype critiquing systems, or machine critics, have been built for several domains,
predominately medical applications (Langlotz and Shortliffe, 1983; Miller, 1986; Fischer
et al., 1990). Note that the machine critic needs to be able to determine and analyze the
human's decision or plan of action. Thus, it is related to work on user intent inferencing,
user modeling and error detection (Rouse et al., 1987-88; Hollnagel, 1991) in human-
computer interaction and intelligent tutoring.
Teaching
If the advisor is more expert than the problem holder on a particular kind of problem,
then an important advisory function may be teaching. In this case, a good outcome to the
advisory interaction in addition to achieving a better solution to the local problem, would
be for the problem holder to know more about how to handle that kind of situation better
in the future (Gadd and Pople, 1990).
Informational
In this case the advisor may function like a staff member who assists in information
handling. For example, the problem holder is confronted with a multiple failure situation
where the standard plans for handling each individual fault interact negatively. The
advisor as staff assistant may help manage information retrieval collecting the background
documents and analyses that underlie each standard plan to support the adaptive planning
process.
Merging partial overlapping expertise
What may be one the most important characteristics in aerospace advisory interactions is
that frequently the advisor(s) and problem holder possess partial and overlapping
expertise which must be integrated in order to solve the problem at hand (Jackson and
Lefrere, 1984).
C.I.I Formulating and Delivering Advice
Developing a style of interaction between human and intelligent advisor involves design
decisions about how to formulate and deliver advice. One of these dimensions of advisory
interactions has to do with the unit or grain of expression of the advice that should be offered at
a given stage of an evolving incident. Should the system generate highly specific micro-
assessments or micro-responses, or should the advice be formulated in terms of global control
strategies or plans of action leaving the operator some degrees of freedom? Does the advisor
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say"turntheknobtwo turnsto thefight" to compensatefor low pressure in the system or does
the advisor say "turn the heater system on"? A second dimension is when should the advisor
interject during an evolving incident, for example, when does it interrupt the problem solver to
remind him or her of another hypothesis or to critique the problem solver's actions. Third,
should the intelligent system attempt to generate advice under all conditions or only for those
situations where the appropriateness of the advice can be assured?
These design problems can be particularly difficult for tasks that involve continuously changing
dynamic processes. For example, micro-advice about what response to make is antithetical to
the formulation of flexible, adaptive responses that characterizes skilled performance, because
no context or rationale is provided. This form of advice can inhibit the ability of the
practitioner to formulate an adaptive response to an unanticipated situation. Thus, action
oriented advice should be integrated with information about what process state the advice is a
response to (the intelligent system's situation assessment) and with information about what are
the expected effects of this response on the relevant parameters or system states within the
monitored process.
To deal with design problems like the above Woods and Roth (1988; Roth and Woods, 1989)
proposed two concepts for human-advisory.system interaction. One is the concept of severity
dependent variations in the grain of expression of advice. In this approach the intelligent
advisor is designed to be quiescent when the system is relatively stable or normal and to
gradually output stronger and more specific response advice as the situation worsens. In low
exposure regions (exposure refers to the risk of negative consequences), advice takes a
relatively unobtrusive form as broad dynamic targets on major parameters that allows the
operator wide latitude and preserves his or her responsibility to formulate responses, for
example, analog indications of the intelligent system's computation of desired state that can
vary in width as well as in position. As the situation worsens, the advice becomes more
pointed and increasingly restricts the operator's latitude.
This concept of a severity dependent grain of advice is an approach to interfacing machine
advisor and human practitioner that balances several constraants on what is good advice: (a)
deliver advice in those situations where one can generate clearly appropriate information, (b)
but interject advice only when it is needed (which implies an understanding of the current state
and likely future course of the problem solving process and which tends to be an inverse
function of how easy it is to generate advice), and (c) preserve the operator's initiative and
flexibility in responding to situations beyond the capacity of the advisor (cf., Roth et al.,
1987).
Another issue in building advisory systems is the problem of explanation -- how to
communicate to the user why the system has determined that the recommended action is needed
and how the action it suggests will achieve the desired outcome. While the importance of
explanation is generally recognized, advisory systems often fall short in this respect.
Typically, explanation consists of a justification of the machine's decision in the form of a trace
of the detailed process by which the machine generated the advice. One can call this
retrospective explanation -- an explanation for some event (the intelligent system's diagnosis or
suggested corrective action) that has already occurred (Wick and Thompson, 1989).
But notice how the human-in-the-loop must decide when to question the machine's advice and
to call for an explanation. To do this the human problem holder must build and maintain his
own assessment of the world. Frequently in intelligent advisory interactions, the human
problem holder does this independently using whatever interface capabilities are available for
examining the monitored process without help from or building on the cognitive work already
performed by the intelligent system (e.g., Roth et al., 1987). Independent problem solving
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and cross checking is a very weak style of cooperative problem solving for most applications,
especially monitoring and controlling dynamic processes.
Another problem with relying exclusively on retrospective explanation in dynamic fault
management applications is time pressure. The human problem solver must break away from
examining the monitored process to evaluate the soundness of the intelligent system's advice at
exactly the time when there is a failure in the system perhaps requiring sating actions or various
operator cognitive activities (see appendix B on the disturbance management cognitive activity
in dynamic fault management). While the person just begins to evaluate the appropriateness of
the intelligent system's assessment of the situation and its recommendation, the disturbance
chain started by the fault continues to propagate towards various levels of negative
consequences. Experience in the nuclear industry with non-AI diagnostic systems has shown
that such a style of interaction is very likely to fail as a form of cooperative problem solving --
operational personnel devote their attentional and cognitive resources directly to the monitored
process and filter out "interruptions" from the "advisor." Note that the demand for interacting
or communicating with the other team member in cooperative problem solving goes up at the
same time that the difficulty or degree of threat of the problem goes up. This correlation creates
a difficulty whenever the communication bandwidth is low or the cognitive workload of
interaction and interpretation with the agent is high. This interaction is the source of the
phenomenon termed clumsy automation by Earl Wiener (cf., Wiener, 1989 or Cook, Woods
and Howie, 1990 for data on clumsy automation phenomenon in another application).
An alternative approach to explanation is to present advice in the context of the assessment of
current (and future) state of the monitored process in order to create a common frame of
reference for the person and intelligent system (Woods and Roth, 1988). By having access to
the intelligent system's diagnostic search, intermediate conclusions, model-based expectations
and situation assessment, the human problem solver is in a better position to evaluate the
soundness of the advisor's conclusions and recommendations when they are reached. In
contrast to retrospective explanations, "explanation" is integral to the presentation of advice,
rather than a side function that must be explicitly requested.
This, combined with explicit indications of the expected future evolution of the monitored
process (e.g., the expected effects of a recommended response on the relevant parameters or
system states within the monitored process), allows the human practitioner to track the
intelligent system's understanding of the monitored process' evolution and supports the
operator need to understand and track the the evolution of the monitored process. The common
frame of reference concept for explaining the behavior of intelligent machines is designed to
avoid the ubiquitous problems associated with opaque advice (Roth et al., 1987; Suchman,
1987).
An important point to draw from this discussion is that an automated problem solving module
that outputs best diagnosis or recommended actions is only one component of an effective
advisory system. The design of advisory systems requires careful orchestration of state
representation and advisory elements.
C.2 Intelligent Subordinate
Figure C-2 illustrates another major style of interaction between human and intelligent system
where the latter functions as an intelligent subordinate and the former as supervisory controller.
Note that the intelligent system, as compared to the advisory paradigm, has the capability to act
autonomously on the monitored process (to be strict, the subordinate is semi-autonomous).
Figure C-2 is drawn with multiple subordinate and monitored sub-processes to illustrate the
situation in which several subordinates have the capability for autonomous action and where
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Figure C-2. Styles of Human-Intelligent System Interaction: Intelligent System as
Subordinate and Human as Supervisory Controller
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the human supervisor (second order control element) has responsibility over a larger part of the
total monitored process (say, for example, all the power related related systems on the Space
Station rather than just the power distribution system).
This style of interaction is very important in NASA space applications because of the need to
increase system autonomy to reduce the human load in monitoring and managing Space Station
systems as well as other aspects of space missions. But it is important to recognize that the
human will still have the role of supervisor of a set of partially autonomous subordinates each
with local scopes of responsibility.
C.2.1 Scope of Responsibility
Multiple cooperating agents can vary in scopes of responsibility (Roth and Woods, 1988). A
scope of responsibility involves two components: a portion or area of the process where the
agent is responsible for taking actions or supervising control, and a temporal horizon.
The scopes of responsibility of two or more agents can be independent but overlapping so that
there is a coordination requirement. Each agent needs taking into account how events and
changes within his own sphere can affect the processes within the other agent's scope of
responsibility. Similarly, each agent needs to understand and anticipate how events and
changes in the other sphere may affect his own scope of responsibility. Note we assume here
that the cooperating agents have equivalent status.
A supervisor has a larger, encompassing scope of responsibility relative to a set of
subordinates who work within narrower scopes. This entails periodic assessment of
subordinate activities in relation to goal achievement and delegation to the subordinates; these
tasks imply a shifting of the supervisor's attentional focus as events warrant.
Coordination from supervisor to subordinate focuses on delegation. Delegation involves
assignment and removal/termination of delegated tasks either through intervention in
subordinate's activities or manual takeover. Delegation implies that the delegator is actively in
control and knowledgeable at some level about how to carry out tasks or how to achieve goals.
The delegation role implies that the supervisor makes judgments about the capabilities of
subordinates (where "capability" is a long term characteristic of the subordinate (cf., Muir,
1987)) and uses that assessment to decide when and how to delegate, and when to take over or
intervene.
Supervisors exert strategic control. Supervisors coordinate subordinate activities at the
boundaries of subordinate scopes of responsibility or in overlap areas; they need to re-direct
subordinates when circumstances change (i.e. when new events occur or when new stages in
the evolution of a scenario are reached).
Coordination from subordinate to supervisor focuses on when the subordinate should alert the
supervisor to changes/events/trouble within the subordinate's scope of responsibility (see
Norman, 1990; Sheridan, 1988; Billings, 1990 on coordination from subordinate to
supervisor).
C.2.2 Control of Attention
One paradigmatic scenario for supervisor-subordinate interaction is a situation where the
supervisor with his physical and mental resources devoted to some other area of the monitored
process receives or recognizes some indication that there is some trouble in another part of the
monitored process. The issue here is how to give the subordinate the ability to communicate,
"Hey, there's something going on, maybe you want to know about this." This implies a
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consideration of how the supervisor decides when to interrupt his ongoing line of work to
investigate the activity or trouble report (Miyata and Norman, 1986). Note that in the China
Air incident in commercial aviation the machine subordinate (the autopilot) did not tell the
human supervisors or provide any clear indication that it was working harder and harder to
keep the aircraft in the proper attitude until the disturbance (from an engine loss) grew too large
for the capabilities of the subordinate, causing the aircraft to stall (Norman, 1990; Billings,
1990).
The broader scope of supervisory responsibility means that the supervisor cannot examine all
parts of the monitored process within his or her scope simultaneously, at least not in detail.
This raises the problem of alerting/shifting the supervisor's focus of attention; placing the
supervisor in what Sorkin and Woods (1985), call the "alerted monitor" role. This attention
switching process occurs in shifts from normal operations to upset conditions, from one part
of the monitored process to another during abnormal operations, and from one kind of
cognitive activity to another (e.g., interrupting diagnostic search in order to monitor for and
verify expected subordinate responses or to take sating actions).
As part of the alerted monitor role, the supervisor needs to be able to quickly size up what is
going on in the relevant portion of the process and integrate it with the larger context in order to
dynamically prioritize and allocate his or her limited attentional resources (Gopher, in press).
What resources are available to support the supervisor in answering: what kind of trouble is
present? Where is the process headed (and how fast is the situation deteriorating)? What does
the intelligent subordinate think is wrong in the system? What is the intelligent subordinate (or
other autonomous agents) doing to stabilize (sating actions) or treat (corrective actions) the
situation so far? What kind of trouble is present? Does the supervisor need to intervene,
continue his other activities, or monitor the subordinate as it tries to handle the situation? Is the
subordinate outside its range of capability?
Answering these situation assessment questions involves examining the monitored process and
the intelligent system in an integrated fashion, i.e. knowing the state of the process and the
state of control of the process. Do the interface and communication capabilities between the
human supervisor and both the monitored process and the intelligent system support mentally
economical, quick assessments or do they force the person to use slow, effortful deliberative
processing. Another issue is whether the supervisor can trust the subordinate to be able to
handle the situation. This relates to the supervisor's sense of confidence in the subordinate's
competency (i.e. knowing the range of problems it can handle). This judgement is built up
over a longer term pattern of interaction (Muir, 1987). There is data that people form
judgements about the capabilities of automatic systems as they do of other people (Roth and
Woods, 1988); they form judgements about the kinds of situations subordinates can handle on
their own and the kinds of situations that will require take over or intervention because they lie
outside their range of competency.
C.2.3 Clumsy Automation
Clumsy automation refers to the benefits of the automation accruing during workload troughs
and the costs of automation (i.e., additional tasks, forcing the user to adopt new strategies,
new communication burdens, new attentional demands) occurring during periods of peak
workload, high criticality or high tempo operations. (e.g., Wiener, 1989; Cook et al., 1990).
The concept is based on the fact that in complex systems human activity ebbs and flows, with
periods of lower activity, more self paced tasks interspersed with busy high tempo operations
where task performance is more critical (Rochlin, et al., 1987). Machine automation is
designed to shift workload from the human to the machine. But the critical design feature for
well integrated cooperative work between the automation and the human is not some overall or
C-8
JJJ
J
_J
y
time averaged workload reduction, but rather how the automation impacts on low workload
and high workload periods. Clumsy automation is an example of poorly coordinated
cooperative work where the automation helps at times of least need and hinders performance in
situations of greatest need.
There is a growing body of evidence that clumsy automation is a significant danger when new
technology is introduced into many high consequence, complex domains. Quesuonnaire and
interview results of new computer based commercial aircraft avionics ("glass cockpits") and a
protocol analysis study of physician performance with new computer based operating room
devices revealed cases of clumsy automation where the new device actually increased human
workload during peak workload times and decreased it during less demanding periods
(Wiener, 1989; Cook et al., 1990).
C.2.4 New monitoring requirements
In the supervisory control style of interaction the human is removed from direct contact with
the monitored process at least for nominal operations. While the supervisor's control actions
may be reduced, this style of interaction tends to create new monitoring requirements. The
supervisor still needs to know what the subordinate is doing (at some level), and what the state
of control of the process is. Wiener (1989) found that, in reference to the automation, the
most common questions asked by the supervisor (pilot) on highly automated commercial
aircraft are: what is it doing? why is it doing that? what will it do next? The ability of the
person to answer these three questions is the critical test for assessing the interface between the
human and the intelligent system. Again, the theme of visualization is important -- in this case,
visualization of intelligent system assessments/activities.
The supervisor should be able to actively search to assess subordinate activities in relation to
the state of the monitored process rather than only wait for alerts from process or subordinate.
This concept can be called the directed telescope (after van Creveld's, 1985, analysis of
successful organizational problem solving in the military). Information about subordinate
activities in relation to the state of the world should be continuously available rather than
available only as part of retrospective explanation. For example, commercial aviation
flightdecks integrate control information through throttle movements and yoke positions so that
one agent (human pilot or autopilot) can know about the activities of other agents. This
example also shows how the common frame of reference concept for advisor-problem holder
interactions can be extended to supervisory-subordinate interactions.
C.3 Cognitive Tools
There is a third style for the interaction of human and intelligent system -- intelligent system as
a cognitive tool wielded by the human problem solver (cf., Woods, 1986; Roth et al., 1987;
Woods and Roth, 1988; Norman, 1990 for treatments of the cognitive tool approach). The
cognitive tool approach is often overlooked because the AI research agenda tends to focus our
attention on intelligent capabilities as an autonomous machine agent, where human-intelligent
system interaction is like the interaction between two people.
Figure C-3 shows that in the cognitive tool approach the intelligent system is considered as just
another source of data for the human problem solver. The intelligent system's power is applied
to produce better (e.g., processed) information for the human operator (smart displays),
support information management, and help the operator overcome data overload. Instead of
thinking of the intelligent system's output as an "answer" to the problem, the cognitive tool
metaphor suggests that we should think of the intelligent system's output as information for the
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Figure C-3. Styles of Human-intelligent System Interaction: Intelligent System as Cognitive
Tool for Human Problem Solver
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human problem solver, albeit much more processed and potentially more "pointed" (focused on
possible actions) than measured data from the process, but still as information that neexis to be
gathered and integrated with other sources of information about the monitored process to
produce an overall situation assessment.
This point of view helps explain some of the experience to date with developing automated
fault diagnostic systems. Attempts to develop automated diagnostic systems focus on the
intelligent system getting the right answer. However, the complexities of fault management
make this very difficult for all possible circumstances that may arise. But from the point of
view of the human operator, the diagnostic system is but one of many information channels
that he or she must monitor, process and integrate to assess process state and meet process
goals. Very often, the human operator's problem in fault management is coping with data
overload so that attempts to add another information channel -- the diagnostic system -- that is
not integrated with the other available sources of data have foundered by exacerbating the
operator's data overload problem (Woods, 1989).
The cognitive tool approach emphasizes the active role of the person in the system and the
importance helping him or her visualize what is going on in the monitored process and in the
control of the process. This is, of course, is ultimate goal -- improving the management of
faults, the diagnosis of faults and recovering from faults.
In several of the NASA intelligent system development cases examined, the resulting system
functioned as a cognitive tool in the hands of an expert practitioner (Muratore et al., 1990;
Intelligent Launch Decision Support System or ILDSS; Spacecraft Health Automated
Reasoning Prototype or SHARP and potentially the Selective Monitoring system or
SELMON). It was very difficult in these cases to untangle the benefits that accrued from better
visualization of the monitored process, from better information handling capabilities that
avoided data overload problems, and from conceptualization aids that allowed the user search
for and discover patterns in the data. This reflects a general trend to focus more on supporting
human interaction with the monitored process, through the medium of the computer, rather
than just to develop stand alone machine consultants. As a result, the necessary human support
functions become the critical driving force in design, where intelligent data processing becomes
a means for implementing the desired functions (e.g., Woods and Elias, 1988; Doyle et al.,
1990'_.
C.4 Summary: Styles of Human Interaction with Intelligent Systems
All three of the styles of interaction described above point to a common theme. In order to
develop meaningful cooperation between human and intelligent machine, one cannot simply
build a stand alone intelligent system and then decorate it with human-computer interface
features. Integrating human and machine problem solvers into an effective cooperative system
requires serious consideration of the desired coupling between human and intelligent system as
an integral part of the design of intelligent system itself. The concept developed for how the
intelligent system will assist the person can strongly constrain the architecture and design of the
intelligent system itself. When one first develops an autonomous machine problem solver and,
only later, considers how the person will use the system to achieve better performance, the
resulting design often fails to make allowances for features that turn out to be critical for people
to make effective use of the system's capabilities.
The three styles of human interaction with intelligent systems described above are intended as
heuristics to guide our thinking about how to couple human and machine intelligence. A given
intelligent system is very likely to have some characteristics from each of these styles. Each
style is one point of view on effective collaboration and real world success stories probably
will need to use some aspects of each style.
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Description of Fault Management Agent Activities and Information
D.I Fault Management Agent Activities
In section 3.3.1, three types of agent activities were identified:
• Monitoring and Assessment
• Planning and Dynamic Re-Plan
• Intervention and Control
Additionally, Coordination activities were identified for multi-agent systems. These categories
of activities have been used to organize the agent activities required for fault management.
Monitoring and Assessment
• Assess state, status, health, and configuration to determine behavior of monitored
process, related peripheral systems, and the intelligent system
Compare on-going operations to planned activities
This activity requires access to flight procedures and the schedule of crew activities.
Monitor the activities of the fault management team (intelligent system, crew, ground
controllers) for errors and anomalous behavior
Assess the accuracy and applicability of intelligent system conclusions
The human must understand intelligent system conclusions and integrate them with
other information being monitored to make final decisions in fault management
situations.
Distinguish between nominal behavior and anomalous behavior
It is necessary to discern anomalous behavior to identify when faults occur and to
verify that faults have been corrected. Parameters required for assessment of
behavior include state, status, health, configuration, on-going operations, and
indicators of anomalies (e.g., alarms)
Relate anomalous behavior and failures to loss of functional capability and hardware
items
This function requires access to an analysis of fault modes and effects of faults,
design specifications, and functional descriptions.
Relate loss of functional capability to resulting impact to safety or mission goals
Safety and mission impacts due to functional loss are dependent upon the criticality
of the lost capability, the availability of redundant capability, and the ability to
satisfy mandatory flight conditions specified in the flight rules and mission
objectives.
Assess Go/No Go calls based on impacts and remaining capability
Go/No Go calls are status checks of primary monitored systems conducted prior to
a critical activity that has global impact to assess readiness to perform that activity.
These calls are based on an assessment of the current capability to perform the
activity and must consider any impacts introduced by that activity due to functional
losses. The criteria for these calls are outlined in the flight rules.
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Identify possible faults resulting in observed anomalous behavior
To initiate fault diagnosis, candidate faults must be identified for investigation. An
analysis of failure modes and effects, design specifications, and functional
descriptions can be useful in postulating faults. Groups of indistinguishable faults
(i.e., fault ambiguity groups) within these suspected faults should also be
identified.
Assess the reliability and quality of information from both the monitored process and the
intelligent system
The reliability of information is based on an assessment of confidence in source of
the information. The quality of information is related to imperfections in the
information.
Assess the availability of data
Sampled data that are not changing due to loss of the data source (i.e., unavailable
data) should be distinguishable from data that are not changing due to steady-state
or stable conditions (i.e., unchanging but available data).
Planning and Dynamic Re-Plan
Assess potential for a failure to propagate and affect other portions of the monitored
process or associated peripheral systems
Failure propagation potential is considered when evaluating reconfiguration
options. Propagation effects are determined for all suspected faults. This
determination requires an understanding of the causal connectivity within the
affected portion of the monitored process or associated peripheral systems.
Determine re,configuration options or schedule changes to minimize impact of anomalous
behavior
Options for reconfiguration or rescheduling depend upon the ability to continue on-
going operations and conduct planned operations with the remaining functional
capability while minimizing the impacts to mission and meeting safety
requirements. The potential for degradation of capability due to failure propagation
and the criticality of failures must also be considered.
Determine options to reconfigure the intelligent system when in error
Reconfiguration of the intelligent system can include such options as changing the
mode of operation, selective disabling of portions of the knowledge base, loading
of alternate knowledge bases, or a complete reset to initial conditions.
Assess the impact of operator intervention into or take over of either the monitored
process or intelligent system prior to taking action
Safety and mission impacts due to operator intervention into the monitored process
or the intelligent system should be assessed prior to the execution of intervention
actions.
Predict the anomalous behavior associated with a fault
A common method of identifying faults is to postulate a fault and see if the
predicted behavior matches actual behavior of the affected system. An analysis of
failure modes and effects, design specifications, and functional descriptions are
used to determine the behavioral characteristics of the affected systems resulting
from a postulated fault.
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Explore alternatives for reconfiguration and schedule changes after functional loss
Information required to explore reconfiguration and schedule changes includes an
assessment of the remaining capability and its criticality to continued operations and
the impacts of changes on mission goals and objectives.
Explore alternatives for recovery after identification of fault
The criticality of recovering lost capability must be balanced against the impacts and
risks of the recovery process.
Assess recovery options based on identified fault
Once a fault has been identified, the ability to recover from the fault must be
assessed. Malfunction correction procedures execute recovery options and are
selected on the basis of achieving the required functionality to accomplish mission
objectives safely.
Intervention and Control
Control the Intelligent system
Control of the intelligent system refers to such functions as starting and stopping,
restarting from stored state, and playback using recorded data.
Redirect the intelligent system
Redirection of the intelligent system reasoning process can include:
- Correcting intermediate intelligent system solutions
- Postulating likely alternatives and selecting between hypotheses
- Altering information internal to intelligent system processing
- Controlling activation of portions of knowledge base
Control the acquisition of data
Acquisition of data requires execution of data collection software, data recording,
data quality assessment, and entering information unavailable from data collection
software (i.e., operator input).
Command monitored process
Command options include initiating action in the monitored process or altering the
knowledge or data in monitored process. These options can either be exercised by
the crew onboard the vehicle or by command uplink from the ground.
Correct spurious or erroneous information from monitored process
Capabilities to correct information include filtering data, discarding data outside
limits, disabling use of data, or selecting an alternate source of the information.
Simulation can be used to estimate data is not available from any source.
• Initiate scheduled procedures
* Alter scheduled activities in response to fault management activities
Establish alternate modes of operation for both intelligent system and monitored process
The selection of modes of operation will be dependent upon the current activity and
the roles def'med for each member of the fault management team.
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Selectbetweenalternativesolutions for:
- Reconfiguration and schedule changes after functional loss
- Recovery after identification of fault
Takeover of intelligent system responsibility by operator
Two types of takeover are possible. Partial takeover allows the operator to
selectively influence performance of the activity (e.g., enable/disable rule base).
Override is a complete takeover of the activity.
Take over of monitored process (crew command, up/ink)
Take over of the monitored process is accomplished in the same way as
intervention, via crew commanding or command uplink from the ground.
Coordination
Clarify intelligent system actions and conclusions by inspection of relevant information at
intermediate steps of the reasoning process
Relevant information includes internal states, intermediate solutions, alternatives
and hypotheses, and contents of the knowledge base.
Review of algorithms, processes, and reasoning strategies used to compute or derive
information about the intelligent system and the monitored process
These strategies are defined in the design specifications and functional requirements
for the system of interest. Forms that this information could take include
schematics, knowledge representation, and functional diagrams.
Evaluate data trends and system performance for both intelligent system and monitored
process
This evaluation requires access to data archives, performance specifications, and
mission and design constraints for both the intelligent system and the monitored
process. The evaluation should take into account any constraints imposed by the
mission.
° Clarify agent responsibilities and task assignments
Review previous actions of fault management team in the context of current events
This requires access to archived events and actions of the fault management team.
• Synchronization of dependent activities (e.g., wait for a result)
Archival of important information and provision for access to that information at a later
time
Potential uses include re-execution of intelligent system, review of important
information from either intelligent system or monitored process, and identification
of trends.
Manipulation of archived information from both the monitored process and intelligent
system
Manipulation can be as simple as review of information or as complex as
processing data using a simulation or trend analysis program. Reviewing the
results of this manipulation can be accomplished either by viewing the displays
used for real-time support or by providing display formats specific to the
manipulation.
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Alteration of the appearance of the display to meet information needs
The ability to access information available but not currently visible (e.g., review
archived data using special display formats) requires some means of navigating
through the available display formats.
D.2 Fault Management Information
In section 3.2.3, four types of information were identified based on the source of information:
Dynamic Information
Baseline Operations Information
Mission Specific Operations Information
Design knowledge
These types of information have been used to organize the information required for fault
management.
Dynamic Information
Sensed and Processed Data
This is a very large class of information, since it includes much of the telemetry
downlisted from the vehicle and the ground-based trajectory data. This information
includes both raw telemetry (e.g., sensor measurements) and data computed on the
ground (e.g., Space Shuttle COMPS processing).
Time
Time has been distinguished as a separate category of sensed information to
emphasize its function as the reference point for synchronizing information. Each
piece of dynamic information will have an associated timetag. Examples of the
variety of types of timing information include current time, elapsed time, time of an
event, and the ordering of timed events.
System State, Status, and Configuration
State, status, and configuration are required for the primary monitored system,
peripheral systems, including the communications path, and the intelligent system.
State information evaluates the current condition of the system being assessed (e.g.,
Remote Manipulator System (RMS) is DEPLOYED). Information relevant to
intelligent system state includes the intermediate conclusions and alternative
hypotheses and solutions encountered in transitioning between states.
The Status of a system is an evaluation of the health of the system (e.g., a motor on
the RMS Manipulator Positioning Mechanism has failed). Intelligent system status
may not be explicitly stated. A related research issue is the ability for an intelligent
system to describe its limitations and point out when it encounters problems outside
its expertise (Wexelblat, 1989).
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TheConfigurationof a system is an assessment of the system's readiness to
perform a specified task based on the state and status of the system (e.g, RMS
Powerup is complete and RMS is ready for Checkout). The Configuration of the
intelligent system would include such information as the knowledge bases that are
enabled or the model currently employed. Reconfiguration is the process of
changing a system's configuration in response to a new situation. Misconfiguration
is the process of incorrectly altering a system's configuration for a specified task.
Alarms, Anomalies, Faults, and Failures, including suspected faults and fault ambiguity
groups
Anomalies are irregular system behavior or conditions that can be caused by a
variety of influences, including faults, environmental factors, operator error, etc. A
fault is the cause of failure in a system, subsystem, component, or part. A failure is
the inability of a system, subsystem, component, or part to perform its required
function within the specified conditions, (i.e., lost capability) (JSC, January
1989). For example, one anomaly of a Display and Control panel is that a light did
not glow when expected. The resulting failure is the inability of that panel light to
glow and the fault is a burned out light bulb. Alarms are often ranked according to
the severity of the failure that they indicate. For example, alarms indicating
emergencies can be distinguished from alarms indicating that parameter value is
outside expected limits. An example of the alarm ranking used for Space Shuttle
malfunctions is (JSC, June 1990):
class 1: Emergency
class 2: Caution and Warning (C&W)
class 3: Alert from the Major Functions (GNC or Systems Managemen0
class 0: Limit Sense
Alarms do not always translate directly into a fault. Ambiguous faults are faults that
cannot be distinguished using the available symptoms. Misconfigurations and
errors on sensed data can result in alarms that may be misidentified as faults with
the same symptoms. Faults can occur sporadically or inconsistently (i.e.,
intermittent faults) which complicates the fault identification process.
Mission Impacts and Failure Propagation Potential
Failures can result in impacts to crew, vehicle, and mission. These impacts have
implications for the safety of the crew and vehicle and can affect both on-going and
scheduled operations. Failure impacts include not only immediate effects, but the
potential for a failure to propagate (i.e., cause other forms of aberrant behavior)
over time.
Context of On-going Operations
Operational context is the setting or conditions that represent capabilities and
constraints implicit in on-going operations. Examples of common operational
contexts are (1) crew or vehicle activity (e.g., maneuver in progress), (2)
configuration (e.g., RMS ready for checkout), (3) capability (e.g., telemetry
unavailable after Loss Of Signal).
Go/No Go Calls
Go/No Go calls are status checks of all primary monitored systems conducted prior
to a critical activity to assess readiness to perform that activity.
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Functional Capability
Functional capability is the ability to perform the pre-defined functions of a system.
An assessment of functional capability includes both the criticality of the function
and the availability of redundant capability. After a functional loss, the remaining
functional capability is assessed.
Operator Inputs
Operator inputs include commands to the monitored process (e.g, either by crew
keypad entry or grouted uplink), control inputs to the data acquisition system, and
inputs to the intelligent system. The inputs to the intelligent system can include
information unavailable in electronic form (e.g., voice, not on downlist), control
and redirection of the intelligent system, and configuration of the human-computer
interface.
Performance of the monitored process, related peripheral systems (e.g., sensors) and the
intelligent system
Trends in archived data
Archives are analyzed to identify trends in the occurrence of faults and failures of
the monitored processes, sensors, and the intelligent system. Performance trends
are also analyzed.
Dynamic intelligent system information, including:
- State, status, health, and configuration
- Internal states
- Hypotheses and intermediate or alternative solutions
- Activities (previous, current, planned)
Reliability assessment
Archived Information
Archived information is information recorded for later use. Types of data archives
frequently made include:
Telemetry and Trajectory (e.g., Space Shuttle Data Tabs; JSC, October 1983)
Processed information (e.g., output of intelligent system)
Internal state information (e.g., intermediate states and alternatives)
Checkpoint
Actions taken by fault management team
Annotations from fault management team (e.g., operator activity logs)
Hardcopy of displayed information
Mission Specific Information
Mission Goals
The objectives of a planned mission. For Space Shuttle, these objectives are
outlined in the Flight Data File (FDF).
Schedules and Activity Timelines
Time-ordered sequences of activities that were previously scheduled to meet
mission goals. Scheduled activities can be altered during the mission in response to
anomalies. An example from Space Shuttle is the Crew Activity Plan (CAP).
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Mission Constraints
Mission constraints define the range of valid values and the boundary conditions
levied by specific mission requirements (e.g., a unique limit used for limit sensing,
special performance requirements).
Mission Specific Procedures
Mission Specific Procedures are special procedures required to achieve mission
goals and accommodate mission constrmnts.
Mission Configuration
Mission configuration defines the readiness of the monitored process and peripheral
systems to perform mission-specific tasks. Mission configuration includes such
information as values for initialization that are loaded prior to a mission.
Mission Specific Expertise and Experience
Information acquired during training in mission specific simulations and previous
support of similar missions
Baseline Operations Information
Flight Rules
Flight rules document nominal and off-nominal conditions and behavior and
constraints of monitored processes (e.g., the Delta State Update limits specify
conditions for performing an update of the onboard navigation state with the
redundant ground state).
Procedures
Procedures are methods for accomplishing mission goals within the constraints of
flight rules. Procedures encountered during the case study include:
- Nominal activities
- Test and Checkout
- Safing
- Reconfiguration
- Malfunction Diagnosis and Correction
Procedures not only define actions but include the behavior expected to result from
those actions.
Modes of Operation
The monitored process can have modes of operation that define the operating
constraints of the system (e.g., Space Shuttle OPS modes indicate the flight
software load which is unique to the phase of support (e.g., ascent, on-orbit, de-
orbit, entry)). For the intelligent system, modes of operation result from the
defined roles and responsibilities the team members.
Operational Performance Requirements
Performance specifications based on operational requirements.
Failure Signatures
Failure signatures are distinctive patterns of information that uniquely identify a
failure. These patterns are usually recognized as a result of operational experience.
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Operations Expertise and Experience
Information acquired during training in generic simulations (i.e., simulations
independent of a specific mission objective) and during actual flight support. This
expertise can include operator heuristics and unwritten procedures.
Design Knowledge
Monitored System Specifications
The monitored system is specified by functional descriptions (e.g., requirements,
flow charts, algorithms), physical descriptions (e.g., location, connectivity), and
design specifications (e.g., schematics).
Intelligent System Design Specifications
The intelligent system design specifies the reasoning strategies employed, defines
the information contained in the knowledge base, and describes the knowledge
representation.
Design Constraints
Design constraints define the range of valid values and the boundary conditions
resultant from the system design (e.g., design constants).
Design Performance Specifications
Performance specifications based on the design.
Failure Modes and Effects
Failure effects are the effects of failures on functional capability and failure modes
are the resultant operating modes. Both types of information are based on the
design of vehicle systems (i.e., the monitored processes). For Space Shuttle, this
information for hardware systems is captured in the Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) documentation.
Redundancy
The availability of alternate, comparable capability. Redundancy is a typical
approach to risk management in space systems.
Criticality Ratings
Criticality rating classifies hardware items and functional capability by the potential
effect of a failure on the mission and safety. Functional criticality indicates the
effect of the loss of all redundant capability. Hardware criticality indicates the effect
of a hardware failure with available redundancy. For Space Shuttle, Critical Item
Lists (CIL) are constructed that identify the single point failures and redundant
elements with respect to safety and mission (JSC, January 1989).
Design Expertise
Expertise acquired during the design (e.g., design engineers) and implementation
(e.g., implementing contractor) of the monitored process or the intelligent system.
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